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INTRODUCTION 
To accept the necessity for development, one must first ac-
cept one's relative inferiority and inadequacy and the need 
to evolve and advance towards something else. I 
Globalization is said to be the defining convention of the 
new millennium.2 For the Third World, however,3 development is 
the most important concept in the international system, for it is 
development that defines and locates the Third World within the 
, Gustavo Esteva, Development, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY: A GUIDE TO 
KNOWLEDGE AS POWER 6 (Wolfgang Sachs ed., 1992). 
2 See, e.g., GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGES OF THE NEW CENTURY: A 
READER (Patrick O'Meara et at. eds., 2000); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE Mys-
TERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERY-
WHERE ELSE (2000); ANTHONY GIDDENS, Runaway World: How Globalization Is 
Reshaping Our Lives (1999); GLOBAL FORTUNE: THE STUMBLE AND RISE OF 
WORLD CAPITALISM (Ian Vasquez ed., 2000); JOHN EATWELL & LANCE TAYLOR, 
GLOBAL FINANCE AT RISK: THE CASE FOR INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 
(2000); THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999); KEvIN 
BALES, DISPOSABLE PEOPLE: NEW SLAVERY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1999); 
ADAIR TURNER, JUST CAPITAL: THE LIBERAL ECONOMY (2001); NOREENA 
HERTZ. THE SILENT TAKEOVER: GLOBAL CAPITALISM AND THE DEATH OF DE-
MOCRACY (2001). 
J This article will use the terms Third World or Southern nations to identify what is 
commonly referred to as the developing world. The Third World was initially an 
ideological category, and a political strategy connoting nonalignment with either 
the "First" or "Second" World. It also has a "political geographic content" in 
that it describes "certain spaces or regions of the world possessing distinctive 
demographic, economic and political characteristics in comparison with the First 
or Second Worlds." The Third World also identifies those nations and regions 
that were historically subjected to colonialism. Finally, the Third World has been 
defined in terms of a certain set of images including: "poverty, squalor, corrup-
tion, violence, calamities and disasters, irrational local fundamentalism, bad 
smell, garbage, filth, technological 'backwardness: or simply lack of modernity." 
See Keith Aoki, Space Invaders: Critical Geography, the "Third World" in Inter-
national Law and Critical Race Theory, 45 VILL. L. REV. 913.925 (2000) (quoting 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Locating the Third World in Cultural Geography, in 
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES - 1998-99, at 1 (2000». Therefore, while the 
term Third World may be somewhat problematic, it is a more constructive term 
than developing, underdeveloped or undeveloped nations. For a more detailed 
discussion and analysis of the term "Third World," see Karin Mickelson, Rhetoric 
and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Discourse, 16 WIS. INT'L L.J. 
353, 355-62 (1998). 
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international community.4 Whether praised or excoriated, de-
fended or condemned, "development" shapes and dominates 
most thinking about Third World nations.s Indeed, the peoples 
and nations of the world have come to be characterized in terms 
of their development or lack thereof. Development has evolved 
into an essentially incontestable paradigm with such a powerful 
hold on our collective imaginations that it is almost impossible to 
think around it. 
Since the advent of "development" in the early 1950s, Third 
World nations have demanded more meaningful assistance from 
monetarily richer countries and more control over their political 
and economic destinies.Their demands have been largely re-
jected and/or ignored, and the assistance that has been made 
available has been accompanied by countless conditions. These 
conditions have often yielded disastrous results, including ever-
mounting debt for numerous Third World governments and in-
creasing deprivation for the very people the development project 
purports to assist.6 Even when measured in terms of its own 
stated goals and objectives, development has, for the most part, 
failed.7 As "experts" have promulgated widely varying and often 
4 Some argue that globalization is "little more than a repackaging of develop-
ment.'" For example, O'Hearn maintains that after a decade of discipline 
through debt and disinvestments, the neo-liberal regime is even more powerful as 
it now forces developing states themselves to agree that the market is the most 
rational way to do things correctly. Denis O'Hearn, Tigers and Transnational 
Corporations: Pathways from the Periphery?, in CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT THE-
ORY: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A NEW PARADIGM 117 (Ronaldo Munck & Denis 
O'Hearn eds., 1999). 
5 Esteva, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that even when development is disparaged or 
critically appraised, the focus is generally on its ever-changing content or its im-
plementation - never on the concept itself). 
6 For a detailed discussion of the debt crisis in sub-Saharan Africa, see Jon H. Syl-
vester, Impracticability, Mutual Mistake and Related Contractual Bases for Equi-
tably Adjusting the External Debt of Sub-Saharan Africa, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & 
Bus. 258 (1992); see also infra Part II. B and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of World Bank and IMF programs, see infra Part II. A. 
7 Of course this is not to say that each and every development project has been a 
failure. Nonetheless, "[bJy the beginning of the 1990s, most people in sub-
Saharan Africa were poorer than they had been thirty years before. With a popu-
lation of about 500 million, nearly 300 million are living in absolute poverty. In 
developing countries as a whole, nearly 800 million people do not get enough 
food, and about 500 million are chronically malnourished. Almost, one-third of 
the population of developing countries - about 1.3 billion - lives below the pov-
erty line. The infant mortality rate, at about 350 per 100,000 live births, is about 
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contradictory theories and strategies, it has become increasingly 
apparent that they do not in fact know how to achieve the objec-
tives that ostensibly define their expertise.8 
This article does not contend, however, that the experts 
need only devise the appropriate strategy, nor does it simply cri-
tique micro-development, civil participation, market-led develop-
ment, sustainable development, gender and development or 
other current variations in an exceedingly long list of variations 
on the development theme. We do not assert that money is all 
that is needed,9 or that industrialized countries need only assume 
their responsibility to bring civilization to the desperate masses 
of the Third World.IO Rather, we challenge and interrogate the 
very concept of development. Development is a set of practices 
and beliefs that are part of the Western political and cultural im-
agination, despite being presented as universal, natural and inevi-
table. The development paradigm comprises a pervasive and 
largely unquestioned set of interlocking ideological assumptions 
that must be exposed and then questioned. It presumes a univer-
sal and superior way of ordering society, and that all societies are 
nine times higher than that in 'advanced countries.'" Ray Kiely, The Crisis of 
Development, in GLOBALISATION AND THE THIRD WORLD 24 (Ray Kiely & Phil 
Marflect eds., 1998). See also Vma Kothari & Martin Minogue, Critical Perspec-
tives on Development: An Introduction, in DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND PRAC· 
TICE CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 4-5 (Vma Kothari & 
Martin Minogue eds., 2002). 
, See infra Part II. B and accompanying text. 
, Full funding would not necessarily mean that development would ever achieve its 
intended results, although it could mean an improvement in what has been 
termed "basic needs," such as minimal health care, potable water and the like. 
Achieving even these modest goals, however, would not be a certainty, given how 
projects are chosen and funded. See, e.g., William Easterly, The Cartel of Good 
Intentions, 7/1/02 FOREIGN POL'y 4049 (contending that for a variety of reasons, 
large, flashy projects are the projects most often funded, while those that assist 
with simple tasks such as maintaining infrastructure are ignored). 
10 This is not to absolve industrialized countries of their share of blame for the gross 
inequalities in the international community; for the disarray of destroyed socie-
ties and cultures; or for the poverty. violence and degradation that has accompa-
nied the development project. One criticism of the postmodern view of 
development is that it encourages affluent countries to disengage, and does noth-
ing to assist the billion or more people who are living in absolute poverty; that it 
would leave those people to their own devices. David Simon, Development Re-
visited, in DEVELOPMENT AS THEORY AND PRACTICE: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES 
ON DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION 17 (David Simon & An-
ders Niirman eds .. 1999). This is a fair argument that deserves serious attention. 
See infra notes 431-34 and accompanying text for a response to this contention. 
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to advance toward the same goal. Local and indigenous cultures, 
economies, self-concepts, and ways of existing are largely without 
value in this discourse (notwithstanding recent attempts at "local 
participation"), for the entire development project is premised 
on its subjects "developing" into something else - and that some-
thing else is the West. ll Thus, in the name of modernization, cul-
tures have been destroyed, communities uprooted or eradicated, 
and whatever sovereignty emerging nations possessed has virtu-
ally disappearedY 
The concept of development privileges certain societies, cul-
tures and institutions, while disparaging others; it is grounded in 
defining the "Other" as incompetent, inferior and in need of 
transformation. That most "undeveloped" people are people of 
color only reinforces the Western view of the developing world 
as essentially dysfunctional, for it comports with American views 
of brown and black people in the United States. For Europeans 
the development project continues the colonial civilizing mis-
sionY Taking up where colonialism and the "White man's bur-
den" left off, the development project provides the legal and 
moral justification for substantial interventions in the affairs of 
those who have been categorized as underdeveloped.14It justifies 
and supports the economic and political status quo and the im-
balance of international power, and it renders the underdevel-
oped powerless, for it is the developers who name subjects, 
II Majid Rahnema, Towards Post-Development: Searching for Signposts, a New 
Language and New Paradigms, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER 384 (Majid 
Rahnema & Victoria Bawtree eds., 1997) [hereinafter Rahnema. Towards Post-
Development]. 
12 For a discussion of the ways in which development has stripped many Third 
World states of significant aspects of their sovereignty, see infra Part III; see also 
Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. 
J. INT'L L. & POL'y 903 (1997) [hereinafter Gordon, Saving Failed States]. 
13 Saving Failed States, supra note 12. Development confirms and validates racial 
hierarchy, which explains in part why after the disintegration of the USSR, East-
ern Europe and the former Soviet Republics - whether industrialized or not -
were immediately understood to be in a different global category than the devel-
oping Third World. Ruth Gordon, Racing U.S. Foreign Policy, 17 NAT'L BLACK 
L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Gordon, Racing U.S. Foreign Policy]; cf Kothari, supra 
note 7, at 8 (maintaining that "the development project is expansionist and has 
found new territory" for with the triumph of neoliberalism, development has 
broadened its breadth to include the transitional economies of Europe and the 
former Soviet Republics). 
14 Saving Failed States, supra note 12, at 934. 
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problems and solutions. The objective in the following pages is 
to construct and then deconstruct the concept of development, 
and to question whether development is so fundamentally flawed 
that it should be abandoned in favor of a post-development 
paradigm. 
Part I constructs the theory of development, beginning with 
the discovery of global poverty after the Second World War. It 
establishes how poverty is in some respects socially contingent, 
and how the notion of global poverty suddenly homogenized and 
problematized the lives of the majority of the world's peoples. 
With the impending Cold War and the disintegration of colonial 
empires as crucial backdrops, industrialized nations set out to 
eradicate poverty and bring the benefits of modernization to the 
impoverished masses of the newly de-colonizing world, and thus 
development as we now know it was born. From its inception, 
development was informed and shaped by the meta-narrative of 
modernization, which is explored as the primary theoretical 
foundation for the undertakings that were to follow. IS Law and 
development is also analyzed as the legal manifestation of mod-
ernization theory and as an additional theoretical underpinning 
of development. 
Part II explores how development has been constructed in 
practice. It begins with the international financial institutions 
that form the institutional edifice of the development project 
with particular emphasis on the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. It then focuses on the succession of 
often-contradictory economic experiments and development the-
ories that have emanated from these and other institutions. De-
velopment theories have run the gamut as sustainable 
development, micro-development, women-centered develop-
ment, endogenous development, appropriate development, "Ba-
sic Needs," and both state and market-led development have all 
had their days in the sun.16 What began as economic growth to 
15 See infra Part I. C and accompanying text; Kothari, supra note 7, at 7-12. 
16 Some development strategies such as micro-development, participation, and sus-
tainable development began life as "alternative development" strategies, These 
alternative theories have been institutionalized and absorbed into mainstream 
development theory and in the process watered down and stripped of any sem-
blance of their sometimes-radical origins. As reconstituted, they reproduce the 
same power relationships found in conventional development theory and prac-
tice. Moreover, even these "alternative theories" generally originate in the West 
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Over Natural Resources, and then turned to broader demands 
for a New International Economic Order. When these failed, 
Southern nations asserted a Right to Development, seeking to 
incorporate development into the burgeoning rights discourse. 
Reparations are the most recent evolution in the campaign for 
economic justice, as some Third World nations now demand 
compensation for the exploitation and crippling consequences of 
slavery and colonialism. To the extent that these initiatives 
sought to establish legal obligations for the West, they have been 
unsuccessful. As this section demonstrates, international law has 
only reinforced and reproduced the economic and political ineq-
uities present in the international economic system. 
Part IV turns to de constructing the discourse of develop-
ment, demonstrating that it is a method of conceptualizing the 
and are then imposed on the Third World. Kothari, supra note 7, at 9-10. See 
also infra notes 149-59 and accompanying text. 
17 Michael Cowen & Robert Shenton, The Invention of Development, in POWER OF 
DEVELOPMENT 7,28 (Johanthan Crush ed., 1995). 
18 Of course the level of control varies, given that some Third World countries are 
larger, and more politically and economically powerful than others. Thus, this is 
not to suggest that all Third World countries are homogenous or indistinguishable 
from each other. 
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world that, in turn, shapes the world. 19 Although portrayed as a 
neutral and universal concept, development is planned, directed 
and controlled by specific international and national institutions 
that act in ideological concert and reflect the views and interests 
of certain communities, societies and cultures. This ideology cre-
ates and defines the "Other" while providing the legal and moral 
rationale for interventions that locate and cement the Third 
World on the lower rungs of the international system. Develop-
ment is the product of a particular perspective and that perspec-
tive problematizes and homogenizes the majority of humanity. 
Deconstructing this discourse suggests that it is at least possible 
to imagine a post-development world and to perceive the people 
of the Third World in a fresh light. 
Given the failures of development, the power relations it en-
genders, and its generally negative and degrading view of non-
Western peoples and cultures, Part V attempts the very difficult 
task of envisioning a different approach to thinking about the 
world. No new meta-narrative or grandiose strategy to replace 
the development paradigm is proposed, for the aim is to reject, 
rather than substitute, meta-narratives.20 Nor is the objective to 
glorify and resurrect Third World traditions, for tradition is sel-
dom faultless and idyllic.21 Third world peoples have had varied 
and complex encounters with development, and these exper-
iences must not be over-simplified.22 Our objective is to begin to 
envision approaches that accord agency to the people develop-
ment presumes to assist. We hope that these alternative visions 
can somehow give voice to the local, including the voice to em-
brace, transform, reject or otherwise engage the West and the 
entire modernization project. We believe the West must abdicate 
some of the power it has presumed and to begin to re-imagine 
19 ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UN-
MAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD 12-14 (1995)_ 
20 This article takes up the bold challenge posed by Professor Tayyab Mahmud in 
his brilliant article: Postcolonial Imaginaries_' Alternative Development or Alterna-
tives to Development?, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25 (1999), and criti-
cally examines the post development literature. 
21 Kiely, supra note 7, at 24 (criticizing the anti-development critique as romanti-
cizing pre-colonial cultures that may never have existed). 
22 On problems with marginalizing and representing the other, see Uma Kothari, 
Feminist and Postcolonial Challenges to Development, in DEVELOPMENT THEORY 
AND PRACTICE CRITICAL PERSEPCTlVES, supra note 7, at 48-50. 
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the lives and agency of others, and in the process perhaps reject 
often unarticulated but crippling assumptions about "the 
Other. "23 The objective is to pose different questions, to let 
others pose questions, to learn to listen and to actually hear the 
responses of others rather than assuming that the answers are 
already known. 
I. CONSTRUCTING DEVELOPMENT IN THEORY 
A. THE BIRTH OF A PARADIGM 
It is difficult to imagine a world without development, for it 
seems as if development has always been one of the fundamental 
criteria by which nations and peoples are defined. In fact, how-
ever, the contemporary concept of development has a quite short 
history.24 Notions of progress and growth have been part of 
Western discourse for well over a hundred years and, more gen-
erally, since the enlightenment. "Development" as it is currently 
construed (i.e., modernization and national economic growth), 
however, is essentially a post-World War II phenomenon.25 In 
1949, President Harry Truman proposed a "fair deal" aimed at 
improving the lives of people inhabiting the underdeveloped ar-
eas of the globe. In his now famous Point IV Program, he 
declared: 
More than half the people of the world are living in condi-
tions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate, they 
are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and 
23 On constructing "the Other" in opposition to self, see EDWARD W. SAID, ORIEN-
TALISM 1-8 (1994). 
" The origins of development are quite complex, but a unitary meaning seemed to 
congeal around the end of the Second World War. Development came to signify 
indefinite growth, maturity and the capacity to grow without end. This expecta-
tion was based on a number of developmental hypotheses including "the omnipo-
tence of technique, the asymptotic assumption relating to science, the rationality 
of economic mechanisms, and the presumption of social engineering as a prereq-
uisite for growth." Michael Watts, "A New Deal in Emotions": Theory and Prac-
tice and the Crisis of Development, in POWER OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 17, at 
44,49-50. 
25 For an extensive discussion of the concept of development before 1949, see 
Cowen & Shenton, supra note 17, at 27; Watts, supra note 24, at 44. The mandate 
system and later the trusteeship system were also precursors of development. Id. 
See also Saving Failed States, supra note 12, at 940-53, on the mandate and trus-
teeship systems. 
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stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to 
them and to more prosperous areas.26 
Truman's declaration profoundly changed the manner in 
which the people of what would eventually become the Third 
World were viewed. In a sense, he created the "underdeveloped 
world,"27 and in the West this new perception of self and "the 
other" found immediate acceptance.28 "Billions of diverse and 
complex peoples were suddenly identified, homogenized and de-
fined as backward, miserable victims" who would be rescued by 
the West.29 This perspective continues to define the development 
project. 
Truman also proposed that the industrialized world should 
undertake to alleviate the newfound poverty in the underdevel-
oped world, but this call to action was a self-interested one on 
the part of the United States. Many American policy makers 
thought that if poor countries were not liberated from their pov-
erty, they would be vulnerable to "communist subversion".30 
26 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 3. 
27 Truman's plan facilitated the establishment of numerous "international institu-
tions, professions, organizations whose existence was dedicated to development. 
Development was industrialized." Watts. supra note 24, at 44-45. 
28 Esteva, supra note 1. at 10. Indeed, "as a neocolonial discipline, the authoritative 
discourse of development reproduces unequal relations by assuming the power to 
label groups of people. . in development we have constructed an entity called 
the Third World." KOTHARI, supra note 22, at 38. 
29 Esteva, supra note 1, at 9. 
30 In 1956, John Foster Dulles stated that defeat in the contest for development of 
the underdeveloped countries "could be as disastrous as defeat in the arms race." 
CHRONICLE OF THE 20TH CENTURY 776 (Clifton Daniel ed., 1992). Indeed, the 
introduction to a development economics textbook used in the U.S. in the early 
1960s made the point rather bluntly: "the Cold War is not going very well for the 
Western World. Soviet or Chinese influence is infiltrating into many of the un-
derdeveloped countries, in Asia, Africa, and Latin America." 11 STEPHEN ENKE, 
ECONOMICS FOR DEVELOPMENT (1963), quoted in 1 DEVESH KAPUR, THE 
WORLD BANK: ITs FIRST HALF CENTURY 144 n. 10 (Brookings Institute 1997). 
The World Bank was pressed into service to address this problem. See also infra 
notes 94-95 and accompanying text discussing how the Cold War helped shaped 
World Bank policies. See also ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 34; Pierre de Senar-
dens, How the United Nations Promotes Development Through Technical Assis-
tance, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER, supra note 11, at 190 (Noting that 
just as the Marshall Plan was to contain the communist threat in Europe, eco-
nomic aid became part of American political strategy. The Cold War thus 
animated and colored the development project, as anti-communist credentials be-
came a condition for assistance.). 
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Consequently, bringing "progress" to the Third World was an in-
tegral part of the struggle against the Soviet Union and interna-
tional communism.3! The development paradigm also originated 
within the context of collapsing colonial empires and a global 
economy dominated by the United States.32 As a result, the U.S. 
had a profound influence on the funding, objectives and ap-
proaches of the international financial institutions established at 
the end of the Second World War. These institutions - mainly 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund - are at 
the center of development theory and practiceY Completing this 
scenario were Western beliefs in the ultimate superiority of West-
ern culture, values and people, and the explicit and implicit ra-
cism that often persuaded the United States and former colonial 
powers that they had the right to intervene in politically weaker, 
poorer and darker countries. Development provided the legal 
and political means, as well the moral justification for interven-
tions that under other circumstances would probably have been 
considered impermissible.34 
B. THE DISCOVERY AND QUANTIFICATION OF 
GLOBAL POVERTY 
If President Truman discovered global poverty, then the 
World Bank quantified it in 1948 by defining countries with an 
annual per capita income below $100 as poor. Two-thirds of the 
world's peoples were instantly impoverished.35 Once annual per 
capita income was the gauge, the discernment of global poverty 
31 Senarciens, supra note 30. 
32 "At the end of the Second World War, the United States controlled approxi-
mately 70% of the world's gold and foreign exchange reserves and 40% of indus-
trial output." Kiely, supra note 7, at 26. 
33 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 32 (noting that "1945 marked a profound transforma-
tion in world affairs" as the United States assumed the "undisputable position of 
economic and military preeminence, placing under its tutelage the entire Western 
system"). 
" ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 28; Gordon, Racing U.S. Foreign Policy, supra note 
13, at 1. 
35 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 23-24; Majid Rahnema, Poverty, in THE DEVELOP. 
MENT DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 161. 
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became "a comparative statistical operation,"36 and entire na-
tions were regarded as poor because of their overall income.3? 
"Poor countries" came to be defined as those lacking the "wealth 
of more economically advantaged nations,"38 and because indus-
trialized countries were the points of reference, the gap was enor-
mous.39 Eradicating global poverty, as well as the expanding 
disparity between industrialized and unindustrialized countries, 
became an important challenge facing the international commu-
nity.40 Of course, it is entirely plausible to maintain that Presi-
dent Truman and the World Bank were only stating the obvious, 
and articulating the willingness of the United States to lead West-
ern countries in tackling a very real problem. It can also be ar-
gued, however, that in certain significant respects poverty itself is 
a social construct, and in some senses an invention.41 While most 
definitions of poverty emphasize a lack of something or some de-
ficiency, such definitions only demonstrate the basic relativity of 
the concept, for if poverty is defined as lacking the necessities of 
life, it must be asked what is necessary, and who is to determine 
necessities.42 In the end, this question was answered by defining 
36 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 23 (quoting Wolfgang Sachs, The Archaeology of the 
Development Idea, 23(4) INTERCULTURE 1-37 (1990». The origins of standard of 
living and the projection of global poverty are relatively new constructs that are 
"encased in development plans, foreign aid reports and national accounts data 
building in part on the Keynesian revolution." Watts, supra note 24, at 51. 
37 Rahnema, supra note 35, at 161. 
38 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 23. 
39 Senarclens, supra note 30. 
40 Id. During the decades following the Second World War and throughout the 
decolonization era, the idea of "convergence" - that the gap between the rich and 
the poor would shrink - dominated thinking about development. There clearly 
has been no such convergence and the entire idea appears to have been dis-
carded. See generally Lant G. Pritchett, Forget Convergence: Divergence, Past, 
Present, and Future, 33 FIN. & DEV. 2 (1996); Jeffrey Williamson, Globalization, 
Convergence, and History, 56 J. ECON. RIST. 277 (1996). For example, during the 
last two decades, China and India have experienced faster income growth than 
the world's rich countries. Nonetheless, it would require another 100 years of 
growth at rates higher than those of the U.S., for China and India to reach today's 
level of average income in the U.S. Nancy Birdsall, Life is Unfair: Inequality in 
the World, 98 FOREIGN POL'y 76 (1998). 
41 Rahnema, supra note 35, at 158 (detailing the many ways in which a variety of 
cultures define and perceive poverty). 
42 Id. at 159. See also Ivan Illich, Needs, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY, supra 
note 1, at 88. 
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necessity in reference to the West; Third World nations and peo-
ples were found to be sorely lacking. 
Once problematized, poverty became the defining character-
istic of the Third World, and the "agreed" solution was economic 
growth and development.43 Indeed, the Third World increasingly 
became part of a "system of thought and practice where particu-
lar interventions to eradicate poverty became central to the 
world order."44 While traditional responses to poverty were 
based on "the pluralistic, culturally established and holistic per-
ceptions of each particular space, post-war programs of action 
represented a universalistic, one-track, income-based and cultur-
ally lacking recipe for abstract solutions. "45 The perception of a 
global economy that would save the world's poor "reinforced 
and legitimized pauperizing economic and political systems," and 
led the victims of these systems to view their particular situation 
in the same terms.46 As more people came to trust that poverty 
could be eradicated through adopting (and, more recently, in-
tegratng into) a "modern economy," the search for modes of life 
and social organization based on simplicity, or on voluntary or 
moral forms of poverty were devalued and discredited. "47 
People now identified as impoverished may have viewed 
themselves and their place within their respective communities 
quite differently before the advent of "development,"48 as most 
societies had found ways of "defining and treating poverty that 
43 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 24. 
44 This assumption justified the basic tenets of intervention: poverty was too global 
and delicate a matter to taken out of the hands of professionals and institutions 
that were trained and empowered for this purpose; programs had to be charted in 
terms of economic resources and needs; and the agents that would be primarily 
responsible for designing and executing such strategies would be governments 
and other institutions. Rahnema, supra note 35, at 164. Professor Rahnema ex-
plains that anti-poverty programs claim to be based on an assessment of needs, 
but that within the global context, needs are identified in an abstract manner. [d. 
4) [d. 
46 [d. at 163. Thus impoverished wage earners focused their struggles on limited 
objectives such as raising income. Labor unions were utilized while informal and 
formal community organizations that had traditionally assisted the poor were dis-
regarded and ignored. [d. 
47 [d. 
48 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 24. 
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accommodated visions of community, frugality and sufficiency."49 
Professor Nanda Shrestha, writing of "becoming a development 
category," describes one such different vision.50 Without roman-
ticizing the pre-development period, Professor Shrestha paints a 
complex picture of his village, his family and his life in 1940s Ne-
pal. He begins by describing life in Nepal before "development," 
where his family was extremely poor by World Bank standards. 
Nonetheless, neither his family nor others in the village thought 
that people were lesser beings because of their poverty. This is 
not to say that life was idyllic and indeed he notes elements of a 
type of caste system, which he does not defend. Yet, Professor 
Shrestha also observes a sense of responsibility and a community 
that protected even the very poor, such as his family, from utter 
destitution. 
While most traditional societies rejected the idea that pov-
erty necessarily reflected personal inadequacy, this belief was a 
major component of the new international value system.51 
Within this new paradigm, economic poverty was perceived and 
acted upon as a disgrace and a scourge,sz Accordingly, with de-
velopment, the poverty experienced by Professor Shrestha and 
his family became a problem to be solved, and development ex-
perts were thought to have the solution. All that the Nepalese 
brought to the table was summarily discarded by those who as-
sumed that the culture, knowledge, wisdom, insight and judg-
ment that Nepalese villagers brought to their own lives and 
existence was for the most part worthless. In some ways the vil-
lagers came to believe this of themselves, as the Nepalese began 
to want to be like the developers. In the end, development plans 
and strategies did not actually lessen poverty, but they did dimin-
ish self-sufficiency and a sense of community, as functions that 
49 Rahnema, supra note 35, at 163; Illich, supra note 42, at 88. 
50 Nanda Shrestha, Becoming a Development Category, in POWER OF DEVELOP. 
MENT, supra note 17, at 266. Except where noted. this account of life in Nepal 
before and after development is from this fascinating chapter by Professor 
Shrestha. 
51 Rahnema, supra note 35, at 163. 
52 [d. 
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were formerly the collective responsibility of the community 
were now left to the developers.53 
The purpose of this account is not to romanticize poverty or 
to champion non-Western societies per se, nor is it to suggest that 
societies and cultures are fixed and impervious to change. It is 
also understood that there are concrete aspects to poverty; that 
poverty and want are not entirely socially constructed. It is only 
to suggest that people existed and lived before the West came to 
their rescue, and they may have devised a variety of internal 
mechanisms to deal with those who had less, even if those mech-
anisms were imperfect.54 The possible value of such indigenous 
knowledge was not even considered as the Western concept of 
development was deployed. Poverty was the singular factor by 
which the development project categorized peoples that were ac-
tually distinct, varied and in many instances quite self-sufficient. 
As poverty became their defining characteristic, development be-
came the obvious solution, to be pursued by following the path of 
the West toward the goal of modernization. 
C. THE META-NARRATIVE OF MODERNIZATION 
The road to development is littered with discarded models 
and philosophies, but at the heart of all development theories is 
the belief that the Third World should follow in the footsteps of 
the West.55 Development began as a quest for "modernity,"56 and 
53 Shrestha. supra note 50, at 266. Professor Shrestha notes how a road that had 
fallen into disrepair would have been mended through the collective efforts of the 
village in the pre-development world. This sense of collective action disappeared 
with the advent of development, as everyone waited for the developers to fix it. 
54 Ted Lewellen, Deconstructing Development: Toward an Anthropological Defini-
tion of a Value-Laden Concept, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Anthropological Association at Washington, DC (Nov. 1997) ( noting that "many 
currently 'underdeveloped' regions of the world were developing quite well 
before their cultures were crushed or shifted in entirely new directions by West-
ern expansion since the 16th Century"). 
55 See, e.g., Ziauddin Sardar, Development and the Locations of Eurocentrism, in 
CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY, supra note 4, at 53; see also Richard Cam-
eron Blake, The World Bank's Draft Comprehensive Development Framework 
and the Micro-Paradigm of Law and Development, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. 
L.J. 159, 166 (2000) (stating "as developing countries created 'economic, political, 
and social institutions similar to those in the West,' economic development would 
inevitably result"); Aoki, supra note 3, at 927-28. 
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while development's history is complex, the modernization pro-
ject has consistently been at its core.57 Modernization has been 
defined as "the process by which a society comes to be character-
ized by a belief in the rational and scientific control of man's 
physical and social environment and the application of technol-
ogy to that end."58 All societies purportedly pass through distinct 
phases at they modernize.59 The Rostow blueprint, for example, 
mandated five stages, the first being traditional society, which 
possessed limited science, technology and output per person; the 
second, where modern science leads to increased production in 
agriculture and industry; and the third "take-off" stage where ob-
stacles to growth are transcended, new technology becomes pre-
dominant and growth becomes self-generating. More refined 
and complex processes mark the last two phases, as original in-
dustries are eclipsed and societies finally reach the level of high 
mass consumption. All societies are believed to traverse this par-
ticular path - that is, the progression is fixed and uni-linear.60 
Early theorists could not agree on how modernization would ac-
tually occur,61 although they did agree that it was essential to ap-
proximate the characteristics of the nations that comprised the 
,6 OZAY MEHMET, WESTERNIZING THE THIRD WORLD: THE EUROCENTRICITY OF 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THEORIES 60 (2d ed. 1995) (noting traditional socie-
ties were viewed as exercising little control over their environment, as "lacking 
the traits of modern persons, and as devoid of political consciousness or active 
involvement in shaping their future.") 
" Kothari & Minogue, supra note 7, at 7. Professors Kothari and Minougue con-
tend that successive development theories have simply been reformulations of 
modernization theory. which they posit as the mega theory of development. Id. 
at 7-8. 
58 Sardar, supra note 55, at 52. 
59 JAMES MITTELMAN & MUSTAPHA KAMAL PASHA, OUT FROM UNDERDEVELOP-
MENT REVISITED: CHANGING GLOBAL STRUCTURES AND THE REMAKING OF THE 
THIRD WORLD 38 (1997). 
60 Id. (paraphrasing W.W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-
COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (1960». 
61 In the early years, all parties seemed to focus on increasing foreign aid from in-
dustrialized countries. See GABE S. VARGES, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC ORDER LEGAL DEBATE 3-4, 29 (1983). Adeoye Akinsanya & Arthur 
Davies, Third World Quest for a New International Economic Order: an Over-
view, 33 INT'L L.Q. 208, 209 (1984) (Noting that "for the developing nations, the 
realization of their economic backwardness and lack of progress in combating it 
led them, at first, to press for more foreign aid from the industrial countries." 
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industrialized Western world.62 It was therefore assumed that 
tradition was an impediment to modernization, and Third World 
countries were encouraged to abandon their traditional lifestyles, 
beliefs and value systems in favor of "modern" Western norms 
and values.63 
The modernization discourse has had an enormous impact, 
and has persisted for several reasons including its compatibility 
with dominant neoclassical economic theories, as well as its sim-
plicity and purported universality. Perhaps another part of its 
appeal is its apparent optimism, for it represents a belief in "pro-
gress."64 During the United Nations proclaimed "Development 
The United Nations proclaimed the 1960s the "Development Decade" and an-
nounced, "less developed countries were to be assisted in achieving five percent 
annual growth in aggregate national income through expanded international 
trade and an annual flow of international assistance and capital. "). 
62 MrITELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at 39; Sardar, supra note 55, at 52 (Noting 
one early indicator of modernization was urbanization, despite the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of the populations of the newly independent countries 
were based in rural areas. Other indicators included literacy and voting. Based 
on these indicators, the only road to modernization was industrialization.). 
6.1 Sardar, supra note 55, at 52. Professor Mittelman and Pasha illustrate the impact 
modernization theories can have by recounting the experiences of farmers in a 
district in Tanzania. In this district, land is in short supply and most farmers inter-
plant bananas (the staple food) and coffee, because they do not have enough 
acreage to plant them separately. The government's agricultural extension of-
ficers, however, advised them to plant coffee separately because bananas draw 
nitrogen and water from the soil and shade the coffee crop. This advice is based 
on experiments performed in laboratories and benefits only a minority of wealth-
ier landowners who have enough land to segregate the crops and cultivate land 
under conditions similar to those in the lab. Larger landowners are also likely to 
mingle with government experts, which facilitate the kind of communication that 
leads to the adoption of such changes. Peasants resist the proposed innovations 
because they are useless or harmful to them. Government officers then regard 
the peasants as traditional, meaning irresponsible, stupid and lazy. The Moderni-
zation hypothesis is then invoked to justify supporting the agents of change and 
to legitimize coercing those now termed traditional peasants. MI1TELMAN & P A-
SHA, supra note 59, at 39. 
M For a critique of progress, see Jose Maria Sbert, Progress, in THE DEVELOPMENT 
DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 192; Vincent Tucker, The Myth of Development: A 
Critique of a Eurocentric Discourse, in CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY, supra 
note 4, at 4-5 (Noting that progress as a concept became pre-eminent during the 
French and English revolutions, as both nations set out to change the world and 
the manner in which it was perceived. This worldview eventually came to be 
perceived as self-evident and universally valid. The rights of man (albeit not all 
men or any women) were championed, science appeared to be capable of captur-
ing nature and it was a period of exploration and experimentation. The new mis-
sion was modernity for the entire world and progress came to be fashioned in 
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Decade" of the 1960s, however, modernization produced only 
minimal improvements in the material conditions of life in the 
Third World. Eventually, initial modernization strategies were 
declared failures.65 Notwithstanding this inauspicious beginning, 
however, modernization theory remains the meta-narrative that 
informs all other development narratives. Modernization contin-
ues to enjoy the unflagging support of major international finan-
cial institutions and other key national and international 
organizations that devise development strategies and allocate de-
velopment resources.66 It is also a key component of "law and 
development" theory which, through multiple incarnations, has 
been the consistent companion of modernization.67 
D. LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
Western legal scholars entered the development discourse 
through an offshoot of modernization theory known as law and 
development.68 While modernization theorists equated Western-
ization and development, law and development theorists focused 
on the Westernization of Third World legal systems as a key pre-
requisite to, and catalyst for, development. Both theories shared 
the underlying premise that the Westernization of Third World 
countries was essential for - indeed, was the essence of - devel-
opment.69 Law and development theorists supposed that adopt-
ing Western legal systems would facilitate development by 
evolutionary terms. It is forgotten or omitted, however, that a belief in "pro-
gress" also justified colonialism and imperialism, and has "legitimized" genocide, 
slavery, and a host of other atrocities.). 
65 See V ARGES, supra note 61, at 29. 
66 DEVELOPMENT AS THEORY AND PRACfICE, supra note 10, at 271; Kothari & Mi-
nogue, supra note 7, at 8. See infra notes 112-228 and accompanying text for an 
extended discussion of these institutions and their role in the development 
project. 
67 Undoubtedly, the relationship of law to development has been an ever-present 
but contested theme. See discussion infra Part V for Third World efforts to use 
law as a tool for achieving and consolidating international political and economic. 
68 Modernization theory arose following WWII and was supported primarily by 
American scholars. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development 
Studies, 89 AM. 1. INT'L L. 470, 471 (1995) (reviewing 2 LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
(Anthony Carty ed., 1992); LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD (Sammy 
Adelman & Abdul Paliwala eds., 1993». 
69 [d. at 471 (stating that "[t]he law and development movement adopted the basic 
tenets of modernization theory, adhering to the notion that evolutionary progress 
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providing the necessary elements for a functioning market sys-
tem.70 Westernizing the legal infrastructure of Third World coun-
tries was expected to create neutral, more accessible and more 
responsive government institutions.71 Benefits would include in-
creased equality, freedom and participation, and these would in 
turn foster improved material standards of living.72 These bene-
fits would then "trickle down" to the poorest of the poor.73 
Despite its strong and promising start, the law and develop-
ment movement that began in the early 1960s lasted little more 
than a decade.74 Perhaps the most significant factor in its demise 
would ultimately result in legal ideals and institutions similar to those in the 
West"). 
70 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections 
on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. 
REV. 1062, 107l. Its earliest proponents placed "extreme reliance on law as an 
agent of modernization and progress predicated on a study of the ideal types of 
law and administration that could facilitate progress." Lakshman Marasinghe, 
Law and Development: A Jurisprudence for the Developing World, 8 DEV. Ex. 
PRESS 1. 2 (1998/1999). 
71 Professor Tamanaha has summarized the law and development paradigm as 
follows: 
1) society is made up of individuals who consent to the state for their own 
welfare; 2) the state exercises control over individuals through law, and it is 
constrained by law; 3) laws are designed to achieve social purposes and do 
not offer a special advantage to any individual or groups within the society; 
4) laws are applied equally to all citizens; 5) courts are the primary legal 
institution with the responsibility for defining and applying the law; 6) ad-
judication is based upon a comprehensive body of authoritative rules and 
doctrines, and judicial decisions are not subject to outside influence; and 7) 
legal actors follow the restraining rules and most of the population has in-
ternalized the law, and where there are violations of the rules enforcement 
action will guarantee conformity 
Tamanaha, supra note 68, at 473 (paraphrasing Trubek, supra note 70, at 1071). 
72 Trubek, supra note 70, at 1073. Development was assumed to involve an increase 
in man's rational capacity to control the world, and thus in his ability to improve 
his material well being. But "development" offered more than increased ration-
ality and material satisfaction; it also promised greater equality, enhanced free-
dom, and fuller participation in the community. As an ideal, therefore, 
"development" held the promise of a life that would be richer in all ways for all 
Third World people. 
73 Blake, supra note 55, at 167. 
74 Several factors contributed to the movement's abrupt demise, including a sharp 
drop in funding by both the public and private sectors in the United States. The 
U.S. Agency for International Development and the Ford Foundation, for exam-
ple, were major funding sources for academic and fieldwork in law and develop-
ment; their financial support declined sharply in the early mid-1970s. Some 
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was the rupture of the coalition that had given the movement the 
appearance of unanimity. Western academics and practitioners 
who were the initial proponents of law and development had en-
joyed an initially positive reception from Third World leaders 
and elites - many of whom were Western educated.75 By the 
early 1970s, however, many political leaders and intellectuals in 
the Third World had turned to dependency theory and other rad-
ical analyses of their circumstances, and were demanding a New 
International Economic Order.76 In this context, law and devel-
opment was widely denounced as "reflect[ing] the ideological he-
gemony of Western capitalism and the dominant economic forces 
of contemporary imperialism .... [and] as inadequate to explain 
development or underdevelopment .. .''71 Moreover, although 
the American experience was thought to exemplify the success of 
law and development, many observers expressed "doubt that the 
model accurately describe[d] legal life even in the United 
States. "78 
Long after widespread reports of the movement's demise, 
however, the core premises of law and development continue to 
inform most Western thinking (both popular and official) about 
observers believe this policy change reflected popular disillusionment and a gen-
eral loss of faith in government and the viability of overseas interventions - re-
sulting significantly from the Viet Nam war and Watergate. See Maxwell O. 
Chibundu, Law in Development: On Tapping, Gourding and Serving Palm-Wine. 
29 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 167, 169 (1997). 
7; [d. 
76 Francis G. Snyder, Law and Development in the Light of Dependency Theory, 14 
LAW & SOC'y REV. 723.727-28 (1980) (Discussing the two ways scholars reacted 
to the lack of success of these philosophies. Some argued that their failure "was 
the inevitable consequence of the transition to capitalist development. .. The 
other elaborated a radical critique, suggesting that capitalist development in the 
periphery would not reproduce the historical capitalist path ... The first approach 
is still followed by the majority of development practitioners."). 
77 [d. at 731; see also Aoki, supra note 3, at 928. 
78 Trubek, supra note 70. at 1081. Critics of the movement also observed that "the 
development equation contain[ed) a heavy social element. for which law is not 
the complete answer." Marasinghe, supra note 70, at 2. Of course, moderniza-
tion has continually reappeared in different guises. See supra notes 67-69 and 
accompanying text. 
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development.79 Indeed, with economic globalization as its bat-
tering ram, the law and development movement recast and reas-
serted itself in the 1990s as "marketization" and 
"democratization. "80 The current reincarnation of the law and 
development movement is known as the "good governance" 
agenda, which has been critiqued as "an uneasy combination of 
two main objectives: on the one hand, a project limiting the 
power of the state in the economy while simultaneously ex-
panding the role of the market, and on the other, establishing 
liberal democracy as a counterpart to structural adjustment or 
neoliberal economic reform."81 Capital exporting countries and 
the international financial institutions they control are actively 
79 For example. the intersection of law and economic development in the Third 
World continues to generate significant attention - as evidenced by a 1992 book 
with precisely that title. The book was edited by P. Ebow Bondzi-Simpson who, 
in the opening chapter, asserts that: 
Law may be used to promote development as an institutional enterprise, 
providing a framework for procedures to be adopted, mechanisms for the 
settlement of disputes and/or agencies to monitor or review programs 
taken in pursuit of development. As a normative device, law may provide 
a catalog of substantive rights, obligations and entitlements. In either re-
spect, law may be used to promote desired action or to curb or regulate 
undesired actions or consequences. 
P. Ebow Bondzi-Simpson, Confronting the Dilemmas of Development Through 
Law, in THE LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 6 (P. 
Ebow Bondzi-Simpson ed., 1992). 
80 Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy and Ethnicity: Toward a NewParadigm for 
Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1, 14-15 (1998) (noting that the over-
whelming majority of development literature still "urge[s] the rapid and full-
blown liberalization and marketization of developing world economies"); id. at 
17-18 (listing the many organizations that follow an agenda which promotes 
marketization and democratization). Professor Maxwell Chuibundu notes: 
Now that the globe seems to be marching to one drum beat, that of the free 
enterprise capitalist system, it follows that the legal institutions and prac-
tices that have fostered and sustained the triumph of the capitalist mode of 
production, accumulation, distribution, and consumption are best suited for 
other societies, appropriately modified at the margins to account for the 
peculiar foibles of those societies. 
Chibundu, supra note 74, at 222. 
81 James Thuo Gathii, Retelling Good Governance Narratives on Africa's Economic 
and Political Predicaments: Continuities and Discontinuities in Legal Outcomes 
Between Markets and States, 45 VILL. L. REV. 971, 1000 (2000). 
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promoting the good governance agenda.82 Like the moderniza-
tion paradigm that is at its core, law and development continues 
to thrive, albeit in a new form. 
Thus, as the first half of the Twentieth Century came to a 
close, a new entity was emerging in the international community, 
the underdeveloped world. Once it was discovered and then de-
fined as poor and pre-modern, the foundation was in place for its 
development. As the second half of the 20th century progressed, 
"development" became the stated objective of virtually every 
country in what became the Third World. New nations differed 
on the question of how best to achieve development, but they 
unanimously agreed that development was their goaP3 Interna-
tional institutions, in turn, propounded a variety of mechanisms 
to assist newly sovereign entities as they moved in the expected 
linear fashion towards the promised goal of being developed. 
Part II turns to the development institutions and the practices 
they propounded. 
II. CONSTRUCTING DEVELOPMENT IN PRACTICE 
A. THE INSTITUTIONAL EDIFICE 
The International Monetary Fund (the IMP) and the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World 
Bank) have come to exercise a profound influence on the econo-
mies of most Third World countries.84 Indeed, International Fi-
nancial Institutions (IFIs) virtually control the policy-making 
82 In a 1989 report the World Bank identified bad government (including poor poli-
cies, incompetence and corruption) as the primary obstacle to economic develop-
ment in sub-Saharan Africa. See WORLD BANK, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FROM 
CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH: A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE STUDY (1989) . 
•.• Chibundu, supra note 74, at 190-91. 
.. Mary C. Tsai, Globalization and Conditionality: Two Sides of the Sovereignty 
Coin, 31 LAW & POL'y INT'L Bus. 1317 (2000); Anthony Galano III, International 
Monetary Fund Response to the Brazilian Debt Crisis: Whether the Effects of Con-
ditionality Have Undermined Brazil's National Sovereignty?, 6 PACE INT'L L. 
REV. 323 (1994); JACQUES J. POLAK & CATHERINE GWIN, THE WORLD BANK 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: A CHANGING RELATIONSHIP 
(1994). International Financial Institutions or IFIs increasingly embrace an ever-
widening array of governmental functions, such as judicial and public service re-
organization, government auditing functions, and labor and environmental con-
cerns. See Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, 
International Financial Institutions, and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & 
POL. 243, 266 (2000) [hereinafter Anghie, Time Present and Time Past] (noting 
Vol. 22, No. 1 Deconstructing Development 23 
processes of some debtor countries.85 When they were estab-
lished at the end of World War II,86 however, the World Bank 
was to assist in rebuilding post War Europe and the IMF was to 
monitor and regulate the international monetary system. Their 
evolution into institutions whose primary focus is the Third 
World is a crucial aspect of the evolving paradigm of 
development. 87 
1. The World Bank 
When the World Bank was founded at the end of World War 
II, its assigned priority was rebuilding Europe.88 In 1947, how-
ever, just three years after the Bank's creation, the United States 
World Bank interference in any activity that involves development); see also 
James Thuo Gathii, Good Governance as a Counter-Insurgency Agenda to Oppo-
sitional and Transformative Social Projects in International Law, 5 BUFF. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 107 (1999) [hereinafter Gathii, Good Governance]. 
85 One means is through "conditionality" - the IFI practice of making loans condi-
tional on policy and/or structural changes by the borrowing state. Conditionality 
allows the World Bank and the IMF to restrict credit if a country's fails to comply 
with the terms of its lending agreement. Tsai, supra note 84; POLAK & GWIN, 
supra note 84. See infra notes 169-203 (detailing Structural Adjustment programs 
during the 1980s) and accompanying text. 
86 The World Bank and the IMF are also known as the Bretton Woods institutions, 
because they were formed at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July 1944. The 
two organizations have similar governance structures, operating according to a 
weighted voting system that is based on contributions made by members. The 
broad legal framework for the two institutions is also similar, with emphasis on an 
ostensibly non-political character. See Anghie, supra note 84, at 269; Gathii, 
Good Governance, supra note 84, at 225. 
f<7 Cf Balakrishnan Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, So-
cial Movements, and the Expansion of International Institutions, 41 HARV. INT'L 
L.J. 529, 530 (2000) [hereinafter Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal]. Profes-
sor Rajagopal rejects the prevailing "functionalist" conception of international 
institutions. He notes that the functionalist "theory explains the emergence of 
international institutions as a result of a pragmatic necessity to serve concrete 
functions. The central proposition of this theory is that institutions are born 
and expand due to top-down policy decisions that correlate with the functional 
needs of international society." Not coincidentally, this top-down conception is 
consistent with the perceived "hegemonic nature of international law as an elitist 
discipline. " 
88 Section I of Article I of IBRD's Articles of Agreement states that the Bank is: 
To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members 
by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purpose, including 
the restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconver-
sion of productive facilities to peacetime needs and the encouragement of 
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embarked on the Marshall Plan and took over most of the fi-
nancing for the reconstruction of Europe. With its role in Eu-
rope eclipsed,89 the Bank was left to pursue its secondary charge: 
"the development of productive facilities and resources in less 
developed countries."90 But even this function, as originally con-
templated, bears little resemblance to the Bank's contemporary 
role in the Third World. The World Bank was intended to act as 
an intermediary between prospective borrowers and prospective 
investors, meaning it was to play the traditional role of a private, 
commercial bank - except that its depositors and borrowers 
would be member states.91 Under the terms of its Articles of 
Agreement, the Bank was to make loans based exclusively on 
"considerations of economy and efficiency;"92 it was expressly 
prohibited from entertaining "political or other non-economic in-
fluences or considerations. "93 
The Bank's evolution into an Institution that touches on al-
most all aspects of the economic, social and political lives of its 
borrowers has much to do with how development itself has 
evolved over the last fifty years and with other factors such as the 
post World War II struggle between capitalism and communism, 
a struggle within which the World Bank was a critical weapon.94 
the development of productive facilities and resources in less developed 
countries. 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement, 
art. I, §1, 60 Stat. 1440, 16 U.S.T. 1942, as amended (1945), available at http://web. 
worldbank.orgIWBSITE/EXTERNALlEXTABOUTUS/0"contentMDK:200495 
57-menuPK:63000601-pagePK:34542-piPK:36600-theSitePK:29708,00.html 
(last visited on Feb. 22, 2004). 
89 John D. Ciorciari, A Prospective Enlargement of the Roles of the Bretton Woods 
Financial Institutions in International Peace Operations, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 
292, 298-99 (1998). 
90 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement, 
supra note 88, at art. I, § 1. 
91 See Ciorciari, supra note 89, at 298-99; Dominique Carreau, Why Not Merge the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) with the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (World Bank)?, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1989, 1991 (1994). 
92 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement, 
supra note 88, at art. III, § 5(b). 
93/d. 
94 Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87, at 438 ("Indeed, it was 
commonplace in development thinking in the late 1950s and early 1960s that poor 
countries would succumb to Communism if they were not rescued from poverty." 
Initially the Bank employed direct "project lending" to support anti-communist 
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With the establishment of the Inter-American Development 
Bank in 1961, the shift began towards linking the extension of 
credit to the implementation of reforms.95 This opened the door 
to broader interventions in the political and social affairs of bor-
rowing nations.96 The Bank eventually began insisting on inter-
nal changes as a condition of receiving assistance. As the Bank's 
role in devising and carrying out both the practical and theoreti-
cal elements of development has persistently expanded and 
regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America. For example, Nicaragua, whose rul-
ing Samoza family was cooperating closely with the U.S. military, received 10 
World Bank loans between 1951 and 1960. Guatemala, however, with three times 
Nicaragua's population, received no World Bank support until the overthrow of 
its supposedly communist regime in 1955. Loans were used to build dams, high-
ways and other infra-structure projects that would facilitate economic growth. As 
these projects failed to achieve their intended results, however, it became appar-
ent that securing the allegiance of Third World regimes - particularly oppressive 
ones - would not necessarily pacify the populations who were subject to those 
regimes, and thus there might be a need for direct programs to alleviate poverty. 
In other words, preventing communist subversion in the Third World was going 
to require programs to alleviate poverty within Third World countries, and this 
was not being accomplished by the World Bank's project-based lending in sup-
port of infrastructure; the required shift in policy began at the regional level.) 
95 In 1959, U.S. President Eisenhower explained the establishment of the Inter-
American Development Bank as follows: 
Traditional unilateral aid was sustaining a prevailing social order, which 
was unjust to the masses of the people, but we could do nothing directly 
about this without violating the policy of non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of other nations. The creation of the new bank changed this, for 
now the Americas had a multinational instrument, secure against control 
by anyone country, for bettering the life of people throughout the Ameri-
cas; if this instrument insisted upon social reform as a condition of ex-
tending development credit, it could scarcely be charged with 
"intervention. " 
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, WAGING PEACE, 1956-61: THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS 
516 (1965), quoted in 1 DEVESH KAPUR, supra note 30, at at 155. Thus was estab-
lished the regional mechanism for development assistance conditioned on specific 
internal reforms by the country receiving the assistance. 
% The establishment of the IDA was the most significant institutional factor in the 
World Bank's shift away from project-lending based on traditional financial crite-
ria and toward investing in "human capital" and poverty reduction programs in 
the Third World. It was the model for multilateral institutions that would have 
the credibility to insist on internal changes without charging individual nations 
with violating the international principle of non-intervention in the internal af-
fairs of states. The same mechanism and rationale were implemented without the 
regional limitation when the International Development Association (IDA) was 
established as a part of the World Bank in 1961. Rajagopal, From Resistance to 
Renewal, supra note 87, at 552. 
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grown, its position in the affairs of its Third World members ex-
panded in tandem, and steadily and consistently grew ever 
broader and deeper.97 
2. The Evolving IMP Role in the Third World 
The International Monetary Fund was initially founded to 
stabilize the international monetary system and promote interna-
tional trade,98 by supervising international currency exchange 
rates and making short-term loans to member states when neces-
sary to meet balance of payments difficulties.99 Many factors 
contributed to the subsequent transformation of the IMF's role 
into a lender to Third World countries, but perhaps the most im-
portant was the 1971 U.S. decision to "float" the dollarYlO This 
determination caused such significant changes in the interna-
tional monetary system that the IMF was eventually reduced to 
monitoring exchange rates rather than setting them.101 Still, most 
IMF activity was directed toward industrialized nations until the 
oil crisis in the early 1970s. Newly established Euro-Markets 
were flooded with so-called "petro dollars, "102 and these markets 
'JI See infra notes 112-228 and accompanying text for discussion of the "cycles of 
conventional wisdom." 
98 The principal task originally assigned to the IMF was "to promote international 
monetary cooperation" and "to give confidence to members by making the 
Fund's resources temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards." Ar-
ticles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. I(i), I(v), 60 Stat. 
1401,29 U.S.T. 2203, as amended (1945), available at http://www.imf.org/external/ 
pubs/ft/aa/aa.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2003) [hereinafter IMF Articles of Agree-
ment]; see also Enrique R. Carrasco, Income Distribution and the Bretton Woods 
Institutions: Promoting an Enabling Environment for Social Development, 6 
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1996); Daniel D. Bradlow, The World 
Bank, the IMP, and Human Rights, 6 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 
(1996); Stephen Anthony, IMF Structural Adjustment Programs: An Economic 
Evaluation,3 GEO. PUBLIC POL'y REV. 133 (1998). 
99 Carreau, supra note 91 (Noting that in essence, the IMF's member states agreed 
to relinquish some of their sovereignty over their national monetary systems in 
exchange for short-term assistance when needed, and for the stability the IMF 
would bring to the international monetary system. The IMF's normative powers 
thus depended on the cooperation of its member states.). 
100 Id. (also noting that this decision may have been in violation of the par value 
system established in the IMF Articles of Agreement). 
101 Id. 
1Il2 Bradlow, supra note 98, at 47. 
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usurped most of the IMP's role as a lender to credit-worthy in-
dustrialized states who could now avoid IMP conditions.103 As 
credit-worthy borrowers sought loans elsewhere, the IMF found 
itself lending almost exclusively to Third World countries.104 In-
deed, since the second amendment of its Articles of Agreement 
in 1978, the IMP has become primarily a lender to the Third 
World. !Os This new role was cemented by the debt crises of the 
1980s, as the IMP assumed increasing control over the economies 
of states that had no alternative sources of outside financing. 
The Third World debt crisis in the 1980s also led the IMF and 
World Bank to effectively consolidate their policies toward the 
Third World.106 
103 Carreau, supra note 91 (noting that IMF lending has always been conditional; 
borrowers are required to adopt stabilization plans and to correct the types of 
imbalances that were thought to have figured significantly in precipitating World 
War II). 
104 Professor Carre au observes: 
Gradually and involuntarily, the IMF has lost its influence over its most 
developed member states, which remain bound by very limited monetary 
obligations since the collapse of the par value system in 1971 and which 
have abstained from turning to the IMF for assistance.. because of the 
conditions imposed. 
Carreau, supra note 91, at 1997. 
105 Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87, at 570. 
106 For example, the IMF now recognizes economic growth as an objective - even 
though economic growth was not one of its original purposes and is still not men-
tioned in the IMF's Articles of Agreement. JACQUES J. POLAK, 184 THE CHANG-
ING NATURE OF IMF CONDITIONALITY, ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, at 
1,17 (1991). It defines desirable economic growth as "high quality growth rather 
than flash in the pan growth fueled by inflation and excessive borrowing, or 
growth at the expense of the poor, of the environment, or growth run by the 
state." IMF Managing Director Michael Camdessus, quoted in id., at 19. This 
model of economic growth is quite compatible with the World Bank's theory of 
economic development. Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87, 
at 573. Professor Carre au notes: 
The IMF's role seems limited to controlling the economies of member 
states requesting financial assistance, namely developing countries and for-
mer command economy countries that have no alternative sources of 
outside financing. . . Its assistance, originally limited to financing short-
term difficulties, has been completely modified to address long-term, struc-
tural imbalances. And this is precisely the World Bank's mission. 
Carreau, supra note 91, at 1997-98. 
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IFI performance as "the apparatus of management and con-
trol of social reality in the Third World"\o7 has provoked an in-
tense barrage of criticism, 108 ranging from liberal critics who 
generally accept the goals and objectives of IFls but perceive 
problems in implementation,109 to those embracing a more radical 
perspective, who view IFls as tools of the industrialized north in 
their continuing exploitation of the South. l1° Others reject both 
critiques. l1l What is certain, however, is the decisive and ever-
107 Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87, at 541. 
1M Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, To Lend or Not To Lend: Oil, Human Rights, and the 
World Bank's Internal Contradictions, 14 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 197 (2001). 
109 Liberal critics generally accept the candor and validity of IFI goals of alleviating 
poverty and improving standards of living in the Third World. See Operational 
Directive 4.15: Poverty Reduction (1992), THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL 
MANUAL 2 (1992) (stating that "sustainable poverty reduction is the Bank's over-
arching objective"); Policy Development and Review Department, The Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) - Operational Issues, International Mone-
tary Fund, at http://www.imf.org/externallnp/pdr/prsp/poverty2.htm (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2004) (proclaiming "poverty reduction efforts among low-income mem-
bers a key and more explicit element of a renewed growth-oriented economic 
strategy" of the IMF). In their view, the problem is ineffective strategies and/or 
improper implementation by IFIs themselves and/or by Third World govern-
ments. Some liberal critics also allege that IFIs are "out of touch" because they 
are Western-dominated and unrepresentative. See, e.g., Oscar Shachter, The 
Evolving Law of International Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 
(1976). 
110 Critics embracing a more radical perspective contend that IFIs are in place pri-
marily to maintain the international economic status quo, and to enable the coun-
tries of the industrialized North to continue exploiting the countries of the South. 
See, e.g., Saving Failed States, supra note 12; David Greenberg, Law and Develop-
ment in Light of Dependency Theory, 3 RES. IN L. & Soc. 129, 152 (1980); James 
Thuo Gathii, Africa's Economic and Political Predicaments, 45 VILL. L. REV. 971, 
1002 [hereinafter Gathii, Africa Predicaments]; Gathii, Good Governance, supra 
note 84, at 224 (relating the hierarchical nature of the international order and 
demonstrating that decisions to undertake national economic management have 
been taken out of the hands of developing countries through structural adjust-
ment programs that are required for the continuance of foreign aid). Critics also 
point out that eighty percent of U.S. aid to Africa, for example, is spent on Amer-
ican commodities, expertise, and subcontractors; only twenty percent of the 
money ever leaves the U.S. It is also noteworthy that in 1989, the Bank em-
ployed 80,000 consultants on Africa with only one percent of them being African, 
meaning the other ninety-nine percent come from outside the continent. Emesto 
Hernandez-Cata, Remark, Panel Three: The Role of Multi-Lateral Institutions in 
African Development, 30 LAW & POL'y INT'L Bus. 708,711 (1999). 
111 For example, Professor Balakrishnan Rajagopal contends that hoth the liberal 
and radical critiques are useful but flawed. He believe~ that the liberal critique 
(1) fails to acknowledge that IFI interventions in the Third World often worsen 
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expanding position of these institutions in the "cycles of conven-
tion wisdom" that make up the ensuing narrative of 
development. 
B. CYCLES OF CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ll2 
The concept of development is "riddled with paradoxes, and 
few theories are more bedeviled by contested hypotheses.''113 
Development has taken many shapes and forms since the 1950s, 
when economic growth was its sole objective. In the 1960s, pov-
erty alleviation and distributional equity were added as objec-
tives. "Basic Needs" emerged in the 1970s, and the cultural 
dimension took its place beside economic development and more 
circumstances by exacerbating class divisions that are already too broad, and (2) 
is inadequate to explain not only the general failure of IFI poverty reduction 
programs, but also the widespread popular resistance to those programs in the 
Third World. He believes the radical critique, on the other hand, oversimplifies 
complex and differing relationships, leads to "policy paralysis," and fails to ex-
plain the continuing participation of legions of intelligent and genuinely well-in-
tentioned individuals in "development work." Professor Rajagopal suggests an 
alternative analysis that differs from the liberal and radical critiques. He main-
tains that just as the Third World is defined by the concept of development, IFis 
are defined by their mission, and the development project has become that mis-
sion. He continues: 
IFIs have had a complex relationship with Third World resistance ... .it is 
the process by which [IFIs] have dealt with that resistance, and not so much 
the resistance itself, that have revealed the centrality of the resistance to 
the formation of the [IFIs'] changing institutional agendas .... This ... is 
hardly acknowledged by the [IFIs], who see their evolution as being gov-
erned purely by the laws of economics, finance, or their Articles of Agree-
ment. It matters less that poverty alleviation programs never alleviate 
poverty or that conditionalities never achieve their stated goals. Rather, 
these specific interventions ... redound to the authority and expansion of 
international institutions. 
Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87, at 576. 
112 The phrase "cycles of conventional wisdom" is borrowed from an article by 
economist Paul Krugman that discusses the myriad models of development 
promulgated by development specialists and how these models were developed. 
He concludes that development specialists are a closed insular group that does 
not rely upon proven methods or past experience, and appear unable to 
accomplish modernization. Paul Krugman, Cycles of Conventional Wisdom in 
Eocnomic Development, 72 INT'L AFFAIRS 717, 717 (1996). 
113 Kothari & Minogue, supra note 7, at 1. Definitions of "development" abound. 
Professor Simon asserts that these definitions are "contextual and contingent 
upon the ideological, epistemological or methodological orientation of their pur-
veyors, and there has never been a consensus or unanimity about the meaning or 
content of development." Simon, supra note 10, at 17. 
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emphasis was placed on self-relianceY4 The 1980s brought gen-
der issues and environmentalism as prominent themes. liS By the 
1990s, globalization had become the focal point. 116 While the fol-
lowing account attempts to break these and many other permuta-
tions into discrete time frames, there is considerabe overlap. 
Theories and practices sometimes evolved slowly; sometimes 
seemed to disappear, only to reappear in a different form; and 
sometimes gave way to polar opposite strategies. This brief ac-
count can only sketch how development has evolved and been 
transformed and adjusted over the last fifty years, as developers 
tried and failed to "better humankind through the alleviation of 
poverty and the realization of human potential. "117 
1. The "Golden Age" of Development: 1950-1970118 
The 20-year period from 1950 to 1970 has been labeled the 
"golden age" of development.1I9 The development project was in 
its infancy, but the clear "expert" consensus was that insufficient 
income was the key problem facing Third World countries, and 
114 Autonomous decision-making and implementation by both nations and peoples 
were emphasized. Sardar, supra note 55. See also Rosemary McGee, Participat-
ing in Development, in DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND PRACTICE CRITICAL PER-
SPECTIVES, supra note 7, at 92. 
11; Finite resources and the fragility of the global environment were additional fac-
tors to be considered and taken into account. Sardar, supra note 55, at 53. This 
followed on the heals of the Stockholm Conference on the Environment in 1972 
and was popularized. by such publications as WORLD COMMISSION ON EMPLOY. 
MENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987). 
116 "Liberalization" and "open markets" have become the driving force of develop-
ment. Sardar, supra note 55. 
117 Cowen & Shenton, supra note 17, at 27. 
liB The so-called "golden age of development" overlapped with the beginning of 
what would be a series of United Nations Development Decades. Pursuant to a 
request by President John F. Kennedy, the General Assembly of the United 
Nations unanimously approved Resolution 1710, which declared the first 
Development Decade in 1961. The goal was to attain, "in each under-developed 
country a substantial increase in the rate of growth, with each country setting its 
own target, taking as the objective a minimum annual rate of growth of aggregate 
national income of 5 percent at the end of the Decade." G.A. Res. 1710, U.N, 
GAOR, 16th Sess., 1084th plen. mtg., at 17, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961); DUSAN 
DJONOVICH, 1 RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, UNITED 
NATIONS RESOLUTIONS (1972). In some respects, these resolutions reflect the 
failures of development, the hopes of Third World nations, and convey the 
progression of development in theory and practice. 
IIY MEHMET, supra note 56, at 63. 
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economic growth was the solution. 120 The prevailing orthodoxy 
postulated that national economic management would maximize 
growth and employment; accordingly, the state was to orches-
trate development through the use of macroeconomic policy 
tools.121Early development theory relied heavily on "state-led 
developmentalism."122 National governments were to adopt poli-
cies that stimulated growth.123 The standard approach to eco-
nomic development involved highly abstract plans, economic 
model building and parastatal agencies.124 Capital investment to 
build infrastructure, industrialize and to generally modernize so-
cieties was thought to be the most important ingredient in eco-
nomic growth.125 Therefore, the World Bank extended project-
based loans to build dams, highways and other infrastructure 
projects.126 Technology was also a critical component and given 
120 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 24 (stating development theory was strongly influ-
enced by the neo-Keynesian consensus that dominated economic thinking and 
practice in the post-War period); Paul Cammack, Neoliberalism. the World Bank 
and the New Politics of Development, in DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND PRACTICE, 
supra note 7, at 157, 161 (noting that it was assumed that states could and should 
intervene directly in production and distribution, making development an active, 
state-led process). 
121 Cammack, supra note 120, at 157, 161; MEHMET, supra note 56, at 60. 
122 MEHMET, supra note 56, at 96. This is quite ironic given the contemporary near-
religious devotion to the free market. 
123 Cammack, supra note 120, at 157, 161; MEHMET, supra note 56, at 60, 
124 MEHMET, supra note 56, at 96. Planners did not consider how countries would 
administer these ambitious plans; indeed institution building was ignored and 
Western planners utilized a "how to do" approach. Id. 
12\ Because underdeveloped countries were believed to be "trapped in a vicious cir-
cle of poverty and thus lacking capital, it would therefore have to come from 
abroad." ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 40. 
126 "Project lending" was aimed primarily at developing infrastructure; it was in-
tended to facilitate business by cultivating the factors necessary for economic 
growth. Bank officials believed it was crucial to construct electric power plants 
and roads because industry could not be developed without electricity and the 
means to transport finished products. Thus in the absence of this kind of infra-
structure, most economic activiti_s would be difficult if not impossible. For ex-
ample, good roads were necessary because no investor would want to invest in a 
country if its products could not be transported. Sandra Blanco, Symposium: Part 
One: Pursuing the Good Life: The Meaning of Development as It Relates to the 
World Bank and the IMF, 9 TRANSNAT'L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 110 (1999). 
Consequently, the Bank mainly financed dams, highways, and other large-scale 
infrastructure projects. Tsai, supra note 84. 
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the lack of capital to purchase it, technical assistance became es-
sential.127 As technology was introduced, Third World social and 
cultural factors were ignored because Western developers be-
lieved technology was culturally neutral and invariably benefi-
cial. 128 Historical, institutional and economic realities were 
generally disregarded in the early days of the development 
proj ect.129 
Very few of the early plans for economic growth led to mea-
surable successes, and it became apparent that the gains that 
were achieved would not automatically benefit the most needy 
citizens within target countriesYo The "trickle down" theory, 
which postulated that economic growth would necessarily shrink 
the gap between the rich and the poor, proved to be untrue.l3l 
As optimism regarding economic growth began to wane, \32 Third 
World leaders began demanding permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources133 and a school of thought known as "depen-
dency theory" emerged offering a radical critique of mainstream 
economics. 134 Meanwhile, the Cold War between capitalism and 
communism had become the dominant factor in global politics 
127 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 36 (noting that technology not only "amplified mate-
rial progress, [but] would confer ... a sense of direction and significance"; it was 
the key to modernization and indeed the transfer of technology became an im-
portant component of the development project). 
128 Id. 
129 MEHMET, supra note 56, at 96. Institutional efficiency, indigenous history and 
culture and critical issues such as land reform were not part of the planning pro-
cess; plans were generally derived in a vacuum. Id. 
1)0 Blanco, supra note 126, at 11I. 
1)1 Id. 
132 Esteva, supra note 1, at 13. 
m See discussion infra Part III. A. 
1)4 The mUltiplying failures of the development project and other events supported 
the dependency critique. For example, when internal forces extended state con-
trol over the economy through nationalizations, and sought to give workers and 
farmers more of a share in national wealth, private investors would flee and for-
eign loans would be denied. This financial strangulation sometimes led to mili-
tary coups and military incursions into the political process. The repetition of this 
course of events fueled radical intellectuals who emphasized the impact of impe-
rialism, which used political, military and economic dominance to control produc-
tion in foreign nations. They also emphasized the impact of external forces from 
the economies of the "center" on the economies of the "periphery", and focused 
on domination and subordination in general, and specifically on the effects of 
imperialism and colonialism. MITIELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at 44-45. 
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and the primary consideration in U.S. policy toward the Third 
World. 135 
The perception grew that more coordination by interna-
tional institutions would be needed to execute what was becom-
ing the ever more complex undertaking of development. 136 Thus, 
as the 1960s progressed (perhaps foreshadowing the contempo-
rary idea of "comprehensive development"), developmentalism 
became more wide-ranging. 137 Third World governments began 
to establish social programs that would more directly address 
poverty, by improving housing, education, health, energy and 
transportation.138 The World Bank began to support projects in 
these areas, as well projects focusing on population control, nu-
trition and urban development. 139 This represented a significant 
change in Bank policy, as the Bank moved beyond lending funds 
for profit-oriented projects towards funding social projects in-
volving non-economic policy choices.14o Development had begun 
its expansion beyond economic growth. 
2. The Second Phase: Integrating Social and 
Economic Elements 
By the early 1970's, the World Bank focused its resources 
and policies exclusively on the Third World.141 What has been 
called the "second era of development"142 was characterized by 
IJl See discussion infra Part II.A. 
136 ESCOBAR. supra note 19, at 40. 
m Senarclens, supra note 30. 
138 Blanco, supra note 126, at 111. 
139 Carreau, supra note 91, at 1999. 
140 This was also arguably a violation of its Articles of Agreement. The World Bank 
Articles of Agreement provide that the World Bank's lending policy is to be dic· 
tated by purely financial considerations. meaning its funds can be lent only on 
projects that are reasonably expected to generate sufficient funds t9 repay the 
loan. Although it was believed these projects would contribute to the overall 
development of member States, these projects could not be viewed as profit-ori-
ented. Indeed, many of these projects did not generate any income whatsoever. 
Thus, the Bank increased its financial exposure, and borrowing members had to 
utilize already limited foreign exchange resources to repay the Bank. Not sur-
prisingly, the Bank began to face defaults. Carreau. supra note 91, at 1999. 
141 Jennifer N. Weidner, World Bank Study, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193 (2001). 
142 In 1970, the UN General Assembly declared the beginning of a Second Develop-
ment Decade (1971-1981) that called for a more equitable distribution of income 
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escalating efforts to integrate social considerations into the pur-
suit of economic goals. 1431t was conceded that the development 
strategies then in place would not eliminate hunger and poverty, 
and "Basic Needs" became the new maxim within the develop-
ment community.l44 Rather than focusing on the infrastructure 
and mega-projects that had previously dominated development 
strategies and funding, the "Basic Needs" approach proposed 
that poverty be dealt with by focusing directly on food, clothing, 
shelter, education and employment.145 Moreover, people whose 
basic needs were met might be less susceptible to "Communist 
subversion,"146 which was an important consideration during the 
Cold War. "Basic Needs" was quite popular because it was 
universalistic, yet easily tailored to be country-specific;147 it re-
mained in favor until policies centered on the poor were aban-
doned in favor of structural adjustment lending.148 
Policy studies that examined processes, values and social 
consequences were prominent during this phase.149 More-
over, the presumptions that policy-making was exclusively a 
and wealth, growth in primary education, prevention and treatment of disease, 
and improved nutrition and housing. It also called for adjustments in trade poli-
cies and for economically advantaged countries to support the development en-
deavors of developing countries. EDMUND OZMANCZYK, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 528 (Anthony Mango ed .. 
2003). See also G.A. Res. 2626, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 1912th plen. mtg., at 39, 
U.N. Doc. A/8124 and /Add.l (1970). 
14, Esteva, supra note 1, at 13-14. As early as 1962 ECOSOC had recommended 
that the economic and social aspects of development be integrated. Proposals for 
Action of the First UN Development Decade (1960-70), declared that "develop-
ment is growth plus change .... Change is social and cultural as well as economic, 
and qualitative as well as quantitative. . The key concept must be improved 
quality of peoples' lives. Nonetheless, development continued to be perceived as 
a "definable path of economic growth passing through various stages, and "inte-
gration" simply linked the social aspect to the economic aspect. Solon L. Bar-
raclough, In Quest of Sustainable Development (unpublished paper, UNRISD). 
144 Development was in reality more likely to worsen levels of absolute poverty for a 
large segment of the population. 
145 MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at 92. 
146 See discussion supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
147 Esteva, supra note 1, at 15. It also dovetailed with the World Bank strategy of 
targeting groups such as the rural poor and small farmers. 
148 See supra notes 169-203 and accompanying text. This coincided with the end of 
Robert McNamara's tenure as President of the World Bank. 
14' MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at 42. 
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state activity and that Third World governments acted on 
behalf of their respective populations, also began to be chal-
lenged. lso As developers explored ways to deliver aid that 
would meet basic needs, Western non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) emerged to assist. l5l "Grassroots develop-
ment" and "empowerment" became the mottos of the 
day, as "bottom up" theories such as micro-development,1s2 
endogenous development,1s3 sustainable developmentlS4 
150ld. 
151 ld. at 92. 
152 For example, "Micro-development" theorists advocated targeting the individual 
rather than infrastructure and governments, on the premise that development 
would occur when people were empowered to confront and address their pov-
erty. Once empowered, people would "organize themselves and overcome the 
obstacles to their social, cultural and economic well-being" with foreign organiza-
tions relegated to a supportive role. Empirically, micro-development theory as-
sumes that poverty results from lack [of] access to resources that are essential to 
the satisfaction of basic human needs," and that this lack of access is a 'product of 
lack of power in social relations.'" See Blake, supra note 55, at 166. Micro-devel-
opment theorists also emphasize a more equitable distribution of international 
economic power, which can occur only at the macro level. Russell Lawrence 
Barsh, The Right to Development as a Human Right: Results of the Global Con-
sultation, 13 HUM. RTs. Q. 322, 327 (1991). 
153 Endogenous development proposed that the distinctiveness of individual cultures 
and societies should be at the center of determining the goals to be pursued. This ~ 
approach was generally accepted for a period of time, even though it was at odds 
with core assumptions of the development project, which are universalistic. Es-
teva, supra note L at 15. 
154 Sustainable development was defined as economic growth that takes account of 
environmental concerns. See David P. Forsythe, The United Nations, Human 
Rights, and Development, 19 HUM. RTs. Q. 334, 334 (1997). Like micro-develop-
ment, it had a social dimension, emphasizing that development is more than eco-
nomic growth. See also Blake, supra note 55, at 168; Forsythe, supra note 154, at 
335. Both micro-development and sustainable development concentrate on edu-
cation and literacy, health services, poverty alleviation, environmental protection, 
community cooperation and participation, and social and cultural cohesiveness; 
success is not measured solely in terms of economic growth. Results can be in-
tangible, such as improved skills in communication, leadership or management; a 
stronger sense of self; the establishment of civil liberties; or the increased ability 
to leverage services from the state. Results can also be tangible, such as increases 
in the production of agricultural or manufactured goods; a rise in family incomes; 
a building used for organizational activities; or a road or water system. ld. at 
166-68. The Stockholm conference on the environment was in 1972, and the no-
tion of sustainable development was further defined and cemented with the pub-
lication of the Brandt Report, entitled Our Common Future, supra note 115. 
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and other themes began to emerge to replace "top down" 
theories. 155 
Indeed, as the 1970s progressed, "major problems, such as 
the environment, over-population, food scarcity, the role of wo-
men, habitat destruction and unemployment were brought to the 
fore, and each new conundrum had an independent career that 
demanded both public and institutional consideration. "156 What 
these numerous theories have in common, however, is that they 
originated in the West, and more specifically the international in-
stitutions that by this time defined, designed and controlled 
developmentalism. They often followed new domestic policy 
prescriptions and emphases in the industrialized countries. For 
example, "Basic Needs" followed on the heels of the War on 
Poverty in the United States, which may have suggested the 
model. 157 Emphasis on the role of women in development cannot 
be separated from the feminist movement in the United States. 
Environmental concerns surfaced as the environment became an 
issue in the United States and Europe. lss This pedigree highlights 
the extent to which policies are designed and imposed separate 
and apart from the communities they purport to serve. IS9 
On the other hand, the complex responses, both real and 
anticipated, of Third World peoples to development interven-
tions cannot be discounted. The idea of meeting "Basic Needs" 
for example, was largely a response to Cold War concerns that 
, poor populations may be susceptible to communist subversion. l60 
ISS MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at 93. The problem was that neither theo-
rists nor NGOs bothered with the endogenous cultures from which successful 
grassroots institutions might emerge. [d. See also McGee, supra note 114, at 92; 
Majid Rahnema, Participation, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY, supra note 1, 
at 116 [hereinafter Rahnema, Participation]. 
156 "The complex relation between one particular problem and the other problems 
would be established and then unified with the problem currently at the center of 
the process." Esteva, Development, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY at 14. 
157 Wolfgang Sachs, Environment, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER, supra note 
17, at 26 (noting that the ebb and flow of international development theories 
generally follow political sensibilities in the West). For a discussion of the emer-
gence of "basic needs" as a development strategy, see Arturo Escobar. Planning. 
in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER, supra note 17, at 137-39 [hereinafter Es-
cobar. Planning); see also Illich, supra note 42. at 88-101. 
15< Sachs, supra note 157, at 26. 
159 McGee, supra note 114. at 92; Rahnema, supra note 155, at 116. 
IW See Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87. 
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Micro-development and participation are partly in response to 
policy failures, but may also have been responses to changing 
perceptions of the objects of development. 161 Certainly, the rela-
tionship between developers and the objects of development 
were and remain complex. Nonetheless, it is quite apparent that 
the majority of power has resided in the developers, as the lost 
decade for development amply demonstrates. 
3. The Third World Debt Crisis and the "Lost Decade" 
for Development (1980-1990) 
The 1980s are often termed development's "lost decade"162 
as a combination of factors led to the debacle of structural adjust-
ment. 163 Chief among these factors was what has come to be 
known as the Third World debt crisis, which even today remains 
a critical issue. l64 Most analysts trace the roots of the Third 
World debt crisis to the oil crises of the early and mid 1970s, 
161 For an analysis of participation, see Rahnema, supra note 155, at 116. The emer-
gence of these paradigms may also reflect the influence of NGOS. McGee, supra 
note 114, at 92. 
162 On December 5, 1980, the UN General Assembly approved Resolution 35/36 
that established the need for a Third Development Decade for the 1980s. It 
called for accelerating development, promoting economic and social develop-
ment, reducing disparities between Northern and Southern tier countries, and 
early eradication of poverty and dependency. The definitive objective was the 
"constant improvement of the well being of the entire population through full 
participation in the process of development and the fair distribution of benefits to 
women." G.A. Res. 36, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., 83d plen. mtg., at 106, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/35/36 (1980). Part of the strategy included establishing a new inter-
national economic order, which would include industrialization and a more sta-
ble, equitable and effective international monetary system. OZMANCZYK, supra 
note 142, at 528. 
163 See infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text. 
164 The crushing burden of this debt continues to cement the dependent status of the 
poorest countries in the international financial system. The combined total exter-
nal debt of the Third World now exceeds two trillion dollars. See UNITED NA-
TIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REpORT 1999, at 196 
(1999). The legion and, thus far, unsuccessful proposals for resolving the crisis 
have included the "Baker plan"; the "Brady plan"; "debt-for-equity," "debt-for-
nature," and "debt-for-development" plans; "securitization"; and the 
"Miyazawa," "Mitterand," and "Robinson" proposals. Sylvester, supra note 6, at 
265-76. The program currently in effect is the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
("HIPC") Debt Initiative. HIPC was launched by the World Bank and the IMF 
in 1996, and then revised in 1999. Assistance provided by HIPC is in addition to 
such relief as a debtor country may be able to arrange directly with creditors. 
The World Bank's web site outlines the initiative as follows: 
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when spiking oil prices simultaneously impoverished oil-import-
ing Third World countries and flooded international financial 
markets with oil profits in need of investment.165 The Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") became "a 
major creditor of the United States and Western Multinational 
banks166 that in turn loaned the money to poor, often politically 
unstable Third World countries. "i67 Left with massive loans that 
carried skyrocketing interest rates, and at the same time unable 
Eligible countries will qualify for debt relief in two stages. In the first stage 
the debtor country will need to demonstrate the capacity to use prudently 
the assistance granted by establishing a satisfactory track record, normally 
of three years ... In the second stage ... the country will implement a full-
fledged poverty reduction strategy, which has been prepared with broad 
participation of civil society, and an agreed set of measures aimed at en-
hancing economic growth. 
The World Bank Group, Ethiopia Receives Debt Relief Under HIPC Initiative: 
Total Support Worth US$I.9 Billion, at http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/about 
background.html (last visited July 13, 2003). The program now involves 42 coun-
tries: 34 in Africa, four in Latin America, three in Asia and one in the Middle 
East. The World Bank Group, HIPC, HIPC Map, at http://www.worldbank.orgl 
hipc/about/map/map.html (last visited July 13, 2003). The results of the HIPC 
Initiative remain to be seen. Its implementation to date, however, has been no 
less top-down and inflexible than previous IFI programs, according to participat-
ing country government officials with whom one of the present authors has spo-
ken. Professor Thomas observes that, "[t]he debt burden is directly related to 
world hunger and poverty because debtor governments must divert precious and 
scarce resources to paying down external debt instead of meeting the pressing 
needs of their populations." Chantal Thomas, International Debt Forgiveness and 
Global Pov.erty Reduction, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1711, 1712 (2000). Many 
Third World governments spend more than twice as much servicing external debt 
as they do on health and education. See Oxfam International Advocacy Offce & 
UNICEF, Debt Relief and Poverty Reduction: Meeting the Challenge, § 2.1 (1999), 
available at http://www.oxfam.orgiengipdfs/pp9908_debt_relieCand_poverty_re-
duction.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2004). "In Zambia - where infant mortality 
rates are increasing, over half a million children are out of school, and illiteracy is 
rising - debt servicing claims more of the national budget that health and educa-
tion combined." Id., at § 3.2 (emphasis omitted). 
165 Jerome I. Levinson, A Perspective on the Debt Crisis, 4 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & 
POL'y 489 (1989). 
166 Oil prices, which had increased five-fold between 1971 and 1974, doubled again in 
1980. Id. at 491, 495-96. 
167 By 1974, OPEC annual revenues exceeded $100 billion. Sylvester, supra note 6, at 
264. The precariousness of the situation was compounded by political instability 
in Middle East, the 1979 fall of the Shah of Iran, and double digit inflation in the 
United States. ld. 
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to raise sufficient revenues through exports to pay these debts, 
Third World nations acquired growing deficits.168 
Structural adjustment became the method by which debtor 
countries were to correct ballooning deficits.169 These programs 
transformed the IMF from an institution that had been primarily 
concerned with stabilizing global exchange rates, into one deeply 
involved in the social and political policies of the poorest coun-
tries of the Third World.170 IMF lending has always been condi-
tional, but the short-term lending provisions originally utilized by 
the IMF were thought inadequate to address the development 
problems faced by Third World nations. So longer-term financ-
ing arrangements were implemented and the IMF broadened its 
traditional scope of inquiry to include evaluations of domestic 
issues such as labor, health care, and agriculture. l7l 
168 Id. at 265 (Noting that these developments affected Third World debtors in two 
critical ways. First, a significant portion of the loans carried floating interest 
rates, and these rates skyrocketed. Second, because of tight money and weak-
ened demand, Third World debtors had trouble selling their exports to raise reve-
nue. In 1982, Mexico made its historic declaration of inability to meet even the 
interest payments on its external debts, and the "Third World debt crisis" was 
well on its way to becoming a household phrase.) 
169 Rajesh Swaminathan, Regulating Development: Structural Adjustment and the 
Case for National Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights, 37 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 161 (1998); Anthony, supra note 98. Adjustment lending con-
sisted of six core objectives. These were: "[1] raising saving rates, [2] securing 
financial stability, [3] liberalizing and opening economies to foreign trade, [4] re-
ducing state intervention and making markets more efficient, [5] reorienting gov-
ernment spending and improving revenue collection, and [6] mobilizing external 
sources." IMF Development and Review Department, Experience Under the 
IMP's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 1997, at 32, 
available at http://www.imf.org/externallpubs/ft/fandd/1997/09/pdf/imf.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2003). 
170 Swaminathan, supra note 169; Bradlow, supra note 98; Anthony, supra note 98. 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") members 
and countries such as Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand could 
bypass the IMF and its constraints. Carre au, supra note 91, at 1996. 
17l Swaminathan, supra note 169, at 178-79; Bradlow, supra note 98. The IMP's Ar-
ticles of Agreement explicitly prohibits any consideration of a nation's political 
affairs in making loan determinations. Bradlow, supra note 98, Carreau, supra 
note 91, at 1997. Indeed, the IMF was to only be concerned with attaining specif-
ically prescribed macroeconomic goals, rather than with how a Member State 
actually reached those goals. Although conditions were always attached to IMF 
lending, they were limited to macro-economic variables such as debt, money sup-
ply, and inflation. Id. But with its involvement in the Third World, these con-
straints began to dissolve, as the Fund's primary role shifted to handling the 
economies of developing countries and, more recently, countries in transition. 
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By the mid-1980s, the World Bank had also begun to grant 
loans for adjustment purposes.172 Loans were now being made to 
meet balance-of-payments difficulties rather than for specific 
projects,173 and these loans were conditional on the debtor na-
tion's promise to take certain steps to reform "inappropriate 
public policies".174 These loans were the Bank's first foray into 
the domestic policies of its debtors, and were the predecessor of 
structural adjustment programs ("SAPs").175 Although the Bank 
had been steadily embracing a broader vision of its role in the 
development process,176 it had yet to involve itself directly in the 
social or political affairs of its borrowers.177 As the international 
debt crisis widened and deepened,178 however, the World Bank 
Moreover, stabilization programs sponsored and approved by the Fund are 'a 
seal of international approval of a State's economic policies that acts as a de facto 
guarantee for prospective private lenders. [d. 
172 [d. at 1999. Loans were made for adjustment in given sectors (sector adjust-
ment), or for national economies as a whole (structural adjustment). 
17) Tsai, supra note 84, at 1331-32; Swaminathan, supra note 169, at 169-70; Weid-
ner, supra note 141. at 200. 
174 The Bank, of course, determined which policies were "appropriate" - and it did 
so against the backdrop of the "cold war" between the West and the Soviet bloc. 
Weidner, supra note 141. 
m Initially, the Bank developed two types of policy-based loans for the Third World. 
The first of these was termed a "structural adjustment loan," or SAL. SALs gen-
erally run eight to ten years and require the borrowing country to conform to 
certain Bank guidelines regarding economic policies. The stated objectives of 
SALs are: "(1) correcting balance of payments imbalances, (2) eliminating distor-
tions and promoting microeconomic efficiency, (3) reducing high inflation rates, 
(4) protecting or resuming output growth, and (5) minimizing the cost of adjust-
ment to the poorest" segments of the population. The second type of policy-
based lending is "sector adjustment loans," or SECALs. SECALs are similar to 
SALs in that both are conditioned on implementing policy-based initiatives. SE-
CALs, however, are generally more narrowly defined, and specific sectors of the 
economy are targeted for fiscal reform. Usually the focus is on exports, agricul-
ture, industry, energy, and public enterprises. SALs and SECALS are both re-
ferred to as structural adjustment programs (SAPs) because they promote 
economic liberalization by forcing nations to address inequity in their fiscal poli-
cies. Carrasco, supra note 98, at 29; Tsai, supra note 84, at 1320-21; 3 THE 
WORLD BANK: LENDING ON A GLOBAL SCALE, RETHINKING BRETTON WOODS 
11 (Jo Marie Griesgraber & Bernhard G. Gunter eds., 1996). 
176 Carreau, supra note 91, at 1999. 
177 Bradlow, supra note 98, at 38-39; Uriz, supra note 108, at 203-04. 
17K See supra, notes 164-65 and accompanying text for discussion of the magnitude 
and significance of Third World debt. 
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began to use structural adjustment programs in an ever more in-
trusive way.179 
The Bank concluded that the primary impediment to eco-
nomic growth was Third World government policies.18o Rather 
than relying entirely on macroeconomic indicators,181 The World 
Bank began to condition its loans on Bank judgments regarding 
an increasingly wide range of domestic policies.182 The World 
Bank was prohibited from becoming involved in the politics of 
borrowing nations by its Articles of Agreement,183 so its growing 
role in the domestic policies of its borrowers was rationalized by 
broadly interpreting the concept of "economic development. "184 
Under this rubric, the World Bank's scope increased to encom-
pass legal and judicial reform, family planning, education, devel-
oping the private sector and health care, among various other 
initiatives.185Moreover, if structural adjustment conditions were 
not met, future assistance could be denied186 and adherence to 
these conditions was critical in securing access to private capi-
taI.I87Consequently, the pressure on countries facing economic 
crisis to conform to SAP conditions was extraordinarily high.l88 
179 Carrasco, supra note 98, at 38-39; Bradlow, supra note 98, at 57. 
180 The bank turned to alleviating Third World poverty by promoting economic 
growth. 
181 IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 98, art. 4(1); Bradlow, supra note 98, at 
57. 
182 Bradlow, supra note 98, at 57 (noting that in the 1980s, the Bank became heavily 
involved in funding development projects in such spheres as health, education, 
agriculture and housing). 
183 Bradlow, supra note 98, at 47, 54. 
184 Weidner, supra note 141, at 198-99; Bradlow, supra note 98, at 60. 
18.1 See Bradlow, supra note 98, at 57; Uriz, supra note 108, at 205; Weidner, supra 
note 141, at 198-99. 
186 Carrasco, supra note 98, at 38-39; Tsai, supra note 84, at 1322. 
187 The "seal of approval" earned by complying with World Bank and IMF credit 
packages was critical to attaining private loans from the commercial banks of 
developed countries. See Tsai, supra note 84, at 1322; Galano, supra note 84, at 
339; Anne Orford, Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interven-
tions after the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT'L L.l. 443,445 (1997). 
188 Tsai, supra note 84, at 1322. 
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Some critics contend that SAPs amount to economic coer-
cion,189 and have caused legendary devastation.190 Structural ad-
justment led to a severe deterioration in living conditions,191 as 
cutbacks in government spending led to drastic declines in medi-
cal services, public education and other services.192 This often led 
to violent protests as basic necessities became unaffordable/93 
and popular protests sometimes triggered government repres-
sion. Structural adjustment thus came to be associated with dete-
riorations in freedom and, at times, human rights abuses.194 
Some observers maintain that Structural Adjustment Pro-
grams were never intended to achieve their stated purposes, but 
were only implemented to further Western interests, such as the 
repayment of Third World debt to Western banks.195 Structural 
adjustment, in part, entailed turning Third World countries into 
"favorable investment climates" for multinational corpora-
tions.196 But this goal often conflicted with meeting the basic 
189 3 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 175, at 134; George B.N. Ayittey, Aid for Black 
Elephants: How Foreign Assistance Has Failed Africa, in PERPETUATING Pov-
ERTY: THE WORLD BANK, THE IMF, AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD 115-16, 
140-42 (Doug Bandow & Ian Vasquez eds., 1994). 
190 Swaminathan, supra note 169, at 177-89. 
191 See Anghie, Time Present and Time Past, supra note 84, at 252-53 (commenting 
on adverse effects of IFI structural adjustment programs in the Third World.). 
Somalia and Rwanda are two examples of states that were subjects of extensive 
structural adjustment programs that may have contributed to their collapse. See 
id. at 263. 
192 With reductions in the size of governments, unemployment rose in countries 
where the state was the largest employer, and privatizing state activities often 
contributed to more hardships for the working poor. Swaminathan, supra note 
169, at 180-82; Ayittey, supra note 189, at 140-41; Orford, supra note 187, at 
470-71. 
193 Swami nathan, supra note 169, at 180-82; Ayittey, supra note 189, at 140-41. 
194 Orford, supra note 187, at 456; Swaminathan, supra note 169, at 181; Rajagopal, 
From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87, at 575; 3 THE WORLD BANK, supra 
note 175, at 14-15,46-48; PERPETUATING POVERTY, supra note 189, at 59-60. 
195 For example, James Gathii opines that structural adjustment in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica primarily focused on producing a conducive framework within which the re-
payment of the debts owed by African states to international banks and lending 
agencies is facilitated, and the unhindered influx of new international capital into 
these countries is secured. Gathii, Good Governance, supra note 84, at 207. 
196 Structural adjustment programs typically involved currency devaluations, pro-
ducer price increases, trade liberalization, privatization, and a range of specific 
institutional changes prescribed under the heading of "good governance." 
Anghie, Time Present and Time Past, supra note 84, at 252-53. See also, Antony 
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needs of the general public,197 as did trade liberalization.19B But 
even when viewed more favorably, SAPs and the conditions that 
they imposed curtailed the governing capacity of member states 
by vastly limiting the range of available economic, political and 
social policy options.199 Once a state accepted financial assistance 
from World Bank or IMP entities, a great deal of state decision-
making authority was effectively delegated to these institu-
tions,201l and the debtor nation, in effect, became an instrument of 
the IFI, as lending officials exerted control over a wide range of 
domestic sectors, including those entrusted with providing educa-
tion, health care and social services, and with protecting the 
rights of the nation's workforce.201 By shaping and determining 
the policy choices available to governments, conditionalities fore-
close political prerogatives that are generally thought to consti-
tute the core of state sovereignty.202 
Structural adjustment was in most respects a failure, for as 
the 1980s drew to a close, developing countries were poorer, 
more debt-ridden, and even less able to provide services such as 
education and health care. Governments were also facing angry 
Anghie, Civilization and Commerce: The Concept of Governance in Historical 
Perspective, 45 VILL. L. REV. 887, 908 (2000) (discussing good governance and 
the IFI goal of furthering neo-liberal economic polices through structural adjust-
ment entailing privatization, trade liberalization and currency devaluation). 
197 Swaminathan, supra note 169, at 181 (noting that regulations that protected la-
bor, for example, were usually early casualties of such policies); Orford, supra 
note 187, at 453-55. Higher interest rates may attract foreign investors, but they 
can also inflict unbearable economic pressures on small businesses, including 
farmers who may be forced to sell their land because they can no longer obtain 
operating capital. 3 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 175, at 10, 47. 
198 Trade liberalization often had devastating effects on Third World countries. 
Eliminating tariffs, for example, can promote access to domestic markets, but it 
can also make it much more difficult for local producers to compete against for-
eign suppliers; as local businesses fail, additional jobs are lost. Encouraging ex-
port production also leads to the increased harvesting of cash crops, which can 
cause domestic food shortages and accelerate soil erosion. SAPs thus tended to 
make countries more dependent on imported goods and manufactured items, and 
more predisposed to overexploit their natural resources. 3 THE WORLD BANK. 
supra note 175, at 47. 
199 Tsai, supra note 84. at 1321; Orford, supra note 187, at 470. 
200 Of course the specific terms of the agreements governing this assistance varied as 
did the actual conditions imposed. 
21)1 [d. at 470-71. 
202 Tsai, supra note 84. at 1319; Galano, supra note 84, at 323; Orford. supra note 
187, at 470. 
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popUlations who were no longer able to obtain the most elemen-
tary goods and services. Sovereign policy choices and preroga-
tives were increasingly limited and shaped by international 
predilections emanating from international financial institutions 
and by the escalating rhetoric of globalization. The dramatic fail-
ure of SAPs in addressing the economic disasters experienced by 
much of Sub-Saharan Africa and other countries during the 
1980s prompted yet another retooling of the IF! approach to the 
Third World.203 It is in this environment that the "Washington 
Consensus" began to take shape. 
4. The Washington "Consensus" and the 
"New" Conditionality204 
The 1990s brought the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
end of the Cold War, making the United States the world's sole 
superpower. With the demise of the Soviet Union and China's 
move towards a market economy, alternative economic models 
disappeared and the political and economic views of the United 
States began to completely dominate both theory and practice. 
Modernization was now defined as integration into the global 
economy, and development as economic liberalization, privatiza-
tion and embracing the "free market".205 
The World Bank articulated the new orthodoxy in a series of 
reports that began in 1991 and culminated with its 1999 Report, 
"Entering Into the 21st Century", which consolidated a decade-
long process of devising and defining what the World Bank 
203 Watts, supra note 24, at 58. 
204 As had been the case since 1961, the UN General Assembly declared yet another 
development decade, to begin on January 1, 1990. Resolution 45/199 again 
declared the objective of accelerated development, calling for a surge in the pace 
of economic growth in developing countries; a development process that is 
responsive to social needs, seeks to reduce extreme poverty, promotes the 
development and utilization of human resources and skills and is environmentally 
sustainable; an improvement in international monetary, financial and trade 
mechanisms in support of development; a strong and stable world economy with 
sound national and international macroeconomic management; the strengthening 
of international cooperation for development; and special efforts to assist the 
least developed countries. G.A. Res. 199, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 71st plen. 
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/199 (1990). 
20; MI1TELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at 42. It is sometimes termed the three Ds: 
denationalization, deregulation, and devaluation. [d. 
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termed a Comprehensive Development Framework.206 With this 
report, development indeed became all encompassing.207 Ac-
cording to the Bank, the underlying premise of the CDF is that 
growth must include consideration of structural,2OB human,209 
physical,2l0 and sector-specific2l1 aspects of development. All of 
these strategies were to be achieved through market-friendly pol-
icies and market incentives.212 The necessary actors would be 
governments, local organizations,213 and non-governmental orga-
nizations ("NGOS").214 The CDF also co-opted development 
206 For a discussion of these reports, which were promulgated throughout the 1990s, 
see Cammack, supra note 120, at 157, 164. 
207 The World Bank Group, COF Proposal, A Proposal for a Comprehensive Devel-
opment Framework (A Discussion Draft) (Jan. 21, 1999) (memorandum from 
James O. Wolfensohn, President, to the Board, Management, and Staff of the 
World Bank Group), available at http://siteresources.woridbank.orgiCOF/Re-
sources/cdf.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2004) [hereinafter "COF Proposal"]; Blake, 
supra note 55, at 160. According to this report, the World Bank would hence-
forth be guided by four guiding principles: (1) development goals and strategies 
should be determined by individual member states, and not by the World Bank; 
(2) development should be holistic in nature, so that growth focuses not just on 
economic variables, but also on social and political implications; (3) the develop-
ment process should involve all actors affected by World Bank lending practices; 
and (4) development policies should have a long-term focus. COF Proposal, 
supra this note, at 22-24. The Bank believes the COF is an improvement over its 
previous adherence to macroeconomic indicators as the sole gauge of a nation's 
economic health, while acknowledging that the COF has not met with universal 
approval. See, e.g., Uriz, supra note 108, at 205; Blake, supra note 55, at 177. 
21ll Structural aspects included good and clean governance, a well-organized financial 
system, and an adequate social safety net to accommodate the short-term nega-
tive impact of some World Bank programs. COF Proposal, supra note 207, at 
10-12; see Blake, supra note 55, at 162. 
209 Human aspects encompassed education, health, and population issues. COF Pro-
posal, supra note 207, at 13-14; see Blake, supra note 55, at 162. 
210 Physical characteristics for growth included quantifiable achievements in building 
infrastructure, including adequate water and sewer systems, access to energy, ac-
cess and transportation inlays. CDF Proposal, supra note 207, at 15-18; see 
Blake, supra note 55, at 163. 
211 Sector-specific aspects of development referred to strategies to promote the ad-
vancement of rural, urban, and private sectors. CDF Proposal, supra note 207, at 
18-20; Cammack, supra note 120, at 157, 164. 
212 Cammack, supra note 120, at 157, 164. 
m Weidner, supra note 141, at 223-24; Blake, supra note 55, at 163. 
214 NGOs had long been critical of - and largely ignored by - the international finan-
cial institutions. The Bank now invites selected NGOs to take part in develop-
ment projects. By 1999, 52% of Bank projects involved some type of NGO 
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strategies previously termed "alternative"215 - such as environ-
mental management, human resource development, building 
self-reliance,216 and concentrating on civil society,217 social institu-
tions, and human rights.218 
The groundwork for the CDP was laid in the 1989 Report, 
Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, which in-
troduced "good governance" as a programmatic priority.219 De-
fined as an initiative to build pluralistic institutions that would 
perform functions in much the same manner as Western govern-
ments,220 good governance also emphasized privatization and 
"marketization", as opposed to government regulation of the 
participation. Weidner, supra note 141, at 220. A rather striking and wide-rang-
ing example of NGO participation in World Bank programs began in 1995 when 
the Bank entered into a joint initiative with the Structural Adjustment Par-
ticipatory Review Initiative Network (SAPRIN). Today, SAPRIN works in 17 
countries where it consults with World Bank officials on the effects of specific 
lending arrangements. The objective of SAPRIN is to legitimize local knowledge 
in the analysis of economic-reform programs and to make space for, and institu-
tionalize, grassroots involvement in macroeconomic decision-making. See Struc-
tural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network, at http:// 
www.saprin.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2003). 
215 Kothari & Minogue, supra note 7, at 9. 
216 Watts, supra note 24, at 58. The rationale behind building self-reliance was "the 
desire to release those energies that permit ordinary people to take charge of 
their lives. " [d. 
217 Civil society is also central in the alternatives to development paradigm, which 
has focused on "new social movements." [d. at 58. Both the new development 
economics of the 1990s and the anti-development paradigm assert alternative 
strategies; both speak of an expanded role for civil society and both question the 
form, function and character of the developmental state. ld. at 59. 
218 ld. at 58. 
219 Uriz, supra note 108, at 204. The good governance initiative was defined as "a 
systematic effort to build pluralistic institutional structures, a determination to 
respect the rule of law, and a vigorous protection of freedom of the press and 
human rights." [d. 
220 [d. at 204-05 (noting that good governance has been criticized as entailing a vari-
ety of interventions that are inconsistent with the Bank's mandate and, as a 
doubtful solution to the multifaceted crises of the Third World). Professor Gathii 
contends that "good governance" policies are based on the questionable assump-
tion that reducing governmental intervention in the economy will automatically 
increase economic growth and personal freedom. The Organization of African 
Unity and the Economic Commission on Africa identified external economic de-
pendence as a major factor in Africa's poor economic performance in the Lagos 
Report of 1980, and recommended that external dependence on Western coun-
tries be reduced and replaced with a self-sustaining development strategy based 
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economy.221 The 1990 World Development Report proposed that 
the poor be integrated into the labor force.222 Thus, at the center 
of the CDP agenda is incorporating the poor into what is now the 
global capitalist system, by putting them to work in the service of 
international capital.223 Throughout the 1990s, the Bank promul-
gated a series of reports prescribing market friendly interven-
tions such as creating a competitive environment where private 
enterprises can flourish, integrating into the global economy, and 
investing in people so that the populace might participate in the 
market.224 In addition, governments were urged to define and 
protect property rights; provide effective legal, judicial, and regu-
latory systems; make available an efficient civil service and pro-
tect the environment.225 Previous orthodoxies have been 
reversed, as the need for import substitution and a strong state 
have been replaced by export-led growth and a state that exists 
on the maximum internal use of the continent's resources. Gathii. Good Govern-
ance, supra note 84, at 109. Professor Gathii also maintains that the good govern-
ance agenda focuses too much attention on internal policy failures within Third 
World countries and not enough on the historical and international economic fac-
tors that Southern governments believe are the primary causes of their current 
difficulties. See Gathii, Africa Predicaments, supra note 110, at 1008 (noting that 
African governments take the opposite view of IFls and other proponents of the 
good governance agenda; and contrasting the Lagos Report with the Berg Re-
port's emphasis on improper economic policies pursued by African governments 
as the main cause of the crisis. 
221 See Gathii, Good Governance, supra note 84, at 108. 
212 Cammack, sllpra note 120, at 164. This policy promoted a pattern of growth that 
would utilize the most abundant asset possessed by the poor - their labor. The 
prevailing logic is that governments should pursue policies that provide busi-
nesses (capital) across the globe with an adequate number of healthy and edu-
cated workers, and to impose disciplines that ensure these workers remain 
available. Basic social services, such as primary education, health care and family 
planning, which make it possible for the poor to work, are to be made available 
and this would more easily allow capital to exploit the global labor market. Ben-
efits are to be targeted to potential workers, which then makes it difficult to sur-
vive outside of the labor market, and creates safety nets that propel workers back 
into the market if they temporarily drop out. 
223 Id. As Professor Cammack puts it, the CDF entails putting the poor to work, in 
the name of poverty alleviation. Of course, it also means low wage workers for 
global capital. 
224 For example, governments should provide health care, education, nutrition and 
family planning services, which are spheres that often are not well-served by the 
private market. Id. at 166. 
215 Id. 
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primarily to support private markets.226 Thus, the Comprehensive 
Development Framework concretizes the new neo-liberal ortho-
doxy of markets and democracy. 
It is evident that the World Bank has sought to respond to 
some of its critics and move beyond the macroeconomic failures 
of structural adjustment. The problem is that the Bank and other 
international financial institutions227 are only capable of modify-
ing their policies within the same discursive space. The Compre-
hensive Development Framework demonstrates just how all-
226 State managed stabilization policies to prevent recession or depression have 
given way to internationally managed policies of restructuring, often deliberately 
inducing domestic recession; re-distributive taxation to bring about greater equal-
ity of incomes has been abandoned in favor fiscal reform that rewards entrepre-
neurship and accentuates inequality; measures to regulate prices have been 
dropped; public control over labor and money markets has been systematically 
stripped away; the indefinite extension of the sphere of wants to be satisfied by 
public enterprise has been thrown into reverse and social security legislation has 
been restructured to promote rather than work against market forces." Id. at 
164. 
m The IMF approach to the Third World has continued to evolve, but it has been 
"less comprehensive" in its interventions in the name of development. Although 
it is outside the scope of its mandate, the IMF expressly supports Third World 
economic growth. The IMF also now includes poverty alleviation among its ma-
jor goals, although its Articles of Agreement do not contemplate this objective. 
Carrasco, supra note 98, at 39-41; Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra 
note 87, at 569-74. The IMF created the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF) in 1999. As described by the IMF, this new endeavor "aims at making 
poverty reduction efforts among low-income members a key and more explicit 
element of a renewed growth-oriented strategy." Creation of the PRGF was sig-
nificant because it was the first time the IMF had officially declared that "growth-
policies should be implemented in a framework in which the pressing need to 
reduce poverty is also a central objective." International Monetary Fund, Policy 
Development and Review Department, The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facil-
ity (PRGF) - Operational Issues (Dec. 13, 1999), at http://www.imf.orglexternall 
np/pdr/prsp/poverty2.htm (last visited June 7, 2002) [hereinafter PRGF]. Instead 
of pursuing strictly macroeconomic objectives, "high quality" economic develop-
ment has become the IMF's new emphasis, and "high quality" development in-
cludes considering the social and political consequences of IMF lending. 
Carrasco, supra note 98, at 569-74. "Good governance" in borrowing countries is 
also currently a stated goal of the IMF, and thus the IMF's stated objectives are 
now more similar to those of the World Bank. Id.; PRGF, supra note 227. Un-
like the World Bank the IMF has not formalized relations with NGOs. Bradlow, 
supra note 98, at 77. The IMF continues to utilize adjustment lending. PGRF, 
supra note 227. Yet even the IMF and World Bank acknowledge it is problem-
atic. See generally International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive 
Board for the Financial Year Ended April 30, 1997, available at http://www.imf. 
org/external/pubs/ft/ar/97/97imf.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2004); WORLD BANK, 
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE (1998). 
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inclusive and wide-ranging interventions in the Third World have 
become. Unfortunately, these economic programs have in reality 
exacerbated inequality and poverty within the populations of 
many Third World countries.228 
III. LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT 
As the cycles of conventional wisdom promulgated by inter-
national institutions waxed and waned, the nations of the Third 
World began to take rather bold steps in the international legal 
arena to obtain and solidify a legal right to development. While 
firmly rooted in the belief that development was the ultimate ob-
jective, the movements that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s were 
quite strident attempts to take control of this process and to 
transform the economic and political relationship between the 
North and the South.229 As the lost development decade of the 
1980s unfolded and these movements collapsed, Third World 
states attempted to incorporate development into the burgeoning 
rights discourse, and thus to explicitly claim comprehensive de-
velopment as a legal right. More recently this quest has ripened 
into the more radical demand for reparations. 23o These efforts in 
many ways mirror the larger evolution of the development dis-
course; with the movement to establish a law of international de-
velopment, countries of the Third World seized the legal 
initiative to establish development as a legally mandated 
imperative. 
228 See Anghie, Time Present and Time Past, supra note 84, at 252-53 (noting that IFI 
loans are part of an adjustment lending process and are supposed to ameliorate 
some of the consequences of the fundamental changes the Bank requires coun-
tries to undertake); Chua, supra note 80. 
229 The emergence of a "Third World," that stood separate and apart from the first 
and second world also emerged during this era, as did the nationalizations of oil 
companies, events that empowered and emboldened nations in the Middle East. 
Given the raging Cold War, the time may also have been ripe to make demands 
for social justice. The 1960s was also a time of political protest in the United 
States and across Europe, and thus "demands" for justice were part of a larger 
trend, so to speak. 
2'0 At this point, the demand for reparations has only been articulated in limited 
forums and within few documents. See infra notes 299-310 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of reparations. It cannot be equated with the sustained 
movements for Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, the New Inter-
national Economic Order, or the Right to Development. 
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The movement to establish a law of international develop-
ment231 became the focal point and the vehicle for a profound 
and historic political confrontation ~etween the West and the 
Third World. Although couched in legal terms, this confronta-
tion was and remains fundamentally ideological.232 International 
law was an instrument that promoted the interests of the North 
at the expense of the South. The South now sought to turn the 
2.11 Development law or the "law of development" was recognized as branch of inter-
national law in the 1960s. Hector Gros Espiell, The Right of Development as a 
Human Right, 16 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 189, 190 (1981). After 1960 the United Nations 
began to give attention to the concept of development, and gradually shaped a 
new juridical discipline, "the international law of development," which attempted 
to characterize, and make enforceable a system of rights and obligations. [d. 
Not to be confused with the "law and development" discussed, see supra Part I.D, 
the international law of development comprises principles promoting the eco-
nomic and social development of the Third World, while seeking to strengthen 
and assert their position in international relations. Nina M. Eejima, Sustainable 
Development and the Search for a Better Environment, a Better World: A Work in 
Progress, 18 UCLA J. ENVT'L. L & POL'y 99, 109 (1999/2000). Indeed, the law of 
development rejects a key premise of law and development, holding instead that 
"[t]he problem was not simply that economic and social institutions in the periph-
eral countries were not modern ... but rather that these societies were character-
ized by ... structures where the economic and social institutions were geared to 
meet the demands of developed societies rather than the needs of the developing 
societies." Chibundu, supra note 74, at 191. 
232 Although it gained widespread attention in the 1960s and 1970s, the roots of the 
law of development go considerably deeper. Early antecedents include the 
Drago Doctrne, by which Latin American states sought to prohibit armed foreign 
(i.e., U.S.) intervention predicated on civil disputes. See Convention on Rights 
and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 9,49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (entered 
into force Dec. 26, 1934). In 1902, Argentina's Minister of Foreign Affairs in-
formed the United States that forcible U.S. intervention in Argentina to secure 
payment of debts allegedly owed to private U.S. citizens and companies was un-
justified and dangerous. Argentine Republic: "Monroe Doctrine" and Diplomatic 
Claims of European Powers, in UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PAPERS 
RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, ISSUE 1903, 
Argentine Republic: "Monroe Doctrine" and Diplomatic Claims of European 
Powers 1-5 (1903) (note from Luis M. Drago to the U.S. Department of State). 
Professor Richard Falk has observed that the concept of a state protecting its 
nationals abroad has also been used "as a means to impose the external will of 
richer and more powerful nations [on others]." Richard Falk, Historical Tenden-
cies, Modernizing and Revolutionary Nations, and the International Legal Order. 8 
How. L. J. 128, 133 (1962). 
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tables by using international law to re-order the international po-
litical and economic sphere and to achieve the goal of develop-
ment.233 Coinciding with the rise of dependency theory, which 
posed a more radical critique of the economic relationships 
among the countries of the world,234 and more specifically "the 
persistent and indeed widening inequalities between the societies 
of the South and the industrialized countries of the West,"235 the 
law of development sought no less than a fundamental change in 
the relationship between the West and the Third World. With 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
("UNCTAD") as their institutional forum,236 Third World leaders 
233 The European origin of an international law that purports to be "universal" was 
and remains a persistent underlying theme. See, e.g., T.O. Elias, Modern Sources 
of International Law, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: ESSAYS 
IN HONOR OF PHILIP C. JESSUP 49 (Wolfgang Friedmann et al. eds., 1972); R.P. 
Anand, Attitude of the Asian-African States Toward Certain Problems of Interna-
tional Law, 15 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 55,56 (1966); Jorge Castaneda, The Underde-
veloped Nations and the Development of International Law, 15 INT'L ORG. 38, 39 
(1961); B. ROLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN EXPANDED WORLD 10 (1960); 
JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 44 (Oxford University Press 1997). 
But the problem was not merely with the origin of the law; the problem was with 
the law's application. Judge Philip C. Jessup, in describing the need for revising 
traditional international law, acknowledged the Third World view that "the rules 
of law were developed by the exploiting imperialistic powers to promote their 
interests at the expense of the countries which in earlier centuries were either 
colonies or politically and militarily weak and provided important sources of raw 
materials and perhaps labor to the exploiting powers." Philip C. Jessup, Non-
Universal International Law, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415, 419 (1973). 
134 See Snyder, supra note 76, at 737 (quoting COLIN LEYS, UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN 
KENYA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEO-COLONIALISM, 1964-1971 (1975» 
(stating that underdevelopment theory is ... partly a correction and partly an 
expansion of Marx's interpretation of history, an expansion of his method and 
central ideas to a problem which, on a world scale, was still in embryo at his 
death: the failure of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to follow a 
path of autonomous, capitalist development, leading to their "regeneration" after 
they had been brought within the world capitalist economy). Dependency the-
ory has been criticized as accepting the fundamental premises of the development 
paradigm. Id. 
235 See Chibundu, supra note 74, at 189. 
236 Akinsanya & Davies, supra note 61, at 209-11 (noting that since it was estab-
lished in 1964 UNCTAD has been "one of the forums used by the developing 
countries to press home their demand for a New International Economic Order" 
and that it has become an "important intervener on behalf of less developed 
countries in their relations with advanced industrial States" (quoting Robert S. 
Walters, UNCTAD: Intervener Between Poor and Rich States, 7 J.W.T. L. 528 
(1973»). UNCTAD's recommendations are not legally binding, however. See 
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declared that "more than foreign aid, what was needed for the 
Third World to break out of the vicious circle of poverty was a 
change in the terms governing its relationship with the industrial 
world".237 Although largely rejected in the West,238 the interna-
tional law of development has been championed in the Third 
World since the 1960s.239 It has been an avowedly activist move-
ment from its inception,240 and in due course, advocated a broad 
also VARGES, supra note 61, at 3 (discussing how unification enabled developing 
countries to be a force that could not be ignored). 
m See V ARGES, supra note 61, at 3. Dependency theorists acknowledged that devel-
oped countries may at some time have been "undeveloped," but argued that they 
never played the role of the "underdeveloped" country within the world capitalist 
system. See Snyder, supra note 76, at 748. The original centers of capitalism 
established their wealth and their power through incorporating and exploiting 
other parts of the world. The primary accumulation of capital in the metropoles 
or center was fed through a drain of wealth from the satellite or peripheral coun-
tries, typically involving their colonization, a "surplus drain" which continues to 
the present day even if its forms may have changed, and direct colonial rule is no 
longer a necessary condition of this process. 
Id. at 726 (quoting Harry Bernstein, Sociology of Underdevelopment vs. Sociol-
ogy of Development?, in DAVID LEHNMAN ED., DEVELOPMENT THEORY: FOUR 
CRITICAL STUDIES (David Lehmann ed., 1979»; see also Makau Mutua, Critical 
Race Theory and International Law: Convergence and Divergence, 45 VILL. L. 
REV. 841, 850 (2000). Using critical race theory to evaluate international law, 
Mutua states, "What the world has witnessed in the last five centuries is the 
universalization of an international law that is particular to Europe and seeks not 
universal justice, but an international legal order that erects, preserves and em-
braces European and American domination of the globe." Id. 
218 Third World leaders warned that the unequal distribution of power threatens 
peace, and that permitting the existence of such a system could potentially give 
rise to a "major worldwide revolution." See V ARGES, supra note 61, at 6. Given 
the wholesale rejection of all aspects of the law of development, however, the 
West apparently did not take this threat seriously, or perhaps believed it had 
other mechanisms at its disposal to deal with outbreaks of violence. 
LW See generally Schachter, supra note 109. Through the international law of devel-
opment, dependency theorists and their allies attempted to establish an enforcea-
ble system of rights and obligations based on international law. 
240 According to Professor Espiell, 
The affirmation that there is and there must be an international law of 
development. implies an acceptance that law must be an instrument for the 
transformation of society. a tool for effective action in the struggle of all 
peoples and all men against poverty, dependence and ignorance. The in-
ternationallaw of development must not be understood as a mere compila-
tion of norms relating to a single subject - development. On the contrary, 
it constitutes a juridical system bound to enable development and hasten it. 
It is, therefore, essentially a teleological law, whose characteristics are de-
termined by the mission assigned to it. 
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range of development-related programs.241 The opening gambit, 
the movement and demand for permanent sovereignty over natu-
ral resources was less wide-ranging than what was to follow, but 
was surely no less far-reaching. 
A. PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER 
NATURAL RESOURCES 
The movement for permanent sovereignty over natural re-
sources ("PSNR") embodied and symbolized the conflict of eco-
nomic interests between capital exporting and capital importing 
nations.242 Control over the natural resources located in what we 
now call the Third World was a principal impetus for European 
colonial conquest. As colonialism ended, it was immediately 
clear to the leaders of newly independent nations that control of 
those same resources would be the key to future economic viabil-
ity.243 Natural resources were the "natural" starting point, and a 
boundary that developing countries could point to as evidence of 
the absence of genuine equality in the community of nations.244 
Accordingly, newly independent states quickly sought to renego-
tiate or void the extraordinarily inequitable arrangements that 
had been imposed upon them during the colonial period, and to 
HECTOR GROS ESPIELL, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL DEL DESARROLLO (1975), 
translated and quoted in Espiell, supra note 231, at 190. 
241 Tamanaha, supra note 68, at 471 (noting such demands as such as "preferential 
treatment, entitlement to developmental assistance, debt relief, low interest loans 
or outright grants, and the low-cost transfer of technology"). 
242 Franz Xavier Perrez, The Relationship Between "Permanent Sovereignty'- and the 
Obligation Not to Cause Transboundary Environmental Damage, 26 ENVT'L. L. 
1187, 1190 (1996) (citing MILAN BULAJIC, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL DE-
VELOPMENT LAW: PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW RELATING TO THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 269 
(2d ed_ 1993». 
243 See WALTER RODNEY, How EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA 28, 162. 168 
(1972). The natural resources at issue include a vast array of minerals as well as 
oil and gas. 
244 Third World leaders believed that "the right to freely dispose of natural resources 
and wealth was the seminal source of a series of corollary state rights, including 
the right to freely determine and control the prospecting, exploration, develop-
ment, exploitation, use and marketing of its natural resources and to subject such 
activities to national laws within the limits of its exclusive economic jurisdiction 
under prevailing international law." See Eejima, supra 231. at 110. 
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establish that the ultimate authority over natural resources is 
vested in the nation-state where those resources are located.245 
Although the movement for PSNR is typically associated 
with the debate surrounding the December 14, 1962 passage of 
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1803,246 in fact, it was under-
way a full decade earlier.247Still, the 1962 Resolution and sur-
rounding debate are said by many commentators to reflect the 
most contentious question of the new international economic or-
der.248 A threshold legal question was whether the inalienability 
of natural resources constituted a peremptory norm of intern a-
tionallaw under the doctrine of jus cogens, or whether individual 
cases should be resolved by balancing strict enforcement of con-
tractual obligations under the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda 
against relief based on changed circumstances under the doctrine 
of rebus sic stantibus.249 The concrete manifestation of this seem-
ingly theoretical issue was the enforceability or void ability of 
long-term concessions providing for the extraction of natural re-
sources on terms extremely favorable to Western based transna-
tional corporations.25o Although these agreements should have 
been highly suspect based on the circumstances under which they 
typically were negotiated, Third World governments were having 
241 Perrez, supra note 242, at 1190. 
246 G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 1194th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. AJ5217 
(1962), reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 223 (1963). Resolution 1803 was adopted by a vote 
of eighty-seven to two, with twelve states abstaining. See KAMAL HOSSAIN, SUB· 
RATA Roy CHOWDHURY EDS., PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RE· 
SOURCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 91 (1984); Perrez, 
supra note 242, at 1191-92. 
247 In 1952, Chile asserted the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural re-
sources at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.24 
(1952). Also in 1952, The General Assembly passed Resolutions 523 (VI) and 
626 (VII), the latter entitled: "Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and Re-
sources." G.A. Res. 523, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., 360th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 20, 
U.N. Doc. AJ2119 (1952); G.A. Res. 626, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., 411th plen. 
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/PV.411 (1952). See HOSSAIN, supra note 246, at 2. 
248 See JERZY MAKARCZYK, PRINCIPLES OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC OR. 
DER: A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING 184, 198, 199 (1988). 
249 See HOSSAIN, supra note 246. 
210 See MAKARCZYK, supra note 248. 
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little success with individual challenges - a series of which were 
made in arbitrations after World War 11.251 
Therefore, Third World countries sought, through the PSNR 
declaration, to establish the right to expropriate foreign enter-
prises if they deemed it necessary to do SO.252 It was clear that 
resolutions according the right to nationalize were widely sup-
ported and would be easily passed by the UN General Assembly, 
so Western interests turned their energy and attention to the is-
sue of compensation for expropriations. Western states and inter-
ests contended that the relevant law was "well settled" - state 
expropriation of foreign-owned property required payment of 
"prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation under the "Hull 
formula".253 Rejecting the unspoken premise that foreign owner-
ship was presumptively legitimate, and realizing that such a stan-
dard would preclude nationalizations in many poor nations, 
Third World leaders contended that the national tribunals of the 
host country, in accordance with national law, should determine 
compensation.254 The standard, ultimately incorporated into 
UN. General Assembly Resolution 1803, requires "appropriate 
compensation. "255 This would appear to reflect a compromise, 
211 See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co., 27 I.L.R. 117 (Arb. Trib. 
1958); Sapphire Int'l Petroleums Ltd. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136 (Cavin 
Arb. 1963); Petroleum Dev. Ltd. v. Sheikh of the Abu Dhabi, 181.L.R. 144 (Arb. 
Trib. 1951) - all enforcing the validity of long-term pro-Western concessions over 
the objections of Third World hosts. Consequently, nationalizing these conces-
sions bound host states to pay prompt, adequate and effective compensation to 
the alien owners. 
252 See Perrez, supra note 242, at 1191-92. 
m See Patrick Norton, A Law for the Future or a Law for the Past? Modern Tribu-
nals and the Law of International Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT'L. L. 474. 475-76 
(1991); Stephen M. Schwebel, The Story of the u.N. 's Declaration on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 49 AB.A J. 463, 465 (1963) [hereinafter 
Schwebel, Permanent Sovereignty]. The "Hull formula" refers to a pronounce-
ment by U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull in connection with a 1938 dispute 
over Mexico's nationalization of foreign-owned oil fields. See G. HACKWORTH, 3 
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 655-65 (1942). 
254 See G. Roy, Is the Law of the Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part 
of Universal International Law?, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 863 (1961); M. BEDJAOUI, 
TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979); F.V. GARCIA-
AMADOR, THE CHANGING LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 895-932 (1984). 
255 G.A Res. 1803, supra note 246, at 15. At the time of its adoption, the United 
States delegation argued that the phrase "appropriate compensation" made "in 
accordance with international law" meant "prompt, adequate and effective" com-
pensation as required under international law. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDC'S 
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but it has proved to be a victory for capital exporting nations who 
have had the political and economic power to insist on the tradi-
tional (Western) Hull formula.256 This constraint made nationali-
zation too costly for many non-oil exporting states. 
Nonetheless, the principle of permanent sovereignty over 
national resources has been reiterated in subsequent resolutions 
and declarations, and clearly reflects at least a Third World con-
sensus not just on what the law should be - but on what the law 
is.257 Although PSNR ultimately proved to be a hollow victory, 
the PSNR movement and General Assembly Resolution 1803 
were important in establishing momentum for an international 
law of development. This movement next appeared in the form 
of demands for a New International Economic Order. 
B. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 
In the early 1970s, the United Nations was again the forum 
for an exceedingly contentious series of debates between Third 
World leaders and representatives of the Western, capital export-
ing countries. Although the debates were again cast in legal 
terms, the conflict remained fundamentally ideological, having to 
do with the international distribution of power. The principles of 
the movement for a new international economic order ("NIEO") 
were embodied in a set of instruments passed by the United Na-
tions General Assembly. These instruments include the Declara-
tion on the Establishment of the New International Economic 
Order,258 the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a 
Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 649 (1998) (citing Schwebel, Permanent Sover-
eignty, supra note 253). 
2.16 Subsequent state practice of paying what amounts to prompt, adequate and effec-
tive compensation, albeit often under pain of international economic ostracism or 
worse military intervention, has reinforced the Hull formula. Industrialized 
states can now point to extensive state practice to support their position, as well 
as a series of bilateral investment treaties that require payment of prompt, ade-
quate and effective compensation. Guzman, supra note 255, at 648. That Third 
World nations have taken these actions under pain of economic banishment ap-
pears to be besides the point. 
2.17 Nicolass Jan Schriver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and 
Duties in an Interdependent World 3, 4 (2002). 
218 G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. AIRESI 
3201(s_VI} (1974). 
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New International Economic Order259 and the Charter of Eco-
nomic Rights and Duties of States.260 The principles embodied in 
these documents represent an expansion of the movement for 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and continuation 
of the legal effort by Southern countries to find voice and to ex-
ercise more power over their political and economic destinies.261 
Relying on the discourse of sovereignty and believing in both the 
power of international law and the importance of development, 
the NIEO movement asserted that full and permanent sover-
eignty was not limited to natural resources, but applied to all eco-
nomic activities.262 
Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1976,263 the Char-
ter of Economic Rights and Duties of States ("the Charter") was 
the documentary centerpiece of this phase of the movement.264 
LI9 G.A. Res. 3202, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974). 
260 Report of the Second Committee, U.N. Doc. Al9946, 28 (Dec. 9, 1974) and U.N. 
Doc. AlRES/3281 (XXIX) (Jan 15, 1975); G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th 
Sess., 2315th plen. mtg., at 50, U.N. Doc. AlRES/3281 (1974). 
261 V ARGES, supra note 61, at 5, 37. 
262 [d. 
263 CERDS was adopted by a General Assembly vote of 120 to six, with 10 absten-
tions. Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the 
United Kingdom and the United States voted against the Charter. Austria, Ca-
nada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain 
abstained. See RALPH STUART SMITH, THE UNITED STATES AND THE THIRD 
WORLD: A DISCUSSION PAPER (1976). 
264 In April 1972 President Echeverria of Mexico proposed that the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) draft a charter delineating 
the economic rights of nations. In May 1972 UNCTAD voted to establish a 
working group to draft such a charter; UNCTAD Res. 45 (III), U.N. Doc. TD/ 
180. The United States abstained from the vote, but agreed to participate in the 
Working Group. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
§ 26.2, at 1166 (3d ed. 1995). The need for such a charter was explained by Mex-
ico's Secretary of Foreign Relations: 
[T]he underdeveloped countries ... have decided not to continue to playa 
passive role, but to be active participants in the changing of those struc-
tures that hinder their well-being ... [T]he interdependence of all the com-
ponents of the global economic system demands a modification of the 
international structures that condition their behavior. .The greatest men-
ace to peace that we face nowadays is the increasing tension and the very 
noticeable separation between the industrialized countries and those which 
are underdeveloped. 
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The NIEO agenda, as articulated in the Charter, included sub-
jecting private foreign capital to the domestic laws of Third 
World host countries, full and effective participation in world 
governance, special trade preferences, stabilizing export prices 
for commodities exported by Southern countries, debt forgive-
ness or rescheduling, and technology transfer.265 The Charter 
also explicitly recognized the sovereign right to nationalize for-
eign property and to determine what compensation should be 
paid,266 and confirmed the right of host nation governments to 
supervise transnational corporations operating within their juris-
dictions.267 The Charter further mandated that industrialized 
countries cooperate to improve living standards and the general 
welfare in developing countries.268 
Emilio O. Rabasa, Address Before the 68th Annual Meeting of the American 
Society of International Law, in 68 AM. SOC'y INT'L PROC. 302, 303-05 (1974). 
265 See JACKSON, supra note 264, at 1166-67. 
266 Marjorie Cohn, The World Trade Organization: Elevating Property Interests 
Above Human Rights, 29 GA. J. INT'L & CaMP. L 427, 438 (2001). Capital ex-
porting states voted against this provision and have never accepted it. Article 
2(2)(c) of the Charter provides that each state has the right to: 
Nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in 
which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting 
such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all 
circumstances that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the 
question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled 
under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, un-
less it is freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other 
peaceful means be sought on the basis of sovereign equality of States and 
in accordance with the principle of free choice of means. 
Tali Levy, NAFTA 's Provision for Compensation in the Event of Expropriation: A 
Reassessment of the "Prompt, Adequate and Effective Standard, 31 STAN. J. INT'L 
L. 423, 436 (1995). 
267 Under the Charter, the right to supervise foreign business operations included 
the right to establish performance requirements that would ensure that foreign 
investment served the economic and social priorities of national development in 
the host nation. See G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 260, at 52. Cohn. supra note 266, 
at 438. 
268 Cohn, supra note 266, at 53-54. Every state is also charged with a duty to cooper-
ate in promoting the steady and increasing expansion and liberalization of world 
trade. In a reference intended to accommodate socialist nations, CERDS stipu-
lated the right to engage in international trade and economic cooperation irre-
spective of political and economic differences. Id. at 53-54, 438. 
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Northern opposition to the NIEO generally and to the Char-
ter in particular was immediate, uniform and adamant.269 Techni-
cally, Northern countries objected to the Charter's alleged 
rejection of "established principles of international law" - princi-
ples they contended were "neutral" and "universal."27o Third 
World leaders and scholars, however, contended (and still do) 
that international law was contrived in part to enable and justify 
colonialism, and has been an instrument "for enhancing and ag-
gravating human suffering, not for alleviating it."271 Yet even as 
the NIEO movement sought to change legal principles, it also 
relied on law,272 seeking only to change its content and to use it as 
a force for change. Given the overwhelming majorities that ap-
proved these declarations, Southern countries took the position 
that resolutions comprising the New International Economic Or-
der were legally binding on all nation states, but the West dis-
agreed and has never accepted them.273 Although Northern 
269 See Akinsanya & Davies, supra note 61, at 211. 
270 See supra note 233 and accompanying text for discussion in European origins of 
international law. See also, e.g., Elias, supra note 233; Anand, supra note 233; 
Castaneda, supra note 233, at 39; ROLING, supra note 233, at 5; BRIERLY, supra 
note 233, at 44. 
271 Makua wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113, 1140 (1995); see also Antony Anghie, Finding the Periph-
eries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth Century International Law, 40 
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1999). 
m Mexico's Secretary of Foreign Relations appealed for support for the NIEO this 
way: 
Let us subject the fundamental economic elements for the future of world 
development to the rule of law .... Let us codify norms and create an au-
thentic body of rules that will allow the international community to settle 
disputes and control abuses. Law represents a force in itself that can be-
come a basic source of innovation for society. 
Emilio O. Rabasa, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 68 AM. 
SOC'Y INT'L PROe. 302, 303-05 (1974) (address at joint luncheon with the Section 
on International Law of the American Bar Association). Secretary Rabasa also 
analogized specifically to various U.S. legislative measures such as the Social Se-
curity Act of 1935, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, the Employment Act of 1946, and the Economic Opportu-
nity act of 1964 as establishing a principle of redistributing wealth for the protec-
tion and betterment of the disadvantaged within U.S. society. "Why not then 
transfer the philosophy that has been the basis for this new process to the interna-
tional field?" he asked. Id. 
m See Charles N. Brower & John B. Tepe, Jr., The Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States: A Reflection or Rejection of International Law?, 9 INT'L LAW 295, 
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countries detailed their objections to specific provisions of the 
Charter,274 it was unmistakable that the disagreement was not 
merely technical. Rather, the NIEO movement brought into fo-
cus a fundamental political conflict between the West and the 
Third World.275 The debt crisis in the early 1980s was perhaps the 
final blow to the NIEO as many Third World governments were 
now pleading for sufficient funds to stay afloat rather than de-
manding economic and political concessions.276 Although the 
NIEO failed to produce the desired redistribution of interna-
tional economic power, the Third World has been persistent, and 
many of the principles found in the New International Economic 
Order were soon reformulated and reintroduced as the Right to 
Development.277 
300 (1975). There is continuing debate on whether these resolutions reflected 
opino juris, that is evidence of what the overwhelming majority of states believed 
the law to be, and whether simply voting for a resolution is the kind of state 
practice necessary to form customary international law. Most western scholars 
have strenuously argued against according the status of law to UN resolutions, 
especially after large Third World majorities began to find voice in the General 
Assembly. Third World nations have taken the opposing view, arguing that at the 
least such resolutions reflect some version of state practice or opino juris. See 
generally ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963). 
274 Brower & Tepe, supra note 273, at 295, 300-01. 
275 See Stephen M. Schwebel, Counselor on International Law, U.S. Department of 
State, Remarks at the 68th Annual Meeting of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law, in 68 AM. SOC'y INT'L L. PROC. 209, 210-12 (1974). U.S. State De-
partment attorney Stephen Schwebel summed up the Northern view: 
If the Charter turns out to be simply a statement of the alleged rights of the 
developing countries and the alleged duties of the developed, it will be a 
kind of bill of particulars, if not an indictment, which will have no more 
impact on international economic affairs, not to speak of international law, 
than a number of self-serving calls which developing countries have issued 
in the past in UNCTAD and elsewhere. 
Brower & Tepe, supra note 273. 
276 See supra Part II. B. 3 for a discussion of the Third World debt crisis. 
277 Isabella D. Bunn, The Right to Development: Implications for International Eco-
nomic Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1425, 1431 (2000) ("The NIEO challenged 
the status quo, and the far-reaching implications of its implementation, were met 
with substantial resistance by industrialized countries. Notwithstanding these 
controversies, it is clear that many NIEO provisions have helped shape the right 
to development.") 
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C. THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 
In 1986, the United Nations adopted the Declaration on the 
Right to Development ("UNDRD"),278 whose objective was to 
convert development from being merely a goal or aspiration into 
an entitlement, both for countries and for their individual citi-
zens.279 The movement for a right to development continued 
Third World demands for a more equitable distribution of inter-
national power, but it did so in a less threatening and strident 
manner than NIEO demands, perhaps reflecting the weakened 
position of Third World countries in the wake of the debt crisis.280 
The UNDRD also sought to expand the definition of develop-
ment to include technology, human rights, participation, equal 
opportunity, accountability, and differential treatment for devel-
oping countries.281 
278 G.A. Res. 128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Annex at 186, U.N. Doc. A/RES/411128 
(1983). 
279 The right to development purports to operate both collectively at the interna-
tional level, and individually at the domestic level. This evolution - from collec-
tive to both collective and individual, and from international to both international 
and domestic - was key to the transition from the law of development to the right 
to development. Espiell, supra note 231, at 192. "After initiation of the process 
designed to establish a law of development and the right to develop, conceived of 
as a collective right, the idea of the right to development as a human right that is 
a right belonging to individuals began to take shape." [d. The results of this 
transition can be seen in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
("ICCPR") and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights ("ICESR"), G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess .. Supp. No. 16, at 
99, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1966), both of which incorporate many of the principles of 
the human right to development. 
280 It also sought to empower individuals and sub-national groups within individual 
countries. See G.A. Res. 128, supra note 278, at arts. 1.1, 2.1, 2.3 (stating that 
individuals are the primary beneficiaries of the right, and that both individuals 
and the state must work for "the constant improvement of the well-being of the 
entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and 
meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of the bene-
fits resulting there from"). 
281 See Mickelson, supra note 3, at 12 (quoting Keba M'Baye, First President of the 
Supreme Court of Senegal, who emphasized this point in his 1972 speech intro-
ducing the right to development: "Economic growth must be accompanied by 
socio-cultural progress; that means, in the simplest possible terms, that we must 
give it a human dimension ... growth is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for the achievement of development"); Barsh, supra note 152, at 328 (stating that 
participants of the Global Consultations concerned with the implementation of 
the right to development were "especially critical of international development 
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Development as a human right evolved in part from earlier 
assertions regarding the law of development.282 It was first articu-
lated by Senegalese Justice Keba M'Baye,283 who proclaimed that 
"development is the right of all men."284 Justice M'Baye rea-
soned that a human right to development was needed to rectify 
the injustices of an international economic system in which the 
North benefits at the expense of the South.285 M'Baye also main-
tained that basic principles of humanity support a right to devel-
opment,286 and he observed an "inherent correlation between the 
strategies which have been 'oriented merely towards economic growth and finan-
cial considerations' "); Forysthe, supra note 154, at 334. 
282 The law of development asserted the need for a right of development similar to a 
human right, but this right was thought to be a collective one - whereas human 
rights are typically thought of as individual. Espiell, supra note 231, at 190. 
283 See Bunn, supra note 277, at 1433; Mickelson, supra note 3, at 10; Espiell, supra 
note 231, at 192 (all identifying Justice Keba M'Baye as author of the Right to 
Development). This pronouncement was made in his inaugural lecture at the 
Third Session of Instruction of the International Institute for Human Rights. [d. 
284 Espiell, supra note 231, at 192 (quoting Keba M'Baye, Le Droit au developpement 
comme un droit de I'Homme, in 5 REVUE DES DROITS DE L'HoMME 503, 505 
(1972». Following M'Baye's lead, Professor Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo of 
Spain also identified the Right to Development as a human right. Carrillo 
Salcedo, El Derecho al desarollo como un derecho humamo, in 25 REVISTA ESPA-
J\lOLA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 119-25 (1972) ("The right of development 
as a right of states and peoples must unavoidably be founded on the recognition 
of the right of every man to a free and worthy life in his community. Every 
human being has the right to live, which implies the right to aspire to an increas-
ingly better existence."». 
285 Even the "development assistance" contributed by the North, he observed, 
served principally to enable underdeveloped countries to become markets for 
Northern goods and services. See M'Baye, supra note 284, at 15 (noting that 
development assistance is "in many cases little more than a disguised export sub-
sidy," designed to improve the underdeveloped countries' ability to act as a mar-
ket for the finished or semi-finished products of the developed world); 
Mickelson, supra note 3, at 381-83 (Addressing M'Baye's observation that, "the 
deep division between the South and North posed an increasing threat to interna-
tional stability, and hence raising the standard of living in poor countries could be 
"a form of life insurance" for rich countries. M'Baye also stated that since indus-
trialized countries designed and benefited from the current international eco-
nomic system, they were responsible for its injurious consequences.) "Given 
their power in the system and their utilization of that power to their own advan-
tage, the rich countries of the North should assume responsibilities for their ac-
tions." [d. at 13 (quoting M'Baye, supra note 284, at 505, 521-22). 
286 Mickelson, supra note 3, at 13 (quoting M'Baye, supra note 284, at 524). 
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enjoyment of human rights and economic development," believ-
ing that human rights could not be enjoyed without economic 
development.287 
However, those who expected the UNDRD to mark a turn-
ing point in international economic relations have been sorely 
disappointed.288 While development as a human right has been 
advocated by developing countries289 it has been just as vigor-
ously opposed by those nations that would be obliged to render 
the substantial material assistance necessary to effectuate the 
right, and by the international financial institutions whose sup-
port and commitment would be needed to implement it.290 To ac-
knowledge a right to development would mean conceding that 
there is an obligation to provide foreign assistance and to take 
part in the development project. The West has vehemently and 
2Il7 [d. at 14 (quoting M'Baye, supra note 284, at 529). See also Espiell, supra note 
231, at 192 (quoting M'Baye, supra note 284, at 515) (acknowledging M'Baye's 
belief that "[eJach man has the right to live and the right to live better"). 
2118 It should be noted that in his 1972 speech, M'Baye expressed reservations con-
cerning efforts to legalize a human right to development. He maintained that 
these efforts were unnecessary because the human right to development already 
existed. He also feared proponents of the right might lose sight of the desired 
end and find "victory" in a mere legal declaration. See Mickelson, supra note 3, 
at 14. Accordingly, M'Baye opposed those who called for completing the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rig;lts by proclaiming a Right to Development, be-
cause he regarded this as unnecessary, and perhaps even counterproductive: "[IJt 
is hardly useful to encumber ourselves with a new proclamation, as if it were a 
matter of creating a new right. The right to development is already inscribed in 
international law." [d. (quoting M'Baye, supra note 284, at 526). 
'" Bunn, supra note 277, at 1436. 
[Iln terms of international human rights law, the existence of the right to 
development is a fait accompli. Whatever reservations different groups 
may have as to its legitimacy, viability or usefulness, such doubts are now 
better left behind and replaced by efforts to ensure that the formal process 
of elaborating the content of the right is a productive and constructive 
exercise. 
Id. (quoting Philip Alston, Development and the Rule of Law: Prevention Versus 
Cure as a Human Rights Strategy, in DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 31, 106 (International Commission of Jurists eds. 1981». Propo-
nents of the right to development maintain that it has a rich legal foundation that 
includes the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice and other international con-
ventions. Id. 
290 See, e.g., Jack Donnelly, In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics 
of the Right to Development, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 473, 478 (1985). Scholars 
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consistently rejected legal obligations of this variety. The 
UNDRD has not been an exception and, of course, there is no 
effective sanction for non-recognition of the UNDRD.29J 
The UNDRD also clearly defines development as compre-
hensive. While earlier international law of development efforts 
were framed as demands to modify the international distribution 
of economic and political power, the right to development at-
tempts to utilize the human rights framework. Perhaps this re-
flects the weaker position of Third World countries by the 1980s, 
or it may signify an altered post Cold War political landscape that 
has changed the nature of what can be claimed and the mode in 
which those claims can be made. While Third World scholars and 
nations have continued to assert the right to development, some 
have also harkened back to more radical demands292 and have 
sought to hold industrialized countries to account by demanding 
reparations.293 
D. REPARATIONS 
If one accepts the proposition that the Third World has been 
severely and systematically exploited through arrangements that 
include slavery and colonialism,294 then the idea of compensation 
contesting its existence assert that these conventions merely make explicit refer-
ences to "development" which does not mean they support a right to 
development. 
291 Advocates reason that the lack of universal recognition or sanctions for non-ad-
herence does not render the UNDRD meaningless, given the initial rejection of 
many new international human rights. Espiell, supra note 231, at 198 ("Conse-
quently it is evident that the inadequacies that still plague the juridical character-
istics of the right of development in general, and particularly as an individual 
right, do not allow the possibility of denying its legal existence, though it is still 
embryonic and imperfect.") 
292 One of the provisions of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
foreshadowed contemporary demands for reparations. Article 16 calls for resti-
tution based on the injuries caused by "colonialism, apartheid, racial discrimina-
tion, neocolonialism and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation and 
domination." G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 260. 
293 M'Baye observed that since industrialized countries designed and benefited from 
the current international economic system, they were responsible for its injurious 
consequences See Mickelson, supra note 3, at 383 ("Given their power in the 
system and their utilization of that power to their own advantage, the rich coun-
tries of the North should assume responsibilities of their actions." (quoting 
M'Baye, supra note 284». 
294 See, e.g., RODNEY, supra note 243. 
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for that harm should hardly be remarkable.295 But calls for repa-
rations to the victims of slavery and colonialism have been ex-
tremely controversial,296 Drawing on the vigorously debated 
movement in the U.S. for reparations to the descendants of Afri-
can slaves,297 the international struggle for reparations has been 
295 Conceptually, reparations may be the simplest approach to international eco-
nomic justice. Black's Law Dictionary defines reparation as both "[tJhe act of 
making amends for a wrong" and "[cJompensation for an injury or wrong, esp. 
for wartime damages or breach of an international obligation." BLACK'S LAW 
DICfIONARY 1301 (7th ed. 1999). Perhaps it is the natural successor to the NIEO 
and the right to development, insofar as the simplicity of the demand for repara-
tions represents an evolutionary focusing and sharpening of the Third World 
position. 
296 This may be because the simplicity and directness of the idea leaves virtually no 
room for obfuscation or for "spinning" compensation as charitable assistance. 
Although reparations focus on repairing the injury suffered by victims, assigning 
responsibility for payment seems to require the assignment of blame, and this 
inevitably triggers belligerent resistance to reparations proposals. It explains, for 
example, the European Union's refusal, as recently as 2001, to apologize for 
Western Europe's substantial role in the Atlantic slave trade. At the 2001 World 
Conference Against Racism, the lead E.U. negotiator, Belgian Foreign Minister 
Louis Michel, equivocated thusly, "[sJlavery today is, of course, a crime against 
humanity, slavery yesterday, in the past was of course ... a very grave thing, a 
very horrible thing .. .It is very difficult to consider that you can compare slavery 
today to slavery in the past." Europeans at U.N. Meeting Agree to Apology for 
Slavery - But Not to Reparations, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (MISSOURI), Sept. 8, 
2001, at 20. 
m The movement for reparations is really a collection of movements. See, e.g., 
RANDAL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS (2000): 
RICHARD F. AMERICA, PAYING THE SOCIAL DEBT: WHAT WHITE AMERICA 
OWES BLACK AMERICA (1993) (in support of reparations); DAVID HOROWITZ, 
UNCIVIL WARS: THE CONTROVERSY OVER REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY (2003); 
David Horowitz, Ten Reasons Why Reparations for Blacks is a Bad Idea for 
Blacks - and Racist Too, 31 BLACK SCHOLAR 48 (2002) (opposing reparations). 
The reparations movement within the United States has had the benefit of sub-
stantial scholarly analysis. For an excellent summary of legal issues and citations 
to a wealth of writings on the topic, see Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and 
Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497 
(2003). Much of the analysis focuses on substantive and procedural legal issues 
that are specific to the U.S. legal system and on the anticipated legal battles over 
reparations within the domestic U.S. context. See, e.g., Rhonda V. Magee, The 
Master's Tools, from the Bottom Up: Responses to African-American Reparations 
Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. L. REv. 863 
(1993); Adrienne D. Davis, The Case for United States Reparations to African-
Americans, 7 HUM. RTS. BR. 3 (2000); BORIS I. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK 
REPARATIONS (2d ed. 2003); Graham Hughes, Reparations for Blacks?, 43 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1063 (1968). However, scholars in the U.S. - particularly within 
the legal academy - have also done a great deal of theoretical work that is likely 
to be useful in support of Third World demands for international reparations. 
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contested in the United Nations and its associated institutions. 
The latest skirmish was the 2001 World Conference Against Ra-
cism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intoler-
ance (the "Conference" or "WCAR").298 Preparations for the 
Some of this work is litigation oriented, but based on principles that might also 
conceivably resonate with the general public. Unjust enrichment is one such legal 
principle - and a politically interesting option because it does not require blame 
or fault; only (basically) that a benefit has been received and retained, and that 
injustice will result if the benefit is not disgorged. See generally E. ALLAN FARNS-
WORTH, CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1999); DOUG RENDLEMAN, RJ!MEDIES CASES AND 
MATERIALS (6th ed. 1999). Difficulties with the technical application of the doc-
trine of unjust enrichment include calculating the benefit conferred and offsetting 
any gain received by the plaintiffs, and tracing the benefit to its present holders. 
Brophy, supra note 297, at 522. In light of the anticipated difficulty of achieving 
reparations through litigation, some supporters of reparations for African Ameri-
cans are advocating a more overtly political approach that relies on the legislative 
process. Id. at 523. 
298 Held in September in Durban, South Africa, the 2001 WCAR was actually the 
third in a series (and is thus sometimes referred to as the "Third World Confer-
ence Against Racism"). The first World Conference Against Racism was con-
vened in Geneva, Switzerland in August 1978, and attended by representatives of 
125 countries, as well as observers from U.N. agencies, intergovernmental organi-
zations, and non-governmental organizations. REPORT OF THE WORLD CONFER-
ENCE TO COMBAT RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, U.N. Doc. AfCONF. 
92/40, U.N. Sales No. E79.xIV.2 (1978) [hereinafter RACISM REPORT]. Because 
of a 1975 General Assembly Resolution equating Zionism with racism and racial 
discrimination, the United States and Israel boycotted the 1978 Conference. 
G.A. Res. 3379, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 83, U.N. Doc. Af10034 
(1975); RACISM REPORT, supra note 298. See also U.S. Participation in the United 
Nations, REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1977, at 172 
(1977). The first Conference focused mainly on South Africa, with a majority of 
participating nations favoring strong international measures to oppose and dis-
mantle the apartheid regime. There was some disagreement regarding the nature 
of the measures that should be taken against South Africa, and some (mainly 
Western European) disagreement with the conference majority's condemnation 
of Israel's treatment of the Palestinians. RACISM REPORT, supra note 298, at 15, 
113, 129-30. A second World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Dis-
crimination was held in August 1983. Geneva was again the venue, South Africa 
and the Middle East were again the principal topics, and the United States again 
chose not to attend because of the majority's position on the latter. See id. As 
with the first conference, Western commentators proclaimed the second confer-
ence a failure. See, e.g., Christopher N. Camponovo, Disaster in Durban: The 
United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xeno-
phobia, and Related Intolerance, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 659,667 (2003». 
Despite majority agreement on its principal themes and conclusions, in 1997, the 
General Assembly resolved to convene a third World Conference Against Ra-
cism, to be held in Durban, in the newly democratized South Africa. G.A. Res. 
52/111, supra note 298. 
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Conference included four regional conferences and each Re-
gional Conference adopted reports addressing the most impor-
tant issues to their region.299 These Regional Conferences 
revealed that the most important issues to many Third World 
countries included the legacy of colonialism, slavery and the 
slave trade,3°O matters that were not priorities for Western 
nations.301 Indeed, the African regional Declaration focused 
299 Regional conferences were held in Strasbourg, France; Santiago, Chile; Dakar, 
Senegal; and Teheran, Iran. In addition, five regional expert seminars were held 
in Geneva. Warsaw, Bangkok, Addis Ababa and Santiago during 1999 and 2000. 
United Nations, World Conference Against Racism, Basic Information, The 
World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Re-
lated Intolerance, at http://www.un.orgIWCAR/e-kitlbackgrounderl.htm (last vis-
ited May 22, 2002). 
JOO For example, the Asian Preparatory Conference in Teheran concluded that 
"States which pursued policies or practices based on racial or national superior-
ity. such as colonialism or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, 
slavery. the slave trade and ethnic cleansing, should assume responsibility ... and 
compensate the victims of such policies and practices." Reports of Preparatory 
Meetings and Activities at the International, Regional and National Levels, Report 
of the Asian Preparatory Meeting (Tehran. Feb. 19-21,2001), U.N. GAOR, Pre-
paratory Comm., 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/PC.2/9 (2001). At the Santi-
ago Regional Conference, representatives of countries in North, Central and 
South America. and the Caribbean agreed to "take measures to alleviate inequi-
ties that still persist because of the shameful legacy of slavery." The delegates 
also condemned "the brutal crimes and injustices that were committed against 
indigenous peoples and Africans and their descendants who were subjected to 
slavery, the trans-Atlantic slave trade and other forms of servitude that today 
could constitute crimes against humanity." Reports of Preparatory Meetings and 
Activities at the International, Regional and National Levels, Report of the Re-
gional Conference of the Americas (Santiago. Chile. Dec. 5-7, 2000), U.N. GAOR, 
Preparatory Comm., 2d Sess., Annex IV-V, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 189/PC.2/ 
7 (2001) [hereinafter Santiago Report]. 
301 These matters that were not addressed in the documents adopted by the Euro-
pean regional conference in Strasbourg. See Reports of Preparatory Meetings and 
Activities at the International, Regional and National Levels, Final Documents of 
the European Conference Against Racism (Strasbourg, France. Oct. 11-13,2000), 
U.N. GAOR, Preparatory Comm., 2d Sess., Annex IV-V, U.N. Doc. AlCONF. 
189/PC.2/6 (2001). Only over the strenuous objections of the United States and 
Canada, did the Santiago conference acknowledge that slavery was an interna-
tional crime, resulting in: 
[Sjubstantial and lasting economic, political and cultural damage to these 
peoples and. . justice now requires substantial national and international 
efforts to repair such damage. Such reparation should be in the form of 
policies, programmes and measures adopted by the States, which benefited 
materially from these practices, and designed to rectify the economic, cul-
tural and political damage, which inflict the affected communities and 
peoples. 
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primarily on injuries stemming from slavery and colonialism,302 
and recommended international compensation for its victims.303 
Although later events diverted attention from the WeAR 
debate over reparations,304 it was apparent that reparations were 
Santiago Report, supra note 300, at 14, 70. 
J02 The African regional Conference in Dakar, Senegal focused primarily on slavery 
and colonialism. The Declaration adopted by the Dakar conference stated: 
[T]he slave trade, ... colonialism and apartheid ... have had profound crip-
pling effects on the economic development of Africa and. .justice now 
requires that substantial national and international efforts be made to re-
pair the damage; ... States which pursued racist policies or acts of racial 
discrimination such as slavery and colonialism should assume their moral, 
economic, political and legal responsibilities ... and provide adequate repa-
ration to those communities or individuals who, individually or collectively, 
are victims of such racist policies or acts, regardless of when or by whom 
they were committed. 
Reports of Preparatory Meetings and Activities at the International, Regional and 
National Levels, Report of the Regional Conference of Africa (Dakar, Jan. 22-24, 
2001), U.N. GAOR, Preparatory Comm., 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. AlCONF. 1891 
PC.2/8 (2001) [hereinafter Dakar Report). The Dakar delegates recommended 
that a follow-up mechanism be established and entrusted with supervising imple-
mentation of the Declaration and Programme of Action to be adopted by the 
World Conference, and that such mechanism be required to report annually to 
the United Nations General Assembly. Id. 
'0' The Programme of Action adopted by the Dakar conference included the follow-
ing language: 
An International Compensation Scheme should be set up for victims of the 
slave trade, as well as victims of any other transnational racist policies and 
acts ... A Development Reparation Fund should be set up to provide re-
sources for the development process in countries affected by colonial-
ism ... [S]uch reparation should be in the form of enhanced policies, 
programmes and measures to be adopted by States which benefit materi-
ally from these practices in order to rectify, through affirmative action, the 
economic, cultural and political damage which has been inflicted on the 
affected communities and peoples in the full implementation of their right 
to development. 
Id. 
)1)4 On the fourth day of the Durban conference, the United States and Israel with-
drew their delegations in protest over the decided likelihood that the Conference 
would condemn Israel for its treatment of the Palestinians. Rachel L. Swans, U.S. 
and Israelis Quit Racism Talks over Denunciation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2001, at 
AI; Douglas Blackmon, U.S., Israel Pull Delegates Out of U.N. Conference on 
Racism, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2001, at A12. A few days after the Conference 
ended, the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, 
D.C. were attacked on September 11, 2001. N.R. Kleinfeld, U.s. Attacked: Hi-
jacked Jets Destroy Twin Towers and Hit Pentagon i'l Day of Terror, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 12, 2001, at AI. These events diverted Western media attention first from 
the issue of reparations and then from the Conference in its entirety. 
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a clear priority for many nations of the world.305 The Declaration 
ultimately adopted by the Conference concluded that colonialism 
led to racism, racial discrimination and related intolerance, and 
that "the effects and persistence of these structures and practices 
have been among the factors contributing to lasting social and 
economic inequalities in many parts of the world today."306 
Nonetheless, the Programme of Action did not endorse repara-
tions for those countries that had been the victims of colonialism. 
Instead it acknowledged a "need to develop programmes for the 
301 Report of the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenopho-
bia and Related Intolerance (Durban, Aug. 31-Sept. 8, 2001), U.N. ESCOR, at 
5-27, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.189/12 (2002) [hereinafter Durban Report). See also 
Celina Romany & Katherine Culliton, The UN World Conference Against Ra-
cism: A Race-Ethnic and Gender Perspective, 9 HUM. BRTB No.2, at 14, 15 
(2002); Nicole Itano, Former Colonies Calling for Reparations, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Sept. 5, 20m, at A-I, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2001l0905/ 
p1s4-wogLhtml. Proponents of reparations - notably the African delegates who 
had met at the Dakar regional conference - also sought apologies for slavery and 
colonialism, noting "other groups that were subjected to other scourges and injus-
tices have received repeated apologies from different countries, as well as ample 
reparations, on a bilateral basis, from both public and private sources and lately 
through certain international organizations." Dakar Report, supra note 302, at 'I! 
29. Certain Native Americans, Holocaust victims, Japanese Americans interned 
during World War II, and South Africans have obtained some form of reparations 
in recent years. Brophy, supra note 297, at 499. Australia, Austria, France, Ger-
many, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United Kingdom - as well as religious 
denominations and multinational corporations - have in recent years offered 
apologies for past wrongs. William Bradford, With a Very Great Blame on Our 
Hearts: Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with 
Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2002/2003). Professor Brophy adds that 
U.S. President Clinton "apologized for, was part of apologies for, or discussed 
apologizing for slavery, the genocide in Rwanda, executions of civilians during 
the Korean war, the United States' support of Guatemala's military while it com-
mitted genocide, medical experiments on African Americans at Tuskegee, radia-
tion experiments, and the deprivation of native Hawaiians' land." Brophy, supra 
note 297, at 501. Professor Bradford has termed this an age of apology. Brad-
ford, supra note 305, at 5-6; Brophy, supra note 297, at 501. Apologies would not 
be extended at this Conference, however. The U.S. delegation withdrew from the 
Conference and did not endorse the final Declaration. Tom Lantos, The Durban 
Debacle: An Insider's View of the UN World Conference Against Racism, 26 
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 31, 48 (2002). European Union delegates avoided 
apologizing, declined to offer reparations, and refused to acknowledge that the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade was a crime against humanity at the time it occurred. 
Michael Slackman, Divisive u.N. Race Talks End in Accord, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 
2001, at AI. 
J(]6 Durban Report, supra note 305, at 14. The Declaration also proclaimed that 
"slavery and the slave trade are a crime against humanity." Id. 
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social and economic development of these societies and the dias-
pora, within the framework of a new partnership based on the 
spirit of solidarity and mutual respect. "307 
Many who supported reparations were very disappointed.308 
Yet, the inability to garner sufficient support for reparations is 
not surprising, nor is endorsement and adoption of the alterna-
tive programs for economic and social development. To demand 
reparations is to demand compensation that can be utilized as the 
payee sees fit. Harking back to the more militant demands of the 
New International Order, reparations are a more radical demand 
to return plundered assets, jurisdiction and authority to their 
rightful possessors, the governments and peoples of the Third 
World. It would indeed be surprising that an international com-
munity that views certain peoples as underdeveloped and in need 
of developing into something else would adopt such a concept.309 
Additional programs, designed and implemented by interna-
tional institutions, however, do fit within the current paradigm 
that defines the Third World. Thus putting the case for repara-
tions on the international public record is an act of historic signif-
icance - despite its rejection by those countries and interests 
currently in power.310 Moreover, its overwhelming rejection by 
the West and the endorsement in its stead of development says 
much about development as discourse. 
307 !d. at 158. 
30S For example, Fode Dabor, an ambassador from Sierra Leone and a member of 
the African negotiating committee at the Durban Conference, said, "[tJhis is very 
bad, very disappointing, but we all had to go along because no one wanted to 
take the blame for the conference collapsing. We lost on everything, the question 
of the apology, the question of the slave trade and the question of reparations." 
Slackman, supra note 305. Moreover, Western press accounts of the conference 
were overwhelmingly negative - many amounting, in fact, to ridicule of the Con-
ference and the positions asserted by its majority. See, e.g., Lantos, supra note 
305, at 48; Anne Bayesfsky, The u.N. World Conference Against Racism: A racist 
anti-racism conference, American Society of International Law, PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE ANNUAL MEETING 65-74 (2002); Camponovo, supra note 298, at 667. 
309 Given the role of the U.S. and other European powers in the slave trade and the 
lack of any real regret for their activities, perhaps this lack of support is not 
surprising. 
310 The Durban conference contributes importantly to strengthening the case that is 
already supported by the great majority of the membership of the United Na-
tions. Samir Amin, World Conference Against Racism: A People's Victory, 53 
MONTHLY REV. 7, 20 (2001). 
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International law proved incapable of being a starting place 
for reordering the international economic system and sharing ec-
onomic power with the Third World. International law is based 
in part on shared interests,311 but it is also based on power and 
that power resides with the industrialized world, and more partic-
ularly these days, with the United States. Law has been used in 
the service of development and as a mechanism to control the 
Third World, through such principles as prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation. When Third World nations sought to 
use law as a source of strength and power they were rebuffed and 
then simply ignored, as their proposals died a slow but inevitable 
death. International law proved incapable of assisting the non-
West, for its purpose is to serve the West. In the era of globaliza-
tion, international law will be an even stronger part of the edifice 
that locks the Third World into chasing a future that is made in 
the West through the discourse of Development 
IV. DECONSTRUCTING DEVELOPMENT 
'Development is the process by which other peoples are 
"dominated, and their destinies are shaped, according to an 
essentially Western way of conceiving and perceiving the 
world; it is part of an imperial process whereby other peo-
ples are appropriated and turned into objects". Develop-
ment is a fundamental part of the process 'whereby the 
developed countries manage, control and even create the 
Third World economically, politically, sociologically and 
culturally '.312 
Development can be viewed as an idea, an objective or as an 
activity.313 Previous parts of this article have discussed develop-
ment within each of these contexts. This part turns to decon-
structing the development paradigm by interrogating 
311 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE, LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (2d 
ed. 1979). 
m Tucker, supra note 64, at 1. 
113 As Professors Kothari and Minogue note, when development is explored as an 
idea, one is in the realm of theory. When objectives are established. one is de-
lineating the process by which ideas are turned into practice. Examining actual 
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development as discourse314 and as ideology.3\5 Postmodernism's 
considerations of difference and discourse, and its challenge to 
the universalizing "truths" of enlightenment thinking, greatly as-
sist in appraising development in both theory and practice.316 
Scholars have drawn on this perspective to question whether de-
velopment is synonymous with westernization and moderniza-
tion, and whether Western political, social and economIC 
practice entails analysis of these activities. Of course, even the idea of develop-
ment is contested territory. Kothari & Minogue, supra note 7, at 12. The mean-
ing of development in practice is also contested. See supra Part II B for 
discussion of the cycles of conventional development policy wisdom. 
314 This term is used is used in the broader Foucauldian sense of discourse: 
The key feature is that the world is not simply "there" to be talked about, 
rather it is through discourse itself that the world is brought into being. It 
is also in such a discourse that speakers and hearers, writers and readers, 
come to an understanding about themselves, their relationship to each 
other and their place in the world (the construction of subjectivity). It is 
the "complex of signs and practices which organizes social existence and 
social reproduction" ... There are certain unspoken rules controlling which 
statements can be made and which cannot within the discourse, and these 
rules determine the nature of the discourse .... These rules concern such 
things as classification. the ordering and distribution of that knowledge of 
the world that the discourse both enables and delimits. 
BILL ASHCROFT ET AL., KEY CONCEPTS IN POST-COLONIAL STUDIES 71 (1998). 
For a definition that uses law as an example of discourse. see HERBERT KOHL. 
POWERFUL IDEAS FOR POWERFUL THINKING 59 (1993). 
J1j Ideology has been defined as: 
Ideas, attitudes, and values that represent the interests of a group or class 
of people. These ideas are expressed through the arts, and in all of the 
ways in which a group within a society displays its perception of the 
world .... Ideas do not express realities so much as the values of the people 
who control society. They are false in that they claim truth and universality 
even though they are rooted in historically based economic relationships. 
Analyzing an ideology consists ... of discovering how dominant systems of 
ideas relate to the actual needs, demands, and self-descriptions of the rul-
ing class. 
HERBERT KOHL, FROM ARCHETYPE TO ZEITGEIST POWERFUL IDEAS FOR Pow. 
ERFUL THINKING 59 (1992). 
316 Postmodernism is a rejection of modernity and is characterized by the acceptance 
of ephemerality. fragmentation, discontinuity and attacks on the notion that there 
might be a metalanguage or metatheory through which all things can be con-
nected or represen ted. There is "an in tense distrust of all global or totalizing 
discourses, a rejection of metanarratives, of large-scale theoretical interpreta-
tions, of universal application. Postmodernism also rejects the Hegelian view of 
history and the idea of progress." MADAN SARUP ET. AL.. IDENTITY, CULTURE 
AND THE POSTMODERN WORLD 95 (1996). 
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institutions and practices (whether liberal or socialist) are the 
keys to solving the problems of the Third World.3!7 
A. POSITIONING DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
WESTERN IMAGINATION 
If development is a natural and universal process, and an 
inherent part of the human condition, we can only critique its 
successes or failures - not the concept itself. It often seems that 
development is indeed innate, for it is seldom contested in a fun-
damental fashion and the reaction to those who raise such que-
ries is often incredulity or outright dismissal. Although it is 
shrouded by a discourse that portrays it as a universal and invari-
ably desirable process, development is actually a set of "prac-
tices and beliefs that are woven into the fabric of Western culture 
and is specific to it. "318 Development is neither an innate process, 
nor a trans-cultural concept that can claim universal validity.319 
Rather, many of the ideas embedded within the development 
paradigm, such as progress, planning, poverty and modernization 
are firmly rooted within Western economic, political and cultural 
thought.320 
317 The entire idea of development epitomizes modernity, which has been described 
as follows: 
Modernity is usually perceived as positivistic, technocratic and rationalistic. 
It has been identified with the belief in linear progress, absolute truths, the 
rational planning of ideal social orders, and the standardization of knowl-
edge and its production. The modernity project came into focus during the 
eighteenth century, and was an extraordinary intellectual effort on the part 
of Enlightenment thinkers to develop objective science, universal morality 
and autonomous art. Enlightenment thinkers embraced the idea of pro-
gress; they believed in justice and in the possibility of the human happiness. 
SARUP, supra note 316, at 94; Jane L. Parpart, Post-Modernism, Gender and De-
velopment, in POWER OF DEVELOPMENT 253 (Jonathan Crush, ed. 1995). 
318 Tucker, supra note 64, at 2 (Postulating that it may be because the "myth of de-
velopment" is part of the social imaginary of Western societies, that despite the 
transfer of goods, gadgets, capital, technology, hospitals and roads, the economic 
and socioeconomic accomplishments of the West have not necessarily been repli-
cated in Third World countries. He also notes that the economic, social and polit-
ical transformations of the Third World are inseparable from the production and 
reproduction of meanings, symbols and knowledge that is cultural reproduction.). 
319 [d. 
320 For critical analysis of these and other widely accepted development concepts, 
see THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY, supra note 1. 
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The widespread acceptance of development as instinctive or 
natural has much to do with the power of the West to construct 
the prism through which the world is perceived. At the heart of 
this overwhelmingly dominant western world view321 is Euro-cen-
trism - "the conscious or unconscious process by which Europe 
and Euro-American assumptions are constructed as, or assumed 
to be, the normal, the natural or the universal. "322 This perspec-
tive has become the near-exclusive organizing principle and eval-
uative standard for humankind.323 The West not only influences 
and alters but, in some ways, essentially produces other cul-
tures.324 Indeed, much of the non-West now uses the West, al-
most instinctively, as the standard for judging the worth of its 
societies.325 Euro-centrism also organizes the system of thought 
321 See Sardar, supra note 55, at 44 ("Western civilization is not located in a geo-
graphical space, for in these days of globalization it envelopes the globe with its 
desires, images, politics, and consumer and cultural products."). 
322 ASHCROFT ET AL., supra note 314, at 91. By the eighteenth century, the concept 
of Europe was solidly constructed as a sign of superiority and as being in opposi-
tion to the rest of the world's cultures. Eurocentrism is also present in the very 
existence of such fields as anthropology, in the assumptions and practices of 
Christianity through mission education and mission activity. and in the assumed 
superiority of Western mathematics, cartography, art and numerous other cul-
tural and social practices which have been claimed, or assumed to be based on a 
universal, objective set of values. /d. at 91-92. 
323 For instance, the West defines "civilization" by reference to technology, thereby 
measuring other civilizations by technological capabilities. The Eurocentric idea 
of nation-state has been deemed to be the only desirable and legitimate form of 
political organization, forcing non-Western societies to organize in this manner. 
Groups without a state are viewed as people without a home, such as the Kurds, 
gypsies and Jews before the state of Israel was established. Freedom is defined in 
a way that does not incorporate basic needs such as hunger and housing or the 
subordination of freedom for more eminent goals such as community and tradi-
tion. Instead the focus is the individuai - which is the epitome of the Western 
view of freedom. All of these Eurocentric categories play an intrinsic role in 
development. Sardar, supra note 55, at 49. 
324 ASHCROFT ET AL., supra note 314, at 91-92. 
,25 The non-West includes intellectuals, academics, writers, thinkers, novelists, politi-
cians and decision-makers in Asia, Africa and Latin America who use the West as 
the yardstick for measuring the social and political progress within their own soci-
eties. Accordingly, the non-West promotes Eurocentrism, both wittingly and un-
wittingly, and colludes in its own victimization while simultaneously maintaining 
the global system of inequality. Sardar, supra note 55. at 44. 
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known as development.326 This is not to suggest that develop-
ment is inherently flawed or invalid because it emanates from the 
West.327 Rather, it is to submit that because development is 
merely a particular system of thought, it is not impervious to fun-
damental challenge or critique. The power of Euro-centrism 
makes this critique difficult,328 however, and reduces even devel-
opment's most serious critics to attacking it from within the 
boundaries of the paradigm.329 
Locating development within the Western imagination may 
seem to suggest that the Third World is "a passive vessel for ideas 
that emanate from the West".330 But neither the West nor its 
326 Whether employing such terms as First World and Third World, or describing 
developed nations as post-industrial societies or as nations in the throes of ad-
vanced capitalism and the non-West as merely industrializing, Eurocentrism can-
not be expunged from the concept of.development. "Development continues to 
mean what it has always meant: a standard by which the West measures the non-
West." [d. at 49. 
J21 Notwithstanding the at times dubious motivations of its proponents, moderniza-
tion or progress as defined by the West is not by definition objectionable - al-
though its desirability can certainly be debated. Indeed, it has been the subject of 
much debate. For a variety of perspectives, see THE POST-DEVELOPMENT 
READER, supra note 11. Rather, it is to suggest that although the dominant West-
ern view is only one perspective, it has been held to be the universal point of 
reference and the only perspective deemed worthy of shaping countless lives for 
the last fifty-five years; other views have been dismissed as invalid or irrelevant. 
Esteva, supra note 1, at 6. 
328 For a discussion of natural law in both its traditional and modern permutations, 
see Brian Bix, Natural Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LE-
GAL THEORY 223 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1999). 
329 For example, despite the challenges dependency theory presented to the prevail-
ing economic order, it shared many of the underlying premises of the moderniza-
tion discourse, never questioning the desirability of development and conceiving 
of it in terms of economic growth, industrialization and liberal democracy. 
Tucker, supra note 64, at 14. The postmodern critique itself can be criticized as 
being part of the Western imagination and Western discourse and its demolition 
of such grand narratives as religion, tradition and history may be inimical to the 
interests of the non-West for it is these things that make the non-West, the non-
West. Sardar, supra note 55, at 45. 
3JO Professor Kiely warns that dismissing development as Eurocentrism is "too sim-
plistic, for it homogenizes both the West and the Third World and reduces the 
latter to passive recipients of the ideas of the former. It then becomes difficult to 
imagine how the people of the Third World could behave in any way other than 
being simple puppets of the West." He contends that a satisfactory analysis of 
development would regard it not only as a European creation, but also as a re-
flection of the responses, reactions and resistance of the people who are its ob-
jects. He cautions that critics be careful to not reduce development to an idea 
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ideas are a homogenous totality, and certainly the millions of 
people who have been on the receiving end of development poli-
cies possess complex histories, societies, politics, cultures and in-
dividuallives. They have responded to development in countless 
ways, and development itself has changed and evolved, at times 
in reaction to these mUltiple responses. Nonetheless, for the 
most part the development project continues to be shaped by 
Western elites and experts, who define its objects, theories and 
practices.331 Its theoretical underpinnings can be found in en-
lightenment philosophy,332 and its veneer of universality and inev-
itability is part of the Eurocentrism that shapes most 
contemporary worldviews, and simultaneously devalues and 
marginalizes the knowledge of others.333 Development thus ele-
vates and reinforces the power of the West, as it controls and in 
essence creates the Third World.334 
Development is rooted in an evolutionary myth that reduces 
history to a series of formal stages.335 Although this myth is 
founded on the particular experiences of European societies, the 
without a history and that is impervious to change, when in fact development 
discourse - its language, strategy and practice - has changed over time, both in 
response to previous strategies and to shifts in power relations in the world. 
Kiely, supra note 7, at 36. 
J31 At the level of policy makers, who are comprised of national and international 
elites, the West has largely won the political, social and ideological battle. Most 
Third World elites attend university in the West, have professors and teachers 
from the West, and have in many respects accepted the Western view of the 
world. Tucker, supra note 64, at 13 (discussing the preponderance of universities, 
institutes, research grants and foundations in the West, all of which support and 
solidify certain world views). Those who reject a Eurocentric worldview are 
marginalized as radicals, fundamentalists, cultural nationalists, or as being irra-
tional, crazy or otherwise to be dismissed. See Sardar, supra note 55, at 44-62. 
At the grassroots level, the acceptance or rejection of Eurocentricity may be 
more complex. Here resistance to development can be found in myriad acts that 
are often classified as ignorance or lack of common sense. These voices are re-
duced to what post-colonialist term "clamor." Ruth Gordon, Critical Race The-
ory and International Law, 45 VILL. L. REV. 827, 835 (2000) [hereinafter Gordon, 
Critical Race Theory]. 
332 SARUP ET. AL., supra note 316, at 94. (discussing the enlightenment foundations 
of modernity). 
m Sardar, supra note 55, at 44, 47-49. 
'34 Tucker, supra note 64, at 1. 
m Indeed these underlying assumptions are so taken for granted that they often 
escape critical scrutiny. [d. at 7. 
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development paradigm regards these stages as universal and ap-
plicable to all societies.336 It is the norm by which other social 
orders are judged,337 and all societies are presumed to transverse 
the same fixed and linear path.338 This linear view of the past, 
present and future is necessarily imbued with hierarchy for the 
concept of development suggests that: 
There are nations that have embraced Western technology 
enough to be developed; there are other nations on a lower scale 
of civilization that are developing; and there are still other na-
tions that, steeped in religion and tradition, reject all forms of 
liberalism and secularism and thus remain underdeveloped ... 339 
Western industrialized nations are at the pinnacle of this edi-
fice and the nations of the Third World are necessarily 
subordinate to those at the apex. But development holds out the 
prospect that, with the assistance of the "more advanced," 
the underdeveloped could catch up and also become modern 
and developed.340 These assumptions were a natural exten-
sion of a colonial discourse that emphasized Third World cul-
tural, political, social and racial inferiority341 and justified itself, 
336 See, e.g., Teodor Shanin, The Idea of Progress, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT 
READER, supra note 11, at 65. 
337 Tucker, supra note 64, at 7. 
318 MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at 38. See supra notes 55-69 and accompa-
nying text on Modernization theory. 
3J9 Sardar, supra note 55, at 49. 
340 Thcker, supra note 64, at 7. Under the rubric of modernization, Westernization 
gained the status of a universal goal and destiny. Progress became not only inevi-
table. but also obligatory and orthodox development hinged on the absolute cer-
tainty of universal modernity. To the "West development" and "modernization" 
characterized efforts by those in the Third World whom they implicitly assumed 
to be destined to achieve their levels of consumption. /d. See also Jose Maria 
Sbert, Progress, in THE DEVELOPMENT DlcrIONARY, supra note 1, at 192. 
141 Colonialism was legitimized and grounded in part on a racial discourse that de-
fined white Europeans as a superior race with a superior culture, and other races 
as inferior and in need of being civilized by whites. See Gordon, Saving Failed 
States, supra note 12, at 908-09; Gordon, Racing U.S. Foreign Policy, supra note 
13, at 14-15. This raises questions regarding the role of race and culture in con-
structing development as discourse, as the largely colored colonized world be-
came the colonized and then the underdeveloped "Other." While race is only 
one of many factors, it is an additional means to separate developers from the 
Other. It may make it is easier to view such peoples as incapable and, implicitly, 
as inferior. See, e.g., Leonard Frank, The Development Game, in THE POST-DE· 
VELOPMENT READER, supra note 11, at 262 (A Canadian described the make-up 
of his development project assessment "team," which included an American, a 
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in part, by a paternalistic mission to uplift and civilize the 
natives.342 While development is a postcolonial (if not a neo-co-
lonial) discourse,343 it has strong colonial roots.344 Indeed, the 
transition from colonialism to the development process may have 
been merely a shift in emphasis rather than the end of one pro-
ject and the beginning of another.345 The rhetoric of colonialism 
Korean, a Japanese, a Dane, and a Bangladeshi, thrown in only for color. He also 
admits his surprise and discomfort when the Other looked too white). Certainly 
there are also issues of class, and Third World elites also generally promote the 
development project. It has also been demonstrated that development theory 
and practice is gendered. See, e.g., Kothari, supra note 22, at 39. Yet the Third 
World is largely the colored world and thus it is at least worth questioning the 
degree to which race figures into the international hierarchy that development 
epitomizes. Power within development discourse resides in the West, and more 
specifically in international institutions that are dominated by western, and pri-
marily white, nations. This is not to say that these Institutions do not employ 
people from many nations, including people of color from all parts of the world. 
Nonetheless, the policies that emanate from these institutions are formed in 
Western capitals and institutions. Markets now dominate, because the U.S. has 
decided that markets dominate. To work in these Institutions one must believe in 
the models they propound. Alternative views are simply absorbed, watered-
down co-opted, or dismissed. 
342 Gordon, Saving Failed States, supra note 12 (discussing trusteeship and colonial-
ism as part of the civilizing mission and the white man's burden of uplifting the 
natives); Parpart, supra note 317, at 261. 
.143 In its simplest formulation, "post-colonial" or "postcolonial" refers, chronologi-
cally, to the post independence period. However, since the late 1970s, the term 
has had a more complex meaning and is utilized to discuss the various cultural 
effects of colonization. See ASHCROFf ET AL., supra note 314, at 186. 
Postcolonial theory has been described as an "umbrella term for diverse critical 
approaches that deconstruct Western thought, and refers not to a simple periodis-
ation but rather to a methodological revisionism that enables a wholesale critique 
of Western structures of knowledge and power." Kothari, supra note 22, at 39. 
For a discussion of the shifting and sometimes vague distinctions between 
postcolonial and post-colonial, see ASHCROFf ET AL., supra note 314, at 186-92. 
344 Kothari, supra note 22, at 36-37 (noting that there may not be a clear distinction 
between the before of colonialism and the after of independence, that can be 
viewed as two sharply contrasting periods separated by the moment of 
decolonization ). 
345 Indeed, as early as 1937, one colonial governor said, "the exploitation theory ... is 
dead, and the development theory has taken its place." Bernard Bordillon, The 
African Producer in Nigeria, West Africa, Jan 30, 1937, at 75, cited in 1 DEvEsH 
KAPUR ET AL, supra note 30, at 96 n. 35. It took a while after the governor's 
insight for the rhetoric to change, but change it did. See Kothari, supra note 22, at 
37 (discussing the extent to which the end of colonialism mayor may not have 
signaled an end to empire, although it did effectively suggest the end of a specific 
form of imperialism even as imperial interest and global reach continued to be 
present). 
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re-emerged in the language of international development agen-
cies through a discourse that emphasized the vulnerability and 
helplessness of Third World peoples.346 The World Bank sent 
"missions" to underdeveloped countries to formulate wide-rang-
ing development programs that would, in effect, bring salva-
tion.347 There was now a moral imperative to intervene,348 even as 
the power relationship that formerly existed between the colo-
nizer and the colonized continued?49 By the middle of the 20th 
century, those whom Europeans had previously designated as 
"uncivilized" and "backward" now had a new appellation: 
underdeveloped.350 
B. CONSTRUCTING THE UNDERDEVELOPED 
A critical aspect of the dominance of the West resides in its 
power to produce and propagate knowledge and to thereby cre-
ate categories such as the underdeveloped.351 The West has been 
able to define and indeed to create the "Other" - objects to be 
).16 Parpart, supra note 317, at 261. This language then provides the rationale for the 
neo-c1assic market-oriented reforms being forced on Third World governments 
with the promise that they will reconstruct their economies. [d. 
,,, Escobar, Planning, supra note 157, at 135. 
148 While colonial discourse constructed an obligation to undertake the white man's 
burden and civilize the natives, such considerations were clearly secondary to the 
economic and political aspects of colonialism. With development, the West now 
had an obligation, and indeed was morally obligated to intervene in the Third 
World and modernize the underdeveloped. 
349 Kothari, supra note 22, at 39. Professor Kathari continues that "the boundaries 
and distinctions that formerly marked the power relations between colonizers 
and the colonized continue to be played out, and are reinscribed on the relation-
ship between development and administrators and recipients of aid." [d. 
35{) Sbert, supra note 340, at 192. 
3S1 Tucker, supra note 64, at 13 (noting that the media is based in Western nations 
and is accompanied by the overwhelming dominance of European and North 
American Universities, foundations, institutes and research resources. Western 
scholars can obtain grants to study in the Third World, while it is more difficult 
for Third World scholars to study in the West, and when they do; they are social-
ized into the dominant paradigms of Western thinking. The unequal relationship 
that persists between the West and the Third World is an integral part of this 
process). 
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studied, described and developed/52 and that "Other" is invaria-
bly lacking, deficient, inferior,353 and in need of Western assis-
tance.354 This power to define and represent others is assumed 
"in the portrayal of ways in which people live their lives, in artic-
ulating their experiences - and on this basis, in shaping the 
processes of change. "355 Peoples with complex and varied histo-
ries, cultures and communities became homogenized masses 
mired in intolerable poverty and in need of Western assistance.356 
The objects of development proliferated and included, inter alia, 
poverty, insufficient technology and capital, rapid population 
growth, inadequate public services, and archaic agricultural prac-
tices; new problems were continually incorporated, categorized 
and further defined.357 Indeed, the "vast surface over which the 
discourse effortlessly moved eventually covered practically the 
"2 [d. 
353 That the Other is lacking, deficient and inferior follows from a colonial discourse 
that viewed certain races and peoples as inferior and in need the benefits of civili-
zation dispensed by their colonizer. See generally Gordon, Saving Failed States, 
supra note 12; BASIL DAVILSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN AFRICA AND THE 
CURSE OF THE NATION-STATE (1993). 
1<1 On "helping," see Marianne Gronemeyer, Helping, in THE DEVELOPMENT DIC-
TIONARY, supra note 1. at 53. 
355 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 40-41. 
356 /d. at 41 (noting that "abnormalities were identified, such as the illiterate, the 
underdeveloped, the malnourished, small farmers, or landless peasants, which de-
velopment would later treat and reform"). 
)57 Additional subjects included cities, rural areas, housing, schools, factories, hospi-
tals, towns, regions and habitat. These ever-proliferating categories came from a 
range of sources, including governments, universities, research centers and the 
expanding international institutional edifice. Other categories and objects, such 
as cultural attitudes and values and the existence of racial, religious, geographic, 
or ethnic factors that were believed to be associated with backwardness, were 
later introduced, but with more caution or surreptitiously. [d. at at 41-42. Pro-
fessor Escobar notes that the never-ending specification of problems required 
detailed observation at all levels of a particular society, and accordingly complete 
profiles of countries were developed and elaborated. [d. at 42. The techniques 
for gathering this data have been refined and expanded. Indeed a cursory exami-
nation of the World Bank's Website confirms this, for complete country profiles 
of most countries can be found covering a wealth of information. See infra notes 
378-79 and accompanying text for discussion in the reliability of this data and its 
place in World Bank analysis. 
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entire cultural, economic and political geography of the Third 
World. "358 
Development problems were invariably framed in a manner 
that required Western intervention and the input of "experts",359 
and it was the discourse of development that determined who 
qualified as "expert. "360 Economists, demographers, educators, 
anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists and specialists in agri-
culture, public health and nutrition were enlisted to carry out the 
modernization project.361 Development professionals were gen-
erally dispassionate academics and practitioners, who were usu-
ally far removed from the experiences and lives in which they 
intervened.362 Locating knowledge in specialists, however, privi-
leges some voices and silences others.363 It also means solutions 
JIR "Client categories" were created and proliferated as populations were consist-
ently and continually found to be lacking and in need of treatment and reform. 
ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at at 41. 
119 Tucker, supra note 64, at 7. Development planners and practitioners often dis-
miss as inconsequential the voices of the individuals whose impoverishment they 
seek to address. Kothari, supra note 22, at 39. 
J60 There is a close connection between control over knowledge and assertions of 
power. For example, Western scientific knowledge is represented as universally 
valid and thus applicable to all, but not everyone qualified as an expert. 
161 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 41; Tucker, supra note 64, at 7. Adaptation became a 
key concept, for peoples and groups had to adapt. Id. 
162 See Anders Narman & David Simon, Introduction, in DEVELOPMENT AS THEORY 
AND PRAcnCE CURRENT PROSEPCTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 
CO-OPERATION 8 (David Simon et al. eds., 1999). For a revealing account from 
inside the development community, see Frank, supra note 341, at 262. This ac-
count of how a multinational team of experts approved a project to develop a 
rural area on the North-West frontier of Afghanistan demonstrates that when the 
"facts" do not fit reality, reality is ignored; that local knowledge is purposely ig-
nored when it would mean that expert knowledge is unnecessary; that areas can 
be "hot" for all sorts of reasons, having very little to do with the needs of local 
people; and that the objects of development are presumed to be people of color 
(Mr. Frank notes his surprise that these people were not the colored people he 
usually encountered on such missions). See also ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 41. 
Moreover, the expert focus on promoting change at any cost raises issues of cul-
tural imperialism. 
163 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 45. Escobar queries: why cash crops (to generate 
foreign exchange, and thus to obtain capital and technology) and centralized 
planning, instead of participatory and decentralized approaches; why agricultural 
development based on large mechanized farms, instead of alternative agricultural 
systems based on smaller farms, ecological considerations, integrated cropping 
and pest management; why rapid economic growth, but not internal markets to 
satisfy the needs of the masses of people; why capital intensive, but not labor 
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emanate from foreign sources,364 while local knowledge and ways 
of knowing and being are ignored, discarded or co-opted.365 
Overpowered by the hegemonic discourse of the West, Third 
World societies often were effectively prevented from articulat-
ing their own identities and worldviews. Many seem to have in-
ternalized the perspectives of the modernizers and developers, a 
process facilitated by comprador Third World intellectuals.366 
The post war development discourse established a discursive 
practice that in turn established the rules of the game.367 This 
discourse permits "the systematic creation of objects, concepts 
and strategies, "368 as it determines who can speak, from what 
points of view, and with what authority. It establishes the criteria 
that define expertise and that expertise was deemed to reside in 
Western systems of thought, values and ways of life. Dominant 
intensive solutions. Some of these choices are now being considered, given the 
profound disasters facing many developing countries and their developers. But 
this reconsideration still takes place within the developmental framework. [d. at 
43. 
'64 The historical and cultural location of the "expert" may make it impossible to 
shake off this status, by simply adopting participatory techniques, for it is a ques-
tion of political power. Kothari. supra note 22, at 39. For a detailed critique of 
participation, see Rahnema, supra note 11, at 116. 
365 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 41 (noting that communities responded to the devel-
opment agenda in myriad ways that sometimes incorporated resistance, and there 
were manifold failures as developers tried and failed to bring about moderniza-
tion); Kothari, supra note 22, at 39 (noting development planners and practition-
ers often dismissed as inconsequential, the voices of the individuals whose 
impoverishment and marginality they were seeking to address); Tucker, supra 
note 64, at 7-8 (Observing that development was not conceived of as a cultural 
process. Rather culture was a "residual variable that would disappear with the 
advent of modernization. Thus it is unsurprising that development has wrecked 
havoc on Third World cultures, ironically in their name and in their interest. 
These multiple and varied encounters "were subsumed under the category of tra-
dition, an essentially pejorative term that denoted divergence from the generally 
accepted norms of reason and progress."). 
'66 Tucker, supra note 64, at 13. 
167 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 41. 
''''' Esteva, supra note 1, at 13. See generally THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY, 
supra note 1 (deconstructing such familiar "devspeak" terms as, inter alia, plan-
ning, participation, poverty, progress, population, needs, helping, and 
development). 
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strands of development theory and practice (including most "al-
ternative" theories) are constructed in the West and imple-
mented in the Third World.369 Western policy-makers decide 
which projects will be funded and where aid money will be spent 
or withdrawn.37o Third World governments are granted ostensi-
ble authority over their citizens, but rich countries and interna-
tionallending institutions very often decide what will actually be 
done in Third World countries.371 Thus, the hierarchical relation-
ship that once existed between the colonizer and the colonized 
con tin ues. 372 
An example of how the problem and then the solution are 
constructed within the development paradigm can be discerned 
in an oft-told depiction of Egypt. Popular representations of 
Egypt invariably describe it as an overpopulated country, whose 
population is crowded within a narrow strip of land in the Nile 
Valley, and is growing at a rate that outpaces its ability to grow 
sufficient food.m The obvious response to the "natural limits of 
369 Kothari, supra note 22, at 38; ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 41 (remarking that it is 
"Western dominated institutions that determine the practices and procedures for 
all problems, theories, or objects that surface and are then named, analyzed and 
eventually transformed into a policy or a plan"). 
370 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 41. 
371 Within the broad parameters of the policies set by the West, Third World coun-
tries may have some agency over the specifics and emphasis of projects. See 
Frank, supra note 341, at 262. 
m Kothari, supra note 22, at 39. 
m The following discussion of Egypt can be found in Timothy Mitchell, The Object 
of Development America's Egypt, in POWER OF DEVELOPMENT 129-57 (Jonathan 
Crush ed., 1995). Professor Mitchell contends that the following description of 
Egypt can be found in almost any study of Egypt produced by an American or an 
international development agency: 
The geographical and demographic characteristics of Egypt delineate its 
basic problem. Although the country contains about 386,000 square miles, 
... only a narrow strip in the Nile Valley and its Delta is usable. This area 
of 15,000 square miles - less than 4 percept of the land - is but an elon-
gated oasis in the midst of desert. Without the Nile, which flows through 
Egypt for about a thousand miles without being joined by a single tribu-
tary, the country would be part of the Sahara. Crammed into the habitable 
area is 98 per cent of the population ... the population has been growing 
rapidly and is estimated to have doubled since 1947. 
The popularity of this image of space and numbers is summed up in a World 
Bank report: "These two themes - the relatively fixed amount of usable land and 
the rapid growth of the population - will be seen as leitmotifs in the discussion of 
Egypt's Economic problems." The additional image of a traditional rural world 
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geography and demography" is technological and managerial as-
sistance, entailing the massive input of Western expertise and 
capital resources.374 Yet substantial questions can be raised re-
garding the claim that Egypt has too many people,375 that it lacks 
the ability to grow sufficient food376 or that it possesses too little 
implies a system of agriculture that is static and therefore incapable of changing 
itself; thus any impetus for change must come from the outside. Yet political and 
economic changes in rural Egypt have taken place since the Middle Ages. Ignor-
ing these transformations creates the impression that the poverty of the Nile Val-
ley is a traditional poverty of a peasantry that only recently joined the twentieth 
..:entury and only external forces can provide the impetus to transform Egyptian 
agriculture. New capital investment, new irrigation methods, improved seed vari-
eties and cut flowers, all of which will bring foreign capital required to finance 
such technologies, becomes the principal means to achieve this transformation. 
374 The World Bank posits that "the development problem is essentially a question 
of the quantity, quality and proportion of resources to be devoted to develop-
ment on the one hand and to economic management on the other." Thus the 
productive limits imposed by nature will be overcome by the forces of technol-
ogy, while existing natural resources will be made more productive by more effi-
cient management, which turns out to mean dismantling the bureaucracy of the 
Egyptian state and permitting market forces to work their magic. Mitchell, supra 
note 373, at 139. 
m Professor Mitchell questions why population densities in Egypt are compared to 
those in Bangladesh and Indonesia, rather than say Belgium or South Korea 
where population densities "are respectively three and four times higher than 
Indonesia." [d. In other words, high population density is not necessarily an 
indication of overpopulation. While Egypt's population level per hectare of ara-
ble land is similar to that of Bangladesh, and about double that of Indonesia, this 
comparison is misleading for Egyptian output per hectare is more than three 
times that of both countries. A more realistic comparison might be with the Phil-
ippines and Thailand, countries that are similar in total population and per capita 
gross national product. combined with far greater areas of cultivated land. But 
even with less land, Egypt's agricultural population produces more crops per per-
son than either of these countries. Professor Mitchell also asserts that there is no 
prima facie evidence for the assumption that Egypt's population of 50 million is 
too large for its cultivable area. On a global level, given the demand on resources 
that the average Egyptian makes on world resources, versus the average citizen 
of industrialized countries, it is arguable whether Egyptian population growth 
threatens the world's limited resources. But the corollary to the population argu-
ment is the rate at which the population is growing and that this rapid growth is 
surpassing the country's ability to feed itself. [d. at 131-32. 
376 Mitchell notes that according to World Bank tables, between 1965 and 1980, 
Egypt's population grew at an annual rate of 2.1 percent a year, but agricultural 
production grew at an even faster rate of 2.7 percent a year. Thus it is not true 
that the population has been growing faster that the county's ability to feed itself. 
He maintains that the reason Egypt has had to import increasing amounts of food 
can be found by examining the kinds of food being consumed and who gets to 
consume it. Egypt actually has a high rate of calorie consumption, with average 
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land.377 If the problem is redefined as changing consumption pat-
terns and access to land, then the solutions also change and may 
encompass political and social constructs that are beyond the 
reach of Western development experts. 
This misrepresentation of Egypt does not merely give rise to 
ineffective policies, however. Its simplistic and unchallenged 
premises378 demonstrate how Western-based development institu-
tions continue to present the countries and peoples of the Third 
World (such as Egypt and its peoples) as objects of development, 
protein consumption exceeding that found in most middle and high-income coun-
tries. The problem is that the shift has come in higher levels of food consumption 
among the better off, and most especially a higher consumption of meat, which 
means that food production has in part shifted to food for animals that are then 
slaughtered and sold as meat. It is the switch to meat consumption, rather than 
an increase in population that has required the dramatic increase in food imports. 
[d. at 132-36. 
m The image of a narrow strip of fertile land crammed with millions of inhabitants 
enables the analysis of Egyptian economic development to quickly eclipse the 
issue of access to land, because with so many people occupying so little space the 
problem appears to be explained. Images are painted of millions of tiny parcels 
and not enough land to go around. (The average size of a holding is two feddans, 
94% of all owners have less than five feddans each, and only 0.2 percent have at 
least 50 feddans each.) But given the extremely fertile soils, year-round sunshine 
and permanently available irrigation water, very high yields can be obtained from 
two or even three crops a year and thus holdings of less than five feddans are not 
as small as they may seem and are well above the minimum farm size required for 
a family farm to feed itself (estimated at 0.8 feddans). These figures also fail to 
mention that the remaining six percent of landowners, with holdings from five 
feddans up to the legal limit of 50 feddans per individual or 100 feddans per 
family with dependent children, controlled 33 percent of the country's agricul-
tural area and this concentration is increasing. It may also be that these official 
figures, which rely on village land registers, under-represent the concentration of 
landholding. ld. at 136-39. 
378 For a discussion of how World Bank data and studies are created and utilized, see 
Gavin Williams, Modernizing Malthus: the World Bank, Population Control and 
the African Environment, in POWER OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 17 (analyzing 
a World Bank report on sub-Saharan Africa and noting how data and impressive 
looking tables are often included, but bare little relation to the report, that much 
of the research that is commissioned is of poor quality and when it is good, it is 
not used or is shaped to fit pre-determined outcomes). See also Frank, supra note 
341, at 262. 
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as something external to the expertise that is development, de-
spite the tremendous involvemene79 of these institutions in the 
affairs of Third World nations and communities.380 
V. CONCLUSION: ENVISIONING A POST 
DEVELOPMENT WORLD 
All developing countries are caught in a time warp of 
sorts, where they can never really catch up with the West, 
.. . for the West has become the past, present and future of 
the non-West. 381 
379 The development project never sees itself as part of the problem and therefore 
developers rarely acknowledge responsibility for development's many failures. 
The World Bank acknowledges failures, but seldom acknowledges its involve-
ment in such failures. Typically the blame is placed on its partner governments, 
and sometimes on the people themselves. An example can be found in the World 
Bank's analysis of sub-Saharan Africa, which in itself is questionable given the 
great variety of cultures, conditions, environmental settings and other factors that 
can be found in Africa. The Bank does not ask whether whole approaches, such 
importing chemical and mechanical technologies, might be inappropriate. In-
stead it recommends more of the same. The environmental consequences of 
World Bank strategies are rarely considered. Instead, African women are identi-
fied as a cause of environmental damage. The Bank overlooks the consequences 
of mechanized farming and chemical fertilizers, and of damns and irrigation 
projects. The Report on Sub-Saharan Africa also draws no distinction between 
pastoralists and cultivators, or between capitalist farms and peasant smallhold-
ings. Moreover, World Bank projects consistently privilege large-scale farmers 
who are politically influential, easier to reach and responsive to advice from pro-
ject officials. Williams, supra note 378, at 158, 165. Much credit is claimed for 
perceived successes, however, such as the so-called Asian miracles of South Ko-
rea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. This too is a constructed space for it is 
doubtful that these "successes" had anything to do with the prescriptions ad-
vanced by development agencies. See O'Hearn, supra note 4, at 113-34. 
380 Professor Mitchell notes: 
The discourse of international development constitutes itself in this way as 
an expertise and intelligence that stands completely apart from the country 
and the people it describes. Much of this intelligence is generated inside 
organizations such as the World Bank and USAID, which playa powerful 
economic and political role within countries like Egypt. International de-
velopment has a special need to overlook this internal involvement in the 
places and problems it analyzes. 
Mitchell, supra note 373, at 130. 
381 Sardar, supra note 55, at 46. For example, the newly industrialized countries or 
larger Third World countries such as China, India and Brazil are now engaged in 
manufacturing and industries that are no longer found in the post-industrialized 
West. As the West abandons a particular activity, it is relegated to the Third 
World. Sardar writes: 
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Can development be transformed? What shape would a 
transformed development paradigm take? If development turns 
out to be incapable of fundamental change, what would the 
world look like without it? This part begins the process of think-
ing about these questions and contemplating a world without de-
velopment. If development depends on shared beliefs rather 
than destiny, it is possible to at least ask whether Third World 
societies must necessarily reproduce themselves according to 
Western notions of development, or remain forever at the mar-
gins of the international community.382 Must one develop or per-
ish?383 We do not propose a substitute grand vision; our aim is to 
challenge the narrative of development, not to replace it with 
another. 
Development theory and practice are in a quandary. There 
IS a gap between academics and practitioners.384 Development 
The present of the non-West is the past of the West, and the future of 
developing countries is the present of the West. When the non-West 
reaches the point of development, it has already become the past of the 
West, meaning the non-West has no real future since its future is already 
known in Europe and America. Parts of the non-West are the distant, pre-
industrial revolution past of the North. The West was not just history; it is 
remade in the present and reconstructed in the future .... At each stage, it 
is internalized more and more and becomes an integral part of the global 
consciousness. As such, the future has been colonized by the West. ... The 
future is defined in the image of the West . .. taking us towards a single, 
determined future . ... An illusion of accelerated movement is produced to 
create an illusion of inevitability and to shroud the Eurocentric dimension 
of the exercise. Conventionally, the colonization of the future was known 
as Westernization. Now it goes under the rubric of globalization. The pro-
cess that is transforming the world into the proverbial global village, rap-
idly shrinking distances, compressing space and time, is also shaping the 
world in the image of a single culture and civilization. In this Eurocentric 
vision of the future, technology is projected as an autonomous and desira-
ble force. Its desirable products generate more desire; its second-order 
side effects require more technology to solve them. Thus there is a perpet-
ual feedback loop and this self-perpetuating momentum has locked us in a 
linear, one dimensional trajectory that has foreclosed the future of the non-
West. 
[d. 
382 Tucker, supra note 64, at 3. 
3R' [d. 
384 For a discussion of the gap between theoreticians and practitioners, see Narman 
& Simon, supra note at 362, at 1-2 (Noting practitioners are preoccupied with 
action, which is often not placed in a larger context, while academics are con-
cerned with understanding. Politician, planners and administrators would prefer 
to not question development because it would threaten international consensus, 
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thought and policy have been subjected to the postmodern cri-
tique385 discussed in this article, and have broadened into diverse 
and sometimes inconsistent theories and modes of analysis.386 
These diverse perspectives are partly in response to a pervasive 
disillusionment with the failures of development,387 and partly in 
support of the rising voices of indigenous resistance to develop-
mene88 At its most radical, anti-developmentalism urges aban-
doning "Western universalism or Euro-Americanism and calls 
for identifying other visions, other ways of knowing and being, 
and for recognizing that development has been an illusion."389 It 
suggests that by challenging the central concepts that set bounda-
ries on our thinking, development can be exposed and "rejected 
as degenerate, ecologically maladaptive, and an empty dream. "390 
Somewhat less radically, there is the hope that exposing the ide-
ology underlying development might lead to transformative re-
sponses from development's proponents and practitioners.391 
instead devoting time to international conferences where declarations are formu-
lated that are to be translated into development policy.). 
385 These critiques and post-modernism in general have also been subjected to cri-
tique See Sardar, supra note 55, at 45-46. 
386 Simon, supra note 10, at 17. 
387 Id. Professor Simon also cites "the collapse of socialism" which was viewed as an 
alternative model of development, the growing economic diversity of countries in 
the Third World, increasing concern for environmental sustainability; increasing 
assertiveness of voices from below and the rise of the postmodern challenge to 
universalizing theories and conventional practices of development. Id. 
31!B See Arturo Escobar, Imagining a Post Development Era, in POWER OF DEVELOP. 
MENT, supra note 17, at 211, 216-20 [hereinafter Escobar, Imagining a Post Devel-
opment Era]; Watts, supra note 24, at 44, 57-60; D.L. Sheth, Alternatives from an 
Indian Grassroots Perspective, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER, supra note 
11, at 329. 
389 Watts, supra note 24, at 44-46. 
390 Id. at 45. Others state "development appears as a blunder of planetary propor-
tions, an edifice which shows cracks and is starting to crumble. At its most under-
stated, there is a sense of malaise, a crisis of development a 1 ism (practice) and an 
impasse in development thinking (theory)." 
391 Martin Minogue and Vma Kothari, Conclusion: Orthodoxy and its Alternatives in 
Contemporary Development, in DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND PRACfICE, supra 
note 7, at 179-80 [hereinafter Minogue & Kothari, Conclusion]. 
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The institutions, experts and politicians involved in technical 
assistance, however, view the concept of development as incon-
testable, even while conceding some of its failures.392 Some pro-
ponents fear that if development is criticized, already inadequate 
assistance could be terminated or diverted to other ends.393 
Moreover, some development projects have been beneficiaP94 
and imposed relatively little negative impact.395 The postmodern 
analysis has also been criticized as challenging the notion of col-
lective action and interests, and as making "even the possibility 
of international intervention in pursuit of development illusory 
and reactionary."396 Post developmentalism seems to encourage 
392 Practitioners do usually agree, however, that development should have a human 
face, and that target populations should be permitted to participate in planning 
programs and implementing them. Rahnema, supra note 11. at 381. 
393 [d. (Noting that there is a real danger that the many plausible arguments against 
development will be used to take funds that would be used for development and 
direct them to other uses. Perhaps it is better to spend the funds on agricultural 
projects. food. shelter and health care, however questionable such spending may 
be from philosophical point of view, than on say security and weapons. But are 
they not connected. Can repressive states obtain funds more easily when security 
requests are coupled with requests for development assistance.). The recent 
spectacle at the UN, with the U.S. bribing or threatening states with development 
aid to persuade them to vote for a resolution to use force against Iraq, really 
crystallizes this point. See, e.g., Henry J. Richardson, III, U.S. Hegemony, Race, 
and Oil in Deciding United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq, 17 
TEMP. INT'L L.J. 27 (2003). 
394 The so-called "Asian tigers" are often presented as proof that development can, 
and eventually will, work. The economies of South Korea, Thailand, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan are frequently offered as proof of the viability of the 
Washington consensus and the triumph of export led growth based on markets. 
Yet the rapid modernization of these nations had little to do with the interna-
tional development paradigm. For a devastating critique of the viability, sus-
tainability and perhaps the myth of the Asian Tigers, see O'Hearn, supra note 4, 
at 117. 
395 Rahnema, Towards Post-Development, supra note 11, at 381. Professor Rahnema 
was the UN Representative in Mali and coordinator of other development 
projects. She also notes that the bulk of the world's resources are being utilized 
for arms and repressive governments and she questions whether or not these 
funds might be better spent on development projects, even if they are flawed. 
396 Kiely, supra note 7, at 36. Professor Kiely maintains that the idea that needs and 
poverty are solely social and cultural constructions. mistake the word for the 
world and can create conditions wherein a positive local politics of empowerment 
slides fitfully into an amoral politics of indifference. Id. In other words, it may 
cause the rich to simply disengage. See also Jan Nederveen Pieterse, My Para-
digm or Yours? Alternative Development, Post-Development, Reflexive Develop-
ment, 29 DEV. & CHANGE 343 (1998). 
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disengagement, and the abrogation of any Western accountabil-
ity for the current state of affairs in Third World nations.397 It is 
believed to offer little to those who aspire to safe drinking water, 
a roof that does not leak and other material goods most citizens 
of industrialized countries take for granted.398 Post-development 
theorists are charged with attempting "to reinvent a pre-colonial 
Eden that never existed and is no less violent in scripting iden-
tity, than are identities constructed in the name of develop-
ment."399 Adding to the complexity is the daunting task of 
considering a post development world in the wake of fifty years 
of development that has left many individuals worse off,400 and 
countries mired in debt and enmeshed in a system that has in 
effect led to re-colonization.401 What is more, in an era of global-
ization, is it even possible to escape the development para-
digm?402 These critiques raise serious questions to which-absent 
397 Simon, supra note 10, at 17. 
398 Both authors have visited Southern countries and witnessed the need for these 
"comforts," and thus take these criticisms very seriously. See Sylvester, supra 
note 6. 
399 It is maintained that the anti-development thesis does not take us "beyond the 
dualisms of modernity and tradition, and dominant and dominated" and is rather 
vague about alternatives as it romanticizes local cultures. Kiely, supra note 7, at 
36-37. Professor Kiely notes that the idea that development always undermines 
authentic cultures "can itself be considered a form of cultural imperialism, based 
on a long tradition of romanticizing the 'Other. ", [d. 
400 See, e.g., Narman & Simon, supra note 362, at 8. Professors Narman and Simon 
point out that silence is often taken for lack of knowledge, while it could really 
arise out of courtesy, a desire to not disagree or offend or to disclose information 
considered too private. Indeed the targets of development have been quite inge-
nious in filtering the advice and instructions received from development profes-
sionals. They have not been as passive as might be thought and have been able to 
be selective in accordance with their own needs and perceptions through their 
cultural filters. 
401 Given the amount of control exercised by international financial institutions over 
the economies, politics and societal choices in the nations of the Third World, it 
does not seem to be too far from colonialism. Indeed the discourse of racial, 
social, political and cultural superiority that justified colonialism, underlies the 
development discourse. Gordon, Saving Failed States, supra note 12, at 926. 
402 It has been argued that nations do not necessarily participate in the globalization 
project "as nations inevitably on their way to modernity, but as pragmatic and 
strategic actors in a much more restricted game that is governed by free trade, 
specializing in what can be done without the aid of protection, privatization, and 
living within ones means." O'Hearn, supra note 4, at 117. 
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a new meta-narrative-there is no comprehensiv~ "answer." In-
stead, there may be a range of inquiries that might help shift the 
entire approach to development and to the Third World.403 Our 
intent is to begin a paradigm shift that relocates the locus of con-
trol and authority. 
With this possibility in mind, consider a question. Is it possi-
ble the Third World would have been better off without the offi-
cial development assistance it has been acc'orded since the 1950s, 
keeping in mind the successes and failures of development and 
its impact on war, peace, government structures, sovereignty, 
debt and a host of other issues? Professors Simon and Narman 
pose a simpler form of this question404 and of course find it im-
possible to answer.405 Yet perhaps it is a question that nonethe-
less should be asked, as the liberal consensus constructs 
globalization in a manner that threatens to consign permanently 
the people of the Third World to do the work that people in the 
West no longer want to do.406 The Western assumption is that 
material wealth means personal contentment, and the middle 
classes and elites of the South seem to have adopted this view.407 
But perhaps this is not entirely the case for everyone. The desir-
ability of material wealth may vary for different peoples depend-
ing on their particular values and mores, just as such needs and 
desires vary within the Western world. Development is assumed 
to improve the lives of its targets, but who defines "improve-
ment," and who determines priorities and the desirability of in-
terventions in pursuit of change. The answers to these 
multifaceted questions are even more complex after fifty years of 
40J Escobar posits that there is little point in speculating in the abstract about the 
character of a post-development era, for if we accept that critical thought must be 
situated, then a discussion of these issues should be practice-oriented, engaging 
with the political claims and actions of oppositional movements. See Escobar, 
Imagining a Post Development Era, supra note 388, at 211, 216. 
4()1 Simply put, "would the Third World have been better off without development 
assistance?" See, e.g., Narman & Simon, supra note 362, at 7. 
405 Id. 
406 Of course, it is international capital that has decided that Western workers no 
longer will do certain types of work. Chantel Thomas, Globalization and the Pro-
duction of Hierarchy, 33 U.c. DAVIS L. REV. 1451 (2000) (discussing when corpo-
rations relocate to the Third World in search of cheap labor, less governmental 
regulation and the like). 
407 See, e.g., Narman & Simon, supra note 362, at 1-2. 
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development, during which a plethora of policies have rained 
down upon a broad range of societies, cultures and peoples. 
Consider a second question. Was everything in the previous 
"non-developed world" really so terrible? Surely the pre-colo-
nial world was not an idyllic paradise. And is true that people 
did not have many of the goods that are now deemed necessities 
in the West.408 But perhaps people were productive enough to 
produce what they needed, a capacity that is sorely lacking today 
as many countries are barely able to feed their people.409 Cer-
tainly, the pre-development world was affected to varying de-
grees by colonialism, which had uneven and often destabilizing 
consequences for the colonized.410 Nonetheless it is important to 
ask how people viewed themselves and their communities before 
the advent of development.41l Is it possible that a sense of inclu-
siveness, cohesiveness, belief in local capabilities, and a percep-
tion of self-worth could characterize communities-even when 
those communities were what many today would characterize as 
poor?412 This is not to champion or romanticize mythical "time-
less traditions."413 Rather, it is to acknowledge that before devel-
opment people were not helpless, incompetent, inferior creatures 
in need of salvation from the West, but instead were quite capa-
ble and diverse human beings organized into myriad, complex 
communities. A post development paradigm must consider how 
408 See IlIich, supra note 42, at 88 (discussing the evolution of needs in development 
discourse, as it evolved from food, clothing, materials for housing and mechanical 
power into a measurable standard such as Gross National Product and then into 
notions of absolute poverty and minimum levels of human decency). 
409 Rahnema, Towards Post-Development, supra note 11, at 377, 379. The pre-devel-
opment world was also the colonized world and colonialism was a destructive 
force that disrupted communities, changed cultures and had complex effects 
across very complex cultures. Thus developers did not confront pristine societies 
untouched by the West. See Ruth Gordon, Growing Constitutions, 1 U. PA. 1. 
CONST. L. 528 (1999). 
410 Gordon, Saving Failed States, supra note 12, at 930-35. 
411 See supra notes 35-54 and accompanying text on poverty. 
412 IlIich, supra note 42, at 88, 96 (Noting in "traditional poverty, people could rely 
on finding a cultural hemlock," but development is a process which "lifts people 
out of their traditional cultural commons," dissolving such cultural bonds. Many 
are sinking deeper and deeper into an abyss of worsening poverty from which 
they will never be able to rise and meet their new needs.). 
m For a discussion of the modern-traditional dichotomy, see ESCOBAR, supra note 
19, at 75-80; Escobar, Planning, supra note 157, at 135-36. 
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local communities might begin to regain the agency to identify 
and name ones own dreams, viewpoints and ways of being. 
This transformation must also interrogate how and why non-
Western cultures and systems of thought are treated as somehow 
inferior, if not unacceptable.414 This query is really directed more 
to Western communities and their views of the non-Western 
"Other." To return agency to the peoples of the Third World 
would mean abdicating the power to name and define the prob-
lem, as well as the scope and content of the dialogue, and the 
substance and scale of any solutions.415 It is undeniable that 
many in the development industry are very intelligent people 
with good hearts and only the best of intentions. They truly care 
about the work they are doing and the people they are trying to 
assist. But it can be difficult to revise long held perspectives and 
perceptions, especially when those perspectives are an integral 
part of the cultural milieu in which one exists.416 Images of the 
Third World as deficient and inferior are inherent in the words 
"underdeveloped," "undeveloped," and "developing." This, of 
course, empowers the developer. Moreover, even as one tries to 
escape the development prism, there is often a nagging suspicion 
that without the West the peoples of the Third World really are 
somewhat helpless and not quite up to the task regardless of how 
414 Cultures change, but development viewed tradition and Third World cultures as 
impediments to modernization and thus to be eradicated in favor of develop-
ment. Indeed development can be visualized as a process by which people are 
lifted out of their cultural commons. In this transition, cultural bonds are dis-
solved, even though culture can continue to tinge development in superficial ways 
- one need only observe rural people recently transplanted to the megacities of 
the Third World. ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 75-80; Escobar, Planning, supra 
note 157, at 135-36. 
415 McGee, Participating in Development, in DEVELOPMENT THEORY at 93, 95-96. 
(Noting early orthodoxy when the "development agency conceived, designed, 
funded, managed, implemented and evaluated the project from somewhere 
outside its boundaries"; and there were the project beneficiaries -undifferenti-
ated, passive recipients of goods and services provided through project channels. 
People - whether in the agency or in the beneficiary population - were scarcely 
acknowledged to be there." Beginning the 1980s higher levels of "participation" 
came into vogue, but even these interventions were problematic.). 
416 See Doug J. Porter, Scenes from Childhood the Homesickness of Development 
Discourses, in POWER OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 17, at 63 (noting that dis-
course analysis at minimum might make development workers aware of their 
practices ). 
94 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
it is defined.417 When coupled with the racism that generally 
presumes the Other as not quite competent, it becomes even 
more difficult to move beyond these beliefs.418 Yet the crucial 
question is control over destinies, the importing and imposition 
of values, and who is given the power to define?419 Besides its 
economic and technological might, the West has the power to de-
fine.420 This power must be returned to the peoples of the Third 
World, who must determine the narratives that are to govern 
their lives. 
This necessarily raises questions as to who exactly are "the 
people," and how to go about determining what "they" want. It 
may be that "the people" are incapable of being concretely de-
fined, and that any attempt to do so risks essentializing broad 
and diverse communities. No attempt is made here to do so. 
Moreover, no assumptions are made about the extent or the 
manner in which peoples may want to engage or disengage from 
the West or the development project, nor as to how people de-
fine their basic needs or how those needs should be met. Indeed, 
it is fully expected that many will completely embrace the West 
and what it has to offer; that others may be more selective, find-
ing value in some facets and unsuitability in others; while still 
others will reject the West across-the-board. Rather than making 
such determinations, the work to be done in the West is to try to 
figure out ways to somehow create a space to let people deter-
mine these things for themselves. 
417 This analysis does not take account of situations involving war or similar conflicts. 
The responsibilities of the international community in any such situation necessa-
rily differ from that in times of peace, regardless of where a particular nation 
stands on the modernization scale. 
418 Racial difference on the international stage cannot be equated with notions of 
race in the United States. But it is equally clear that a racial discourse partly 
inspired colonial discourse and is not irrelevant in foreign policy. It certainly 
colors perceptions of the developing world, which is inevitably seen as the 
colored world. Gordon, Critical Race Theory, supra note 331. It is also acknowl-
edged that development practitioners come from all over the world and thus may 
be people of color. This does not mean race is irrelevant, but that it may be that 
its effect is more complex and difficult to sort out. 
419 Tucker, supra note 64, at 3. 
420 Sardar, supra note 55, at 44. The West defines freedom, progress, law, tradition, 
community science, what is real and what it means to be human. Non-Western 
societies must accept these definitions or cease to exist. /d. 
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What separates this undertaking from alternative develop-
ment approaches such as participation,42t is a different attitude 
and perspective in the West. The struggle to make this change 
begins with Western interrogation of the assumption of power 
over others, and the usurpation of agency and voice. Those in 
the West who are concerned about poor peoples in the Third 
World must begin to question the power presumed to reside in 
self and in the West. At all points along the political spectrum, 
whatever the critique, the power to change or improve the lives 
of Third World peoples is assumed to reside in the West. This 
may not be true in the final analysis. But whether it is or not, 
giving up this power may bring about a humility that permits a 
true exchange and a dialogue that does not frame the questions, 
control the dialogue and assume the answers, for it entertains the 
possibility that those answers may lie elsewhere. 
Consider a third and final question? What if development 
had succeeded? What if the governments, institutions and peo-
ple charged with realizing the development project had suc-
ceeded in fulfilling its many promises, and there had actually 
been sufficient funds and resources to make development a real-
ity and all so-called underdeveloped countries were now on eco-
nomic par with the industrialized countries? It is doubtful the 
planet could support a world in which everyone consumed as 
many resources and generated as much waste as the industrial-
ized world.422 Perhaps this indicates that development as cur-
rently defined is not universally attainable,423 and replicating 
western consumption patterns may not be a desirable goal due to 
its global impact. This is not to say that the people of the Third 
World should not have access to the material goods widely en-
joyed in the West. The people who will be affected must deter-
mine the desirability of those goods, and of adopting the lifestyle 
421 Participation attempts to incorporate the voice of development's target in the 
process of development. For a discussion of the evolution of "participation," see 
McGee, supra note 114, at 93. See also Rahnema, Participation, supra note 155, 
at 116; Minogue & Kothari, Conclusion, supra note 391, at 185-86. 
422 Rahnema, Towards Post-Development, supra note 11, at 377, 379. See also Rich-
ard Douthwaite, Is it Possible to Build a Sustainable World, in CRITICAL DEVEL-
OPMENT THEORY, supra note 4, at 158-60 (detailing why the current global 
economic system is unsustainable). 
423 See, e.g., Eduardo Galeano, To Be Like Them, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT 
READER, supra note 11, at 214. 
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associated with a consumer culture.424 It is only to say that per-
haps modernization as it is currently configured is ultimately un-
sustainable and the entire international community should begin 
to re-think development in all of its manifestations.425 
There is evidence to suggest that this transformation may al-
ready be taking place on both the local and global levels. The 
rising voices confronting globalization raise one set of chal-
lenges.426 At the local level, the development paradigm is being 
contested and transformed by "social movements that are char-
acterized by social actors, as opposed to structures; the promo-
tion of democratic, egalitarian and participatory styles of politics; 
and a search, not for grand structural transformations but rather, 
for the construction of identities and greater autonomy through 
modifications in everyday practices and beliefs."427 While cer-
tainly not a grand break with the past,428 these developments 
42' Often when these questions are raised, the immediate response is that everyone 
wants what the West offers and the person raising the question is queried about 
whether he or she would give up their Western life-style. Third World scholars 
are similarly interrogated, and if they reside in the West, are presented as proof 
that all peoples desire life in the West. For those born and raised in Western 
countries, this is truly an unfair question, for few are willing to change their entire 
way of life, especially when that life has always been posited as superior and the 
alternative posited as inferior. The Western brain drain is certainly a reality, as 
Western educated elites seek jobs in the North. And while it is true that many 
elites have embraced development wholeheartedly, not all Third World elites 
have migrated to the West. Moreover, it may be difficult to straddle the morass 
left in the wake of development, which has left many with few viable economic 
options besides re-settling in the West. Leaving may be the only reasonable 
course, and thus many leave even as they make their life work helping those left 
behind. Finally it is not argued that the West is inferior and undesirable and no 
one would choose it. Indeed many have and many undoubtedly will. What is 
posed is how to give people the choice to direct the change, or lack thereof, that 
will govern their lives. 
421 This would include, if not prioritize, the waste and environmental degradation 
wrought by the industrialized world. 
426 While the demonstrations and other actions against globalizations are more or 
less ridiculed in the United States by the American media, this resistance has 
continued and is perhaps expanding. 
427 Escobar, Imagining a Post Development Era, supra note 388, at 211, 217. 
428 Escobar notes that these new social movements are often compared with the old, 
meaning "modernization or dependency; politics centered around traditional ac-
tors like parties, vanguards, and the working class who struggle for the control of 
the state, and towards a view of society as composed of more or less immutable 
structures class relations that only great changes (i.e. massive development 
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clearly signal a new direction.429 It may be these local and partic-
ular movements that point us towards a post-development world 
that is not tied to grand schemes and designs, but is rooted in the 
diverse and the specific. In the face of globalization, which is 
presented as inevitable, focusing on the local may seem paro-
chial. But almost all global actors, including multinational corpo-
rations, whose reach and power seems to be almost infinite, in 
fact operate locally. Products and services must be made and 
sold within localities and it may be on the local level that such 
entities, and the notion of the global and universal, can be most 
effectively questioned and, if necessary, challenged.430 
Does this mean that there is no role for those in the West 
who wish to assist and act in solidarity with those in the Third 
World who seem to be on the economic and political periphery? 
On the contrary, there may be a number of ways to engage, al-
though the nature of that engagement may have to evolve. Doc-
umenting and sharing the local encounters noted above can be of 
immense assistance for such information can not only be encour-
aging and inspiring, but may help other communities in devising 
strategies and tactics.431 Scholars, attorneys, economists and 
schemes or revolutionary upheavals) can alter in a significant way." [d. He sug-
gests that there may be significant continuities between the two regimes, includ-
ing ways in which "for instance, old styles of politics are pervasive among the new 
movements - are overlooked." Equally important the past is endowed with fea-
tures that are not completely accurate (for instance the claim that all styles of 
politics in the past were clientilistic and non-participatory). [d. 
429 Most of these social movements have been in Latin America. [d. 
430 This insight is found in Gustavo Esteva and Madhu Suri Prakash, From Global 
Thinking to Local Thinking, in (THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER (Majid 
Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree eds., 1997) at 277. This quite brilliant essay be-
gins with the bumper sticker that urges its reader to "think globally, act locally," 
noting that it reflects the desire to act in solidarity with those on the periphery of 
globalization. But they propose that perhaps the best course is to think locally 
and act locally, given that even MNCs must sell and make their products locally. 
Indeed, to this extent, all global projects, including the development project, is 
local. It may be impossible to challenge such entities globally because most local-
ities are unable to act effectively at the global level, which can be seen in some of 
the difficulties faced by the anti-globalization movements. But there may be 
more possibilities to mount such challenges on the local level. 
431 See Esteva, From Global Thinking to Local Thinking, in THE POST-DEVELOP. 
MENT READER, supra note 11, at 286-88 (suggesting this role). By supporting 
local communities as they attempt to take on global capital and international in-
stitutions, there is a space for intervention by Western communities that want to 
assist. 
98 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
others might also engage Western institutions on expunging the 
obscene debt that is draining many of the very poorest coun-
tries.432 The debt did not exist in 1950 and has many roots, but 
surely it is tied to the modernization project. This article does 
not address wars and other instances of extreme dislocation that 
may require certain types of interventions be it from the West or 
other Third World nations. Although the legality of such inter-
ventions is the subject of endless debate,433 this may be another 
area in which concerned communities in the West can assert posi-
tive influence. 
There is certainly work to be done in shaping assistance 
when assistance is desired, although it may be difficult to let go 
of deep-rooted assumptions and long-held power. Without 
doubt, critically questioning the very concept of development is 
the first step in fundamentally changing the manner in which one 
thinks about development and its objects, and is the place to be-
gin probing accepted wisdom about "the Other." There is little 
to suggest that the people whose lives have been dramatically 
changed by development necessarily refuse to accept change. 
What may be desired is change that helps people enhance inborn 
and cultural capacities, and change that allows individuals to 
blossom and leaves them free to change the rules and content of 
change, according to their own ethics and aspirations.434 The ob-
jective it is to pose different questions, to hear the responses of 
others, and to not assume that the answers reside in the West. It 
is to slowly, but steadily and surely, accomplish a paradigm shift. 
432 See supra notes 6, 164-68 and accompanying text. For an excellent anysis of the 
debt problem in Africa, see Chris N. Okeke, The Debt Burden.·An African Per-
spective, 35 INT'L LAW 1489 (2001); Susan George, How the Poor Develop the 
Rich, in THE PosT-DEVELOPMENT READER, supra note 11, at 207 (detailing how 
the debt drains funds from the Third World and enriches the industrialized 
world). 
433 See, e.g., Ruth Gordon, Humanitarian Intervention by the United Nations: Iraq, 
Somalia, and Haiti, 31 TEX. INT'L L.I. 43 (1996). 
434 Rahnema, Towards Post-Development, supra note 11, at 384. Industrialization 
might be rejected by some, welcomed by others or it might be restructured to 
meet local needs; other alternatives would be on the table. Health care and other 
basic social services might be embraced, or perhaps reshaped and then supported. 
